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ABSTRACT
Network anomaly detection must be automated to meet requirements for real-time,
accurate monitoring in the face of exponentially-growing traffic volumes; however,
this accuracy is often reduced when Gaussian methods are applied to non-Gaussian
network traffic. To improve detection accuracy at requisite low false-alarm rates, we
propose modeling network traffic and detecting anomalies using an entirely non-Gaussian
methodology based on the α-stable distribution and appropriately-derived stable estimators.
Using three publicly-available network traffic traces, we show that the non-Gaussian
stable distribution provides a more accurate traffic model under benign and attack
scenarios, as well as a mixture of these conditions. In this research, we demonstrate
that an α-stable traffic model enables adaptive techniques while significantly reducing
data fit errors. To improve the accuracy of anomaly detection, computationally-efficient,
α-stable -derived location and dispersion estimators are identified and developed. These
estimators are implemented in a novel proof-of-concept, non-parametric, non-Gaussian
detection system based on α-stable principles. The proposed real-time detection system
achieves higher accuracy at a lower error rate than equivalent Gaussian methods and
comparable state-of-the-practice techniques.
v
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Despite billion-dollar businesses dedicated to information security and thousands of pro-
posed solutions, computer network attacks continue to increase in variety and severity.
These attacks can have significant financial impact; more importantly, they threaten the
foundation of the internet by enabling censorship and eroding expectations of reliability,
trust, and security.
Even after decades of efforts to identify and mitigate cyber attacks and the increased
resilience of cloud services, network service providers are unable to consistently defeat one
of the oldest of cyber attacks: denial-of-service (DoS). Nearly 30 years after the first DoS
attack, these types of attacks remain the biggest fear of network service providers and the
second-biggest fear of large organizations, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 [1]. Nearly 20% of
network service providers suffer, on average, more than 30 DoS attacks a day, as shown in
Figure 1.2. Each DoS attack consumes resources and imposes costs (even the attacks that
fail), and the cost of successful DoS attacks doubled between 2016 and 2017 [1].
Figure 1.1. Most severe cyber threats, as perceived by network service
providers in 2017. Adapted from: [1].
Limiting these costs and improving network reliability is the motivation for this work. One
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Figure 1.2. Frequency of DoS attacks observed by network service providers
in 2017. Adapted from: [1].
consensus method of improving network reliability is through faster and more accurate (i.e.,
improved) detection of network anomalies, including DoS attacks. In order to classify a
sample as “anomalous,” one must first define what is normal, or benign. So, while it is
our ultimate goal to improve the status quo of network anomaly detection, we begin with
improving the process of defining and modeling “benign.”
Aspects of network traffic have been known to exhibit non-Poisson and non-Gaussian
behavior for some time [2]–[5]. Depending on the specific feature of network traffic that is
monitored, as well as the window over which the traffic statistics are collected, the resulting
distribution is frequently non-symmetric and heavy-tailed. These are characteristics that a
Gaussian distribution can only approximate with error; however, Gaussian-based modeling
and detection continues to be the de facto implementation used by of the statistical and
machine learning anomaly detection approaches that were reviewed as part of our literature
search ( [6]–[8], among others).
It was demonstrated at the beginning of the decade, using a range of network traffic rates,
that the α-stable distribution can provide a more accurate and flexible fit of network traffic
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than traditionally-used Gaussian distributions and their alternatives [9], [10]. Our review of
the literature, however, identified no follow-on α-stable networking studies that harnessed
this improved approach. Many other fields have used α-stablemodels to improve modeling
accuracy [11], [12], though their adoption has likely been limited by the computational
inefficiencies and complexities that result from the lack of closed-form solutions for (non-
special case) stable distributions [13].
Beyond modeling, previous work in radar and underwater signal detection and localiza-
tion (among other fields) has repeatedly demonstrated that applying stable estimation and
detection algorithms in appropriate, non-Gaussian environments can significantly improve
detector performance [14]–[17]. This concept has also been extended to address the impul-
sive noise environments frequently encountered in wireless communications [18].
Consequently, the precedents that network traffic is frequently α-stable and that stable-
derived detection is more effective in non-Gaussian environments suggest approaching our
goal of improved network anomaly detection through the application of stable methods.
1.1 Objective
The objective of this dissertation is the development of a computationally-tractable (i.e.,
scalable) method that improves the performance of a volumetric network anomaly detection
system by using processes and assumptions based on α-stable distributions. To assess
the accomplishment of this objective, we must construct an entirely stable-based detection
system and quantify the resulting gains.
1.1.1 Design of Approach
The design concept of our approach is shown in Figure 1.3. A comprehensive review of
the literature and preliminary investigation identified key detection processes that could
be revised to improve overall detection system accuracy. The three processes shown in
Figure 1.3 provide the framework for the intended overall approach; investigation of these
areas provided the novel results in this dissertation.
The first system improvement, the focus of Chapter 3, is that the traffic model should reflect
the fundamental nature of the monitored feature. This principle is commonly expressed
3
α-stable model Data-adaptive sampling
Appropriate 
detector
Figure 1.3. Summary of intended approach for reducing errors in statistical
network anomaly detection
in the literature, but less frequently practiced. For instance, many traffic models assume
Gaussian distributions of data [6], [8], but recent work and our results show that the α-
stable distribution more accurately reflects many distributions of network traffic features [9],
[19].
Our second process for improvement (and the focus of the novel work in Chapter 3) is
adaptive data windowing. It is our prediction that, when more flexible and accurate non-
Gaussian distributions are used to model the data, we can further improve overall system
accuracy or response time through tuning the amount of data aggregated (e.g., window or
sub-window size) prior to fitting a distributional model.
The final improvement is that the nature of the signal and noise inputs must be incorporated
into the design of the detector [20]. To elaborate on the importance of this final improve-
ment, the consensus of the literature is that Gaussian modeling and detection performance
degrades greater-than-linearly as the environmental noise grows more impulsive and, thus,
less Gaussian (i.e., the characteristic exponent α of the noise goes from 2→ 0) [21]–[23].
As a result, detectors using stable-derived implementations have been shown to improve
detection or reducing estimation errors by two orders of magnitude in some cases [16], [17],
[22], [24]. Developing non-Gaussian approaches for the detector processes is the focus of
both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
To further focus the research and encourage novel results, we propose the following addi-
tional design restraints.
1.1.2 Implementation Restraints
The first restraint is that the proposed implementation utilize scalable techniques with real-
time potential. This restraint should improve the potential for application of any successful
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solution while also focusing the scope of efforts (i.e., reducing the number of potential
solutions).
The next restraint is that the investigation should consider adaptive techniques to improve
modeling and detection accuracy. This ensures investigation of a relatively unexplored area
of network anomaly detection, as will be discussed in Section 1.2.
We also restrain the system in terms of traffic perspective. The proof-of-concept system
is designed with the assumption that it has an aggregate view of all traffic destined for a
target, such as at the border of a large, single-homed network. It is envisioned that the
developed techniques will ultimately be extensible to volumetric monitoring and detection
within the internet core or even at the borders of smaller networks; however, the detection
system proof-of-concept ultimately assumes that the observed traffic is the sum total of all
traffic that could be classified as benign or attack.
The final restraint is that of the types of anomalies to be investigated. The proposed system
is designed to detect, and assessed against, volumetric DoS attacks that exhaust resources
at or near the target through consuming assets such as transmission bandwidth or open
ports (e.g., the SYN flood attack). Numerous other anomalies such as scans and worms
manifest themselves, at least partly, in a volumetric deviation. While the volumetric changes
from these types of anomalies could conceivably be detected by the proposed system,
discriminating these attacks, particularly at low volumes, requires additional classification
layers that are not part of the implementation proposed in this work.
Now that the motivation and methodology to develop an improved, real-time network
anomaly detection system have been described, it is appropriate to review similar and
alternative approaches in the literature.
1.2 Related Work
There is relatively little precedent for non-Gaussianmethods in the field of statistical network
anomaly detection; our literature review identified significant work by only two research
groups: Scherrer et al. [5] between 2005–2008 and Simmross-Wattenberg et al. [9], [10]
between 2008–2011. Tartakovsky et al. [25]–[28] have investigated more rapid methods
for changepoint detection since the early 2000s. Adaptive network anomaly detection
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techniques have been explored by a few groups, most notably Tartakovsky et al. [25] and
Thottan and Ji [6]. In terms of analysis and handling of α-stable data, Kuruoglu [29]–[31]
explored approximation methods, and Gonzalez et al. [23], [32]–[34] investigated analysis
methods during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
1.2.1 Non-Gaussian Network Anomaly Detection
One of the first significant works applying partially non-Gaussian approaches to network
anomaly detection was by Scherrer et al. [5]. Their approach used gamma distributions
and the auto-regressive fractional integrated moving average (ARFIMA) process to detect
anomalies including flash crowds and DoS attacks. They began their investigation by
validating that the gamma ARFIMA method could adequately model several different
datasets of network traffic as well as flash crowds and injected DoS attacks. They then
measured the trend of maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of the gamma distribution
shape α and rate β parameters at various time scales. By comparing the divergence in
mean quadratic distance between the multi-scale trends of actual and expected α and β,
they found they could differentiate between the benign flash crowd anomaly and the DoS
attack. Specific performance results of their techniques are discussed in Chapter 5.
Our overall methodology borrowed heavily from Scherrer [5]; we validated the performance
of our chosen traffic model using public datasets and in a variety of traffic scenarios,
then proceeded to evaluate the performance of our system (though we did not attempt to
differentiate flash crowds). The details of our implementations are different in that we
used non-parametric estimation and detection methods derived from the stable family of
distributions. Our proof-of-concept methodology was also different. Scherrer injected
Iperf [35] and Trinoo [36] DoS attacks into a proprietary physical network operating at a
low volume (e.g., approximately 2,000 packets per second) [5]; in constructed real time we
detected real-world attacks present in a traffic stream at a typical volume in excess of 100,000
packets per second. Scherrer did not evaluate or demonstrate real-time capabilities [5].
1.2.2 Anomaly Detection Using α-stable Traffic Models
The primary applicable prior α-stable network anomaly detection work is that of Simmross-
Wattenberg et al. [9], [10]. In a similar approach to Scherrer’s, Simmross-Wattenberg
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advanced a non-Gaussian distribution as an improved method of modeling network traf-
fic and then examined its performance in a detection system. They first compared the
performance of the α-stablemodel to alternatives common in the literature using various
proprietary datasets collected on the local university network and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test to evaluate fit. Establishing that the α-stable distribution provided a better model than
the gamma, Gaussian, and Poisson distributions for their examined datasets. They then used
an α-stable -derived generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) to examine the likelihood that
the current traffic sample contained either a flash crowd or DoS attack vice one of a set of
stored, benign α-stable reference windows. Anomalous samples were generated using the
Iperf [35] and JMeter [37] tools at intensities of 10, 25, 50, and 100% of baseline normal
traffic. Simmross-Wattenberg’s GLRT compared the α-stable parameters of both samples
to classify the traffic as attack, flash crowd, or normal and found that the α-stablemethods
usually performed better than both their reproduction of Scherrer’s gamma-based approach
and a logistic regression-based classifier.
As Simmross-Wattenberg’s work was the inspiration and benchmark for our research, our
overall approach was largely adapted from his group’s methodology. We used their val-
idation of the α-stable traffic model as an a priori assumption, i.e., we extended the α-
stablemodel to additional public datasets and evaluated its modeling performance against
additional distributions (e.g., the Weibull and exponential) in a more relaxed manner. Our
approach diverged from their methods in terms of detector design. Though we both use
ML tests, our tests are different in both the applied test statistic and the number of attributes
examined. To facilitate real-time implementation, we use single-valued non-parametric
estimates of representative α-stable attributes vice a four-parameter α-stableML fit of the
sample [10]. Also, our system holds and analyzes only the most recent benign prior sam-
ple, while their implementation requires pre-processing and storage of a year of benign
samples [10]. We constructively establish the real-time potential of our system and also
examine the effects of aggregation period on model fit error; Simmross-Wattenberg’s re-
search used a fixed window size and off-line processing [10]. Finally, while both studies
examine detection performance using similar percentage changes in network traffic volume
due to attacks, our proof-of-concept detects real-world attacks at a traffic rate of 1.0 gigabit
per second (Gbps) vice injected attacks at a traffic rate below 0.07 Gbps [10]. Note that the
performance of Simmross-Wattenberg’s system, as well as that of selected peer studies, is
7
partially summarized and compared in Chapter 5.
1.2.3 Rapid Changepoint Detection
A primary focus of Tartakovsky et al. has been improving rapid changepoint detection of
network anomalies [25]–[28]. The first cited work is the most applicable to our methods and
is the focus of our comparison. Tartakovsky developed an online, multi-feature method that
sequentially examines received traffic, categorizing it by type of packet and size as well as
certain other properties. Attacks are detected based on a change in the mean of estimators
based on features selected to discriminate certain types of DoS attacks. Their solution is
adaptive in a constant false alarm rate (CFAR) sense, varying the detection threshold to
maintain a specified false alarm rate (FAR), with the ultimate objective of shortening the
time until detection. Using a complete simulation, they compared the performance of their
algorithm to that of the common exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) and
cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithms in terms of FAR and detection delay. Because of
their significantly different objectives and methodology, their performance results are not
comparable and are not discussed.
Similar to Tartakovsky’s group [26], our approach is a non-parametric changepoint detection
method. The remainder of our methodology differs substantially. Their use of the sample
mean as an estimator of traffic features [26] may produce unreliable measurements, as
explored in Chapter 3. The comparable attribute between our approaches worth identifying
is that of adaptive methods. Tartakovsky’s approach focused on varying the threshold
to maintain a CFAR [26], an approach that inevitably sacrifices detections, while our
exploration of adaptive methods focuses on optimizing window and sub-window size to
improve absolute performance.
1.2.4 Adaptive Network Anomaly Detection
Our review of the literature identified few additional adaptive network anomaly detection
techniques other than that of Thottan and Ji [6]. They developed a multi-feature GLRT
detector to identify network anomalies based on changes in the correlation of the features.
Specifically, their detection features included in- and out-bytes, datagrams, and acknowl-
edgements collected at 15-s intervals. Applying a first-order auto-regressive model, they
used mean, variance, and co-variance of 2.5 minute feature vectors to identify anomalous
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trends and subsequently test whether that trend fell outside error bounds. They evaluated
their system using a physical, two-router, 7-subnet departmental network and validated
performance by comparing system alerts to logs of native network faults. The adaptive
methods in Thottan and Ji’s approach appear to be made in terms of adapting the thresholds
to maintain a low FAR, though no algorithm for adaptation is presented.
Again, our approach differs from Thottan and Ji’s [6] in substantial ways that have been
previously discussed. In addition to bounding the state of the practice in terms of adaptive
network anomaly detection techniques, Thottan and Ji’s work was interesting because they
were authors of one of the first papers we reviewed that, while specifically acknowledging
non-Gaussian trends in their data, categorized the incurred error that resulted fromGaussian
modeling as acceptable [6]. Repeated encounters with this practice during our literature
review encouraged our investigation of non-Gaussian anomaly detection methods and de-
velopment of the term avoidable errors to describe errors incurred from applying Gaussian
distributions to non-Gaussian processes.
1.2.5 Approximation of α-stableDistributions
Kuruoglu’swork establishedmuchof the theoretical basis for approximatingα-stable distributions
using varieties of computationally-tractable alternatives including Gaussian and Lévy dis-
tributions [29], [30]. His 2003 work showed that it is possible to approximate a positive
α-stable (PaS) distribution (defined by having α ∈ (0, 1)) with a finite sum of Lévy distri-
butions. His methodology is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Our research initially intended to apply Kuruoglu’s methods as the basis for our traffic
models because of the perceived computational efficiency that would result from a finite,
closed-form model. As part of this investigation, we incrementally extended Kuruoglu’s
work to an actual network traffic dataset, developing written and MATLAB algorithms for
part of the range of the PaS distribution [30]. For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the
development of this approach stopped, however, when exploration of higher-volume traffic
datasets identified that this methodology was not extensible to the majority of our datasets
and would limit the applicability and flexibility of the proposed system.
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1.2.6 Zero Order Statistics
Gonzalez and Arce explored stable-based estimation in the late 1990s, developing a new
family of robust estimators designed specifically for heavy-tailed data [23], [32]–[34],
among others. Their initial method, the myriad, uses a formula derived from the stable
special-case Cauchy distribution. Their subsequent efforts developed a family of Gaussian-
equivalent estimators, zero-order statistics (ZOS), which provide non-Gaussian alternatives
for estimation of location, dispersion, and power.
Our literature review identified that these ZOS estimators have not been previously applied
in network anomaly detection and remain largely unapplied outside of the developing
research group. We utilize two ZOS estimators, specifically zero-order location (ZOL) and
an adaptation of zero-order dispersion (ZOD), in our proof-of-concept detection system
and demonstrate their superior performance as compared to Gaussian equivalents. We
also adapted their methodology to develop our novel, heavy-tailed estimator, the Lévy
location estimate (LLE) (discussed in Chapter 4). We have only completed a preliminary
investigation of LLE performance, but to date it seems to be largely equivalent to their stable-
derived myriad and ZOL. We have not completed evaluation of their power estimator and
its potential for network anomaly detection; detailed examination of its performance as well
as that of the LLE are items of future work.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Technical topics that are foundational to our
approach that would disturb the narration of our methodology and results are contained in
Chapter 2.
A roadmap for the remainder of this dissertation, beginning with our exploration of the
applicability of the α-stable traffic model and the adaptive techniques it enables, is given
in Figure 1.3. This discussion, and a quantification of the resulting reduction in modeling
error, is contained in Chapter 3.
After validating the applicability of the α-stablemodel to three datasets and four traf-
fic scenarios, we derive and develop methods of both approximating and estimating α-
stable distributions in Chapter 4, including our novel LLE. In this chapter, we also compare
the accuracy of the developed estimators.
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The design of the end-to-end detection system, proof-of-concept implementation method-
ology, and system performance results are discussed in Chapter 5. We show that the
α-stable approach to network anomaly detection improves detection rates by 3–8% over
Gaussian methodologies at a fixed FAR ≤ 1%. We also show that our adapted ZOS esti-
mate of dispersion exhibits 99.96% detection rates at lower FARs than Gaussian methods.
Finally, the results in this chapter constructively demonstrate the real-time potential of our
implemented detection system.
The overall methodology and the results of Chapters 3–5 are summarized in Chapter 6,
along with contributions and recommendations for future work.
The proof-of-concept detection system code used to obtain the results in this dissertation
are contained in the Appendix.
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In this chapter, there are no results or arguments that are fundamental to the objective of this
work; instead, technical background and implementation details that support the arguments
and conclusions in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are provided. The reader may choose to skip this
chapter entirely, referencing topics based upon discussion in subsequent chapters, or skim
the topics addressed here in order to ensure familiarity with our methodology.
We first review terms in this work to which we may ascribe meanings different than those in
common usage or that may have varying definitions depending on the field of application.
We then provide background on the α-stable distribution and the stable family as a whole,
including definitions, descriptions of the four stable parameters, and special cases. Methods
applicable to our modeling and estimation work, such as ML, log likelihood (LL), and
distance measurements are described next. We conclude with an overview of the evaluation
methodology for our detection system, defining important measures and describing the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC).
2.1 Terminology
Let us begin with terminology. Certain terms used throughout this dissertation may have
common or alternate meanings different from our intended purposes. We clarify their usage
in this dissertation as follows:
• sample refers to a data window of network traffic vice probabilistic collection of data.
• .pcap refers to a network traffic capture computer file obtained using the Wireshark
family of network monitoring tools [38].
• trace refers to a network traffic capture collected via any method.
• scenario refers to a type of traffic (e.g., attack, normal, or transition) as discussed in
Chapter 3.
• normal refers to regular or benign (i.e., absence of an attack) traffic vice the Gaussian
distribution. We will endeavor to always use the term Gaussian when referring to
that statistical distribution of data.
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• window(s) refers to the collection period, in seconds, of a data sample and is defined
in Chapter 3.
• attack traffic, unless described otherwise, refers to dataset samples that contain attack
packets mixed with benign background traffic. Unless otherwise specified, this term
does not refer to traffic samples that exclusively consist of attack packets (i.e., samples
where all benign traffic was removed).
• lightweight refers to a method that incurs relatively little computational cost and
possesses the potential for real-time application using commodity hardware.
• DoS is used generally to include both non-distributed and distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks.
Note that Wireshark® [38], Windows®, Python®, MATLAB® [39], and STABLE® [13] are
all reserved titles of software applications. The displayed format will only be used when
referring to the given software application, and these terms are reserved for their rightful
owners regardless of the use of the ® symbol. Note that uppercase “Windows” refers to
the software, while “window” and “windows” refer to the length in seconds of the data
sample(s).
2.2 The Stable Distribution
The objective of this work is to examine modeling and detection gains that can be achieved
through selective application of the α-stable distribution and associated methods vice the
frequently-used Gaussian; thus, background on the stable distribution is essential to explain
why our methodology may be advantageous.
Stable distributions were originally developed in the 1920s by Lévy and Khinchine [40] and
were first popularly applied to financial analysis and forecasting in the 1960s by Mandelbrot
[41]. Stable distributions have been applied to improve the accuracy of modeling random
processes that exhibit non-Gaussian behavior across a significant body of work in fields
as varied as finance, signal processing (including radar, sonar, and wireless noise), animal
behavior, and geologic processes [11], [14], [15]. Stable methods are de facto standard for
financial modeling of appropriate asset classes as well as risk assessment [42].
The family of stable distributions is also referred to in the literature as Lévy stable, Pareto
stable (or Paretian), and α-stable. In this work, we use stable to refer to the family, Lévy
14
to refer to the special case, and α-stable to refer to stable distributions that are not special
cases. Extensive background and theory regarding stable distributions are available in [40]
and [41], among others. We now review the theoretical aspects of stable distributions that
are necessary to understand the applications in this work.
2.2.1 Definition
Special cases of the stable family include the Cauchy, Gaussian (or normal) distribution,
and the Lévy (or Pearson V) distributions. Except for these special cases, a closed-form
solution for the probability density function (PDF) of an α-stable random variable (RV)










































for α = 1.
2.2.2 Parameters
The α-stable distribution exhibits tremendous flexibility as a model because it is described
by four parameters: α, β, γ, µ. For the purposes of this work, the parameter values of
α-stable RV Z are specified using the form S(α, β, γ, µ). These parameters and some of
their properties are listed in Table 2.1 and described in more detail below.
Table 2.1. Parameters of the α-stable distribution. Source: [20].
Parameter Property Range
α Tail size (0, 2]




The characteristic exponent α controls the tail size of the distribution and, thus, affects the
height of the peak as well [41]. A very small α leads to a heavier tail and a very narrow
distribution as shown in Figure 2.1.














Figure 2.1. Effect of varying α on PDF peak height and tail size. Adapted
from: [41].
The skew of the distribution is given by β and is reflected in the placement of the heavy
(infinite) tail. Values of β ∈ (0, 1] place the tail towards +∞. Assigning the opposite value
to β reflects the distribution across the origin. For β = 0, the distribution is symmetric,
such as for the Cauchy or Gaussian distributions. (For the Gaussian case convention assigns
a value of zero, though technically β is undefined [40]).
The scale parameter γ specifies the dispersion of the distribution, which is roughly equiva-
lent to the Gaussian concept of variance [41]. Large values of γ result in a wider distribution
with a lower rate of change around the mode.
The shift parameter µ influences the placement of the distribution; it is roughly equivalent
to Gaussian mean. The shift parameter µ does not specify the mode of the distribution in
the zero parameterization; its location must be numerically determined [41].
16
These parameters can fundamentally alter the shape and support of the distribution, permit-
ting very expressive data models. Some representative stable PDFs for various parameter
combinations are shown in the probability density plot of Figure 2.2.











  = 0.9,  = +1,  = 4,    = 20
  = 1.4,  = +1,  = 10,  = 30
  = 1.6,  = -1,   = 8,    = 60
  = 1.9,  = +1,  = 3,    = 45
Figure 2.2. Distribution of Z for varying values of its parameters
The function values of a stable distribution are affected by the parameterization used to
define the characteristic functions in (2.1) and (2.2). Unless otherwise specified, all figures
and results in this work were determined using the zero parameterization as defined by
Nolan [41]. When a stable distribution is defined in the manner given above, µ and γ can
be considered shift and scale parameters [41] such that
Z − µ
γ
∼ S(α, β, 1, 0). (2.3)
The zero parameterization is used by MATLAB, as all parameters are continuously-defined
[41]. The other implications of the various parameterizations historically used to define
stable distributions and their effects on the values of the distribution are beyond the scope of
this work; the interested reader is referred to [40] and [41] as well as their original sources.
Let us now discuss the special cases of the stable distribution, as all of these cases are
utilized in this work.
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2.2.3 Special Cases of the Stable Distribution
As previously discussed, for certain values of the characteristic exponent α, the stable
distribution can be defined using a closed-form solution; these are the special cases of the
stable family.
The Lévy special case corresponds to α = 0.5, is wholly-skewed (i.e., one-sided), and has






(z − µZ )3/2
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Note that the closed-formσZ in (2.6) does not correspond to the stable characteristic function
parameter value of γZ [40].
The PDFs of these special cases are shown in Figure 2.3, for γZ = σ2Z = 1 and µZ = 0.
Notice the differences in tail size between the special cases; the implications are significant
and are examined in more detail in Chapter 4. In short, the Gaussian has an exponential
tail that decays much more rapidly than the Cauchy and Lévy cases, which possess an
α-stable power-law (or heavy) tail.
The Lévy and Cauchy cases, in particular the Cauchy, have been repeatedly used to provide
improved, non-Gaussian solutions to modeling and detection problems, particularly in
wireless communications, radar, and underwater detection problems [17], [18], [43].
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 Gaussian:  = 2
 Cauchy:     = 1
 Levy:          = 0.5
Figure 2.3. Comparison of form and tail of PDFs of the three special case
stable distributions. Adapted from: [41].
.
2.2.4 Constraints of Stable Distributions
In this section, we elaborate on the stable properties and constraints already discussed in
Section 2.2.2. Two constraints are of particular concern:
1. Summation constraint: A simple formula for the sum of two α-stable RVs X and
Y only exists when the characteristic exponents of the summands are equal, i.e.,
αX = αY [41].
2. Constraint on higher order moments: Only moments of order p such that p < α are
finite [41].
The summation constraint is pertinent to ourwork because network traffic is the sumofmany
stable-distributed processes characterized by many different values of α. There is, thus,
no simple way to mathematically deconstruct streams of traffic from a single, monitored
α-stable trace.
During the data analysis performed for this dissertation, we have observed α ∈ [0.3, 2]
depending on aggregation period and network traffic dataset. The implication of the mo-
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ment constraint, combined with our observations, is that traditional first and second-order
moments from Gaussian processes (i.e., mean for p = 1 and power for p = 2) cannot
be assumed by default to exist for α-stable processes (to use, for instance, in a detection
system).
Given these definitions and constraints, we now describe our approach for modeling network
traffic using the stable distribution.
2.3 Modeling the Data: Maximum Likelihood Estimation
and Log Likelihood
Our selected approach, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), has a venerable history in
applied signal processing and is a-parametric in that the principles can be applied to any
data set once a distribution model is chosen a priori. Additionally, the asymptotic efficiency
of the MLE approaches optimum for sufficiently large data records [44].
Other estimators that may be more accurate in certain cases, specifically minimum variance,
cannot be applied to our model in all cases because of the moment-order constraint (MOC)
(per Section 2.2.4) and because the minimization techniques require assumptions regarding
the distribution of residual errors that may not be appropriate. These constraints are typical
of minimum variance estimation, and as a result, most implemented estimators use the ML
method [44].
2.3.1 MLE
Let us now examine MLE as applied in this research. The MLE method maximizes the fit
of a chosen distribution to a set of probabilistic data di.
For the purposes of this dissertation, assume di is an independent random sample of data
generated by α-stable process Z over a finite period of time, the data window $i.












where θZ are the unknown parameters (α, β, γ, µ) of f (z).




fZ (zi; θZ ). (2.8)
Now assume we wish to estimate the unknown θZ using the known sample di, equivalent
to our repeated observations of z.
Over the range of potential values of θZ , the likelihood of obtaining the sample di for a




fZ (θZ ; di). (2.9)
Our MLE of Z can then be defined as the values of θ that maximize (2.9) [44], or




fZ (θZ ; di) (2.10)
To avoid exceeding floating point constraints, without changing the result we can take the
natural logarithm of (2.10) to obtain the LL MLE per




ln fZ ((θZ ; di). (2.11)
We use both forms of MLE in this work, though generally we use (2.10) for theory and
apply (2.11) in our algorithms.
In summary, for specific data window $i, θ̂ML =
(
α̂Z, β̂Z, γ̂Z, µ̂Z
)
represents the best
estimated stable fit to the data di. The MLE stable parameter vector θ̂ML is determined by
MATLAB as part of the fitting and estimation routines of the distributionFitter tool [39].
This is the tool that we used to produce many of our ML distribution fits, or “best fits.”
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STABLE provides an alternative, proprietary ML routine for fitting stable distributions to
data [13]. Based on thematurity of STABLE, thisML routine was used to produce all results
that exclusively use parametric stable fits (such as trends in α-stable parameters) and the
majority of results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The MATLAB ML routines and estimates
were used to produce the results in Chapter 3, which compare the modeling performance of
various distributions as well as most figures (for ease-of-use purposes). MATLAB routines
were also used to evaluate the fits of Lévy mixture approximation (LMA) methods, as these
results are not central to the estimation and detection contributions of this work.
Empirically, the MATLAB stable tools provide similar results to those obtained from STA-
BLE. The one noted exception is that when α approaches its limits of (0, 2]. Convergence
of numerical estimation routines is a known issue that is well-documented in the literature
for values of α < 0.4 [13], [45], and this can lead to MATLAB and STABLE ML estimates
of θZ that differ non-trivially. Some minor convergence differences also appear to occur
at α values very close to 2, likely due to accuracy thresholds within the algorithms, and
these differences usually only apply to the returned value of β. Given these statements,
however, it is important to note that nearly all data samples across all datasets fell in a range
of α ∈ [0.4, 2]; as such, these convergence issues did not substantially affect our work or
results.
The MLE method described above is used when a sample is known (or assumed) to follow
a distribution a priori. When faced with a sample that originates from a random process
following an unknown distribution, ML estimates of best fit can be obtained using multiple
candidate distributions. The LL can be used to quantify which candidate distribution is
most likely to have produced a given sample.
2.3.2 Log Likelihood
The LL value can be obtained after using the MLE algorithm to estimate the unknown
parameters θ of a distribution. This is the “best fit,” or the specific parameter values that
are most likely to have produced a known data series z.
The likelihood function of the data ϕ(θ̂), given these estimated parameters, can be defined
in terms of the product of the probability of observing each individual value in z for θ̂ such
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that
ϕ(θ̂) = f (z1; θ̂) × ... × f (zn; θ̂) =
M∏
i=1
f (z; θ̂) (2.12)
for integer i ∈ [1, M] [46].
Note that the final term of (2.12) is very similar to our method for determining θ̂ in (2.8).
By taking the natural logarithm of both sides of (2.12), we obtain the LL of our ML-based




ln f (z; θ̂) (2.13)
where z can be seen to be equivalent to our data sample di.
Our work in Section 3.4 uses multiple traffic scenarios from multiple network datasets to
determine the most appropriate distributional model for each dataset; these scenarios and
datasets are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. We processed these samples using native
MATLAB functions to fit various distributions to each filtered trace and used the LL value
of the ML MATLAB fit to compare fits for each scenario and dataset.
Our method was adopted from the literature, which frequently uses LL to compare various
ML best fits and determine which distribution provides the most accurate fit to a sample
originating from an unknown distribution [46]; however, the nature of the LL prevents it
from being a preferred metric for comparing distributional fit across samples of different
sizes because the LL can be seen in (2.13) to be the result of a sum and, as such, is dependent
on sample size. An alternative to the LL is, thus, required to enable this type of comparison.
2.4 Measuring Model Fit
We decided to compare fits, or determine fit error, by measuring the distance between the
sample histogram and the best fit model of the sample (i.e., best fit distribution to the
sample).
The literature contains many methods for calculating this distance (i.e., similarity, dis-
similarity, divergence) between data and the closest statistical approximation [47], [48].
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For comparison and assessment purposes, we initially used three methods to measure this
distance, and we now briefly review their formulae and important considerations for our
applications. An interested reader is referred to the cited references for more in-depth
derivation and analysis.
2.4.1 Kullback-Leibler Divergence
The Kullback-Leibler divergence is an entropy-based measure that is frequently used to
quantify the divergence between one probability distribution (e.g., the ML fit to a data
sample) and a second, expected distribution [47]. Its formula [47] is given by
dKL
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where for our purposes fZ (z j) and f̂Z (z j) are the reference distribution and ML approxi-
mation, respectively, sampled at points j ∈ [1, M] that correspond to the mid-points of the
sample histogram bins.
2.4.2 Hellinger Metric
A frequently-used alternative to the Kullback-Leibler divergence in information-theoretic
approaches is the Hellinger metric [47]. We define the average Hellinger distance [47] as
dHel
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Our final distance measure is the Canberra distance, more frequently used in clustering and
machine learning applications [47]. The Canberra distance was chosen to provide diversity
and enable comparison of trends from (2.15) and (2.14) relative to an independent third
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. (2.16)
2.4.4 Preferred Distance Measure
After comparing the measures quantitatively for consistency, as well as comparing the
quantitative measurements to the visual fits, we chose to quantify the fit results in this
dissertation using the average Hellinger distance. We use average Hellinger distance to
measure of the absolute error of fit because (2.15) does not generate positive and negative
terms that can offset accumulated error during summation, as compared to Kullback-Leibler
divergence. Our formula in (2.15) is a normalized version of the standard Hellinger metric
to facilitate comparison between scenarios.
Now that the methodology for evaluating and quantifying the performance of our α-
stable network traffic model has been established, let us describe our methods for evaluating
the performance of our detection system.
2.5 Measuring System Performance
The proposed end-to-end detection implementation begins with traffic samples that are
extracted from network traffic capture files, or .pcaps, and finishes with an anomaly score,
as determined by the test statistic. After extracting thousands of both benign and attack
traffic samples from the chosen datasets, the samples are applied to test statistics, and the
cumulative system performance is evaluated using a ROC curve, or more typically, ROC.
2.5.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
A ROC is a commonly-used evaluation method for binary classification (e.g., detection)
systems; it summarizes system performance for a set of data by showing the trade-off
between true positives and false positives as a function of a given threshold value [49].
For a given population of attack NA and benign NB samples that are labeled appropriately,
we can define ntp as the number of attack samples that the detector properly classifies, and
n f p as the number of benign samples that are improperly classified as attack samples. We
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where the numerator and denominator are based on counts of the labeled input data.
Similarly, the false positive rate (FPR) P f a is defined as




These equations only give one point on the curve for each detection threshold τ, where Pd
is plotted on the vertical axis and the FPR P f a is plotted on the horizontal. To develop a full
curve, the detection threshold must be varied over the range of the input data, which permits
plotting the curve as a series of points given by (Pd,i, P f a,i) for all evaluated thresholds τi.
An example ROC developed in this manner is shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4. Example ROC and curves
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The resulting shape of the plot provides a comparison to a random classification detector,
given by the dashed curve between points (0, 0) and (1, 1). A detection system that plots
below this straight line has worse performance than a random classifier, while the best
detector is generally given by the curve closest to the point (0, 1) in the upper left of the plot.
The ROC is typically used to compare two or more detectors or approaches (e.g., Curves
1 and 2 in Figure 2.4). The area under the curve (AUC) metric is also used to provide a
condensed measure of detector performance and allows quantitative comparison to other
schemes. AUC is determined by numerically determining the area under a given ROC curve.
The detector with the largest AUC is often considered to be the best, but the assessment
of “best” is also frequently determined by implementation objectives such as the highest
performance for a maximum P f a(as is seen in CFAR detection implementations).
Now that we have described how to evaluate the results of a detection system, we conclude
this section with a description of our methodology for obtaining detection results from our
end-to-end design and input data samples.
2.5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
Given input data samples, or for our implementation estimates of these data samples, our
detector compares the current sample to a prior reference sample and measures the resulting
change. This is done using a specific estimator and test statistic and is discussed in Chapter 4.
The measured change is compared to a threshold τ and an attack “declared” if the change
exceeds τ.
If we wish to robustly assess the performance of our detection system, a problem arises
with our approach due to the limited set of input samples. The shortage of real-life,
labeled, and recent datasets for network anomaly detector testing is a widely-acknowledged
difficulty [50], [51]. This is one of the primary reasons we selected the specific datasets
described in Chapter 3. Even our primary dataset has drawbacks consistent with the
literature: traces constrained to a maximum 15 minutes of length and attack and benign
traffic periods of uncertain duration. To make our evaluation as robust as possible given
our input data constraints (which are detailed in Chapter 5), we obtained our results using
the Monte Carlo method of probabilistic evaluation.
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Monte Carlo analysis has a proven history of performance in areas where solutions are
difficult to evaluate deterministically [52]. We believe that evaluation of detection systems
based on non-closed form α-stablemodels is one such area. We now describe one of our




































1. Select Benign Prior case
2. Select 1/0:
- If 1, select Attack case
- If 0, compare to 
following Benign case
Figure 2.5. Illustration of the Monte Carlo approach for obtaining results
Our method uses data pools of labeled attack and benign samples; for our purposes, attack
samples are labeled as 1 and benign samples are 0. Additionally, each sample is labeled in
its sequential order of collection.
For T iterations, the algorithm randomly selects one of the benign samples (the benign
prior reference case) and a 1 or 0 to determine the type of scenario. If “attack” is chosen,
a random attack sample is selected; else the benign sample subsequent to the reference is
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selected. Both are then sent to the detector, which compares them using a pre-assigned test
statistic from Chapter 5.
Our Monte Carlo algorithm outputs a results record consisting of T rows and two columns.
The columns contain the output of the test statistic and label for the randomly-selected
scenario. This record can then be evaluated by MATLAB algorithms to develop a ROC for
the given test statistic, as described in the previous section.
2.6 Summary
A review of foundational technical topics that support the research described in this work
was given in this chapter. These topics include the stable distribution, used for our non-
Gaussian traffic model. MLE+, and measurement techniques such as LL and the Hellinger
metric, are used to fit the α-stable distribution to histograms of network traffic features
and measure the resulting divergence between the model and data. Finally, the end-to-end
system performance measurement tools of Monte Carlo analysis and ROCs were reviewed.
The remainder of this work focuses on novel methodologies and results.
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The overall approach of the next chapters follows that of our error reduction framework
from Chapter 1. An enhanced version of this framework, developed during our search of
the anomaly detection literature, is shown in Figure 3.1 and includes the interactions and



















Figure 3.1. Model of detection processes and interactions affecting system
accuracy. Adapted from: [20].
The cascading nature of avoidable errors is illustrated in Figure 3.1; these interactions
suggest that small improvements in initial processes could yield significant results [20].
Investigation of these α-stable process innovations and their interactions is the subject of
the remainder of this dissertation. In this chapter, we examine the four elements in the left
half of Figure 3.1, while estimation error and detection algorithms are explored in Chapter 4
and the cumulative accuracy improvements are the subject of Chapter 5.
Specifically, the discussion in this chapter extends previous work [9], [10] by examining
the α-stablemodel against a range of publicly-available network traffic datasets and traffic
scenarios. After reviewing the prior work, we examine our three examined datasets for
suitability and demonstrate that the traffic in each follows an α-stable vice Gaussian (or
other) model. The α-stablemodel is shown to apply most frequently and independent of
aggregation period or link conditions (e.g., benign background, attack, or high-volume
background processes). Finally, the results demonstrate that use of an α-stablemodel, as
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opposed to the next-best performing Gaussian, permits optimizing sub-window and window
size to reduce system response time without sacrificing accuracy.
3.1 Non-Gaussian Traffic Models: Prior Work
The Poisson and Gaussian distributions were among the first used to model network traffic,
and their limitations have long been identified [2], [3], [14]. Common features of network
traffic such as byte and packet count, as well as connection time and delays, have been
previously shown to be asymmetric and heavy-tailed [3]. Additionally, α-stablemodels
have been used repeatedly to improve models of the wireless networking environment,
including noise and delay time [18], [24], [53].
The works cited in the previous paragraph are part of the long history of non-Gaussian,
non-Poisson network traffic models that have been examined since the mid-1990s. Non-
Gaussian network anomaly detection, on the other hand, has relatively limited exploration
in the literature. Studies frequently utilize the Gaussian model for simplicity or speed, at
times noting the non-Gaussian reality while accepting these avoidable errors [6].
3.1.1 Non-Gaussian Methods Using the Gamma Distribution
The gamma distribution appears to have been first applied in a detection system in 2007,
where a gamma-ARFIMA model was applied in a change-point detector to differentiate
between flash crowds and two DoS attacks [5]. The gamma distribution was shown to
provide a good fit to the marginal distribution of packet rate, but the overall detection
system performance, as recorded in Table 3.1, varies dramatically depending on the volume
and type of the attack. Additionally, the accuracy was low in some scenarios, even for the
relatively high fixed P f a of 10 and 20%.
Note that each case in Figure 3.1 differs from the other attacks in terms of volume or attack
packet size. Only selected cases are displayed in this table; for additional cases or details
regarding the differences between attacks, the reader is referred to the source [5].
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Table 3.1. Performance results from selected cases of a gamma-derived DoS






P f a = 10%
Pd at
P f a = 20%
Trinoo tT 82.9 82 82
Trinoo tN 15.2 54 54
Iperf R 33.8 91 93
Iperf V 39.3 18 40
Iperf III 21.5 48 58
3.1.2 Non-Gaussian Methods Using the α-stableDistribution
The first (and only) α-stable -based network trafficmodel appears in the literature in 2008 [9]
and was then used in a detection system in 2011 [10]. This work applied a GLRT-based
algorithm that detected DoS attacks by comparing the current window to a stored, historical
reference sample from the previous year [10].
As part of their detection system, Simmross-Wattenberg et al. examined benign network
traces at volumes between 0.034 and 66Mbps collected at their university (and not publicly-
available) [9]. Our work broadens their validation of the α-stable traffic model to include
multiple types of traffic (e.g., benign, noisy, and attack) from three different, public datasets.
We first discuss the examined datasets and traffic environments, then proceed to our results.
3.2 Datasets
Three unique sources of data were examined in this work. Detailed discussion of dataset
attributes is contained in the corresponding sub-section, and their individual characteristics
are summarized in Table 3.2. Different portions of each dataset were analyzed and clas-
sified into one of four potential traffic scenarios: attack, benign, transition, and noisy. A
visual example of the packet rate fluctuations corresponding to these scenarios is shown
in Figure 3.2, which was developed by measuring packets per sub-window over time for
the beginning of the Measurement and Analysis on the Wide Internet (MAWI) 20151115
trace. The terms attack, benign, transition, and noisy are used throughout the remainder of
this work to describe equivalent scenarios. If pertinent to the discussion, the percentage of
attack traffic in a transition scenario is stated.
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Figure 3.2. Visual characterization of four different network traffic scenarios
based on packet volume
Note that our analysis only classified traffic samples as attack if labeled as such by the dataset
originator or if confirmed by analysis in Wireshark. We now discuss key characteristics of
the three datasets.
3.2.1 Primary Data Source: MAWI
The MAWI archive (or dataset) consists of numerous 15-minute .pcap traces collected once
per day from a backbone link operating at a rate of approximately one Gbps [54]. Each
trace is typically 8–10 gigabytes in size and includes anonymized, truncated copies of
each packet crossing the trans-Pacific backbone link between Japan and the United States
between 14:00 and 14:15 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). After collection, each trace was
subsequently processed by an ensemble of four different machine learning algorithms; the
MAWI algorithms produced graphical and written summaries of major detected anomalies
[54].
Since the MAWI connection serves as a real-world backbone link, MAWI traces are one of
the most realistic, publicly-available data sources. The partial labeling of the archived traces
assists in identifying interesting anomalies for subsequent in-depth analysis. The traffic
mix itself contains varying percentages of benign background traffic, attacks including
multiple varieties of DoS, and automated process traffic (e.g., scans). Because of the link
characteristics and variety of traffic, we determined that MAWI data was the most realistic
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and, thus, “best” data source for validating our modeling and detection methods.
To select appropriate traces for both purposes, we began by examining the trace summaries
for possible DoS attacks of appropriate volume and duration. We then used Wireshark to
examine packet headers in the candidate traces, positively classifying high-volume flows as
anomalous based on common attack indicators such as TransmissionControl Protocol (TCP)
flags; packet size, internet protocol (IP) address, or port distributions; and bi-directional
flow characteristics.
This analysis identified three specific traces of interest for our work, .pcaps from 14 and 15
November 2015 and 28 April 2016. These traces are referred to as 20151114, 20151115,
and 20160428, respectively. The 20151114 and 20151115 traces contain benign periods
with a periodic, high-volume DoS attack, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. For our purposes,
these are high volume attacks, as the additional attack traffic volume roughly equals the
benign traffic volume observed during the OFF periods of the attack.
The 20160428 trace was selected to test the ability of our detection system to identify
a low volume attack; the magnitude of this anomaly varies between 15–30% of benign
background and can be seen in Figure 5.4. As detailed discussion of the attack specifics
is more appropriate for Chapter 5, we now briefly describe the other datasets we used to
extend the prior work in α-stable traffic modeling and validate our approach.
3.2.2 ISCX
The Information Security Center of Excellence (ISCX) dataset was produced by the Uni-
versity of New Brunswick and contains whole-day .pcaps of artificially-generated traffic on
a physical network [55]. Two days of traffic from this dataset were analyzed. The 14 June
dataset contains only benign network traffic produced by automated agents running on the
hosts in the physical test-bed network shown in Figure 3.3. During the 15 June dataset,
two types of DoS attacks are launched from compromised hosts on the network. The
high-volume attack is a typical SYN-flood, while the low-volume attack uses the slowloris
script [56].
The ISCX trace was minimally analyzed and not used at all in our detection work due to the
small size and relatively low packet volume of the network. This small link rate required
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Figure 3.3. Network topology used to create the ISCX dataset. Adapted
from: [56].
large data windows (on the order of 300 seconds) and still produced many zero-packet
count sub-windows that made modeling the benign and attack traffic difficult, regardless of
distribution.
3.2.3 MACCDC
The Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber-Defense Competition (MACCDC) dataset contains
.pcap captures of all traffic on the network during a network defense competition [57].
During this competition, competitors must upgrade and maintain vital network services on
a business-style local network containing 10-20 hosts and servers, while an independent
red team attempts to infiltrate and disable their network. As such, the dataset contains
semi-realistic background network traffic as well as a large amount of reconnaissance and
exploitation traffic.
A typical local network “spoke” of the overall competition network is shown in Figure 3.4.
Based on our analysis, the datasets appear to be obtained from the “hub” router that connects
each spoke and the red team.
The MACCDC traces were also minimally analyzed, primarily because the large volume
of malicious traffic appeared to create traffic distributions that were very different from
the distributions available in the ISCX and MAWI traces; the MACCDC packet volume
histograms were very flat as compared to those obtained from the other analyzed datasets
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Figure 3.4. MACCDC dataset local network topology. Adapted from: [58].
and also different from benchmarks in the literature [5], [9]. Furthermore, the traces were
unlabeled and relatively short in terms of time, frequently varying between eight and 20
minutes, which made it difficult to classify and separate attack and benign trace portions
into usable numbers of samples for our detection system.
Accordingly, after initial analysis both the MACCDC and ISCX datasets were used to
demonstrate the versatility of the α-stable distribution as a traffic model rather than as data
sources for our detection system. The real-life traffic and high link rate characteristics of
the MAWI datasets made these traces our choice to validate the detection system described
in Chapter 5.
Note that “Average Volume” in Table 3.2 was calculated by dividing the total trace size, in
packets, by the trace duration, in seconds.
3.3 Data Considerations
Before we examine our methodology for exploring the α-stable traffic model, we review
some preliminary traffic collection concepts that facilitate understanding of the results in
the following sections.
3.3.1 Data Aggregation
Throughout this work, we refer to the length of a data sample (in seconds) as the data
window, or simply window $. A window is comprised of M counting periods, or sub-
windows ∆sw . The size of $ and ∆sw are related by
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Table 3.2. Characteristics of examined datasets
Name PhysicalNetwork
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M = $/∆sw, (3.1)
where
$ = [tstop − tstart], (3.2)
and tstart and tstop are the start and stop times of the data processing window, respectively.
Note that this research uses $ ∈ [1, 6] s and ∆sw ∈ [1, 10] ms for the vast majority of
quantitative as well as empirical trace analysis, with the exception of the initial model
exploration and LL quantification in Table 3.3.
It is interesting that $ and ∆sw lengths are seldom discussed in the literature. Two of the
few direct comparisons are available from the previous non-Gaussian anomaly detection
works discussed in Chapter 1. The α-stable detection system uses ∆sw = 5.0 s and $ = 30
minutes [9]. The gamma-based anomaly detection work used values for ∆sw ∈ [1, 1000]
ms and $ = 1 minute [5]. Aside from these studies, we have been unable to determine
a “typical” $ and ∆sw , likely due to the proprietary nature of such details. Based on the
available documentation, our use of $ in the single-digit seconds appears to permit faster
traffic modeling and detection than is currently described in the literature. These results are
examined in further detail in Chapter 5.
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3.3.2 Data Stationarity
Statistical analysis requires stationary data to generate accurate and consistent results;
however, time-series data frequently cannot be proven to be either strictly or wide sense
stationary, often due to additive trends, anomalies, or periodic background processes [59],
[60]. Adaptations such as differencing are frequently used to de-trend data and produce a
stationary result for subsequent analysis [60]. For our work, de-trending is not appropriate
because the MAWI traces we have analyzed appear to possess random vice deterministic
or periodic trends; this can be seen in Figure 3.5, where the changes in ZOL, a measure
of average packet volume, appear to fluctuate randomly over the 480-s portion of the trace.
This figure was produced by estimating the typical volumetric rate of MAWI 20160428
trace between 30–510 s using overlapping, 3.0-s windows and 4.0-ms sub-windows. The
displayed volumetric rate is equivalent to average packets per sub-window, as measured by
ZOL (discussed in detail in Chapter 4).
Figure 3.5. Packet volume per sub-window of MAWI trace over 480 s
Returning to the stationarity of our data samples, network traffic is broadly acknowledged to
be non-stationary over very large windows, exhibiting periodicity due to human factors (e.g.,
the diurnal cycle) and self-similarity [2], [5], [10], [50], [61]. Similar to other approaches
in the literature, our challenge becomes a problem of identifying a stationarity time limit,
below which we assume our traffic sample is stationary.
Stationarity thresholds are not extensively discussed in network anomaly detection literature.
Our stationarity assertion is supported by the sparse documentation that does exist, however,
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such that time periods of less than one hour are stationary [2], [10]. Simmross-Wattenberg
et al. applied a safety factor of two to the one-hour threshold in their benchmark paper,
analyzing network traffic collected in 30 minute windows. Accordingly, we begin our
analysis of the MAWI traces by establishing 30 minutes as our maximum interval for
assuming long-term stationarity.
This decision can be reinforced through empirical analysis of our chosen network traffic
traces in terms of some of the requirements for stationarity, such as a constant mean [59]. To
do so, we must first consider the short-term fluctuations of ZOL in Figure 3.5. Fluctuations
such as these are well-examined in the literature and are indicative of short-term anomalies
or random walks inherent to some random processes and do not contradict our assumption
of stationarity [60], [62]. These random walks may become a concern during detection;
however, as such, they are discussed and addressed in Chapter 5.
Discarding the random fluctuations permits assessment of the long-term trend in average
packet count per sub-window. A consistent measure of the typical packet rate over the
first half of the displayed trace (i.e., through window 505) appears to be 350 packets per
sub-window. Assessing the second part of the trace, 350 still appears to be a reasonable
estimation of this rate. Since the “average” volume fluctuates aperiodically around the same
level for the length of the sample, we can hypothesize that theMAWI trace is trend-stationary
for a period of at least eight minutes [62].
Accordingly, given that our window sizes (on the order of 1–6 s) are more than two orders of
magnitude less than the thresholds established in the literature and the empirical assessment
above, we adopt the more conservative of the two thresholds, setting an eight-minute
stationarity time limit for our results obtained from the MAWI traces.
Note that while some qualitative conclusions in this chapter are reached using non-MAWI
datasets sampled at window sizes in excess of 8 minutes, all quantitative conclusions
regarding α-stablemodel and detection performance use MAWI samples with window
sizes below this stationarity threshold.
Now that the traffic traces of interest as well as the methodology and assumptions for trace
analysis have been discussed, it is appropriate to examine the modeling results.
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3.4 Traffic Modeling Results
Given the previous work described in Section 3.1, we now explore our results and conclu-
sions regarding the applicability of the α-stablemodel to network traffic. Portions of this
section, including the model evaluation methodology, LL fit results, and model fit response
to sub-window size, were presented at the 2018 Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences and published in the conference proceedings [20].
3.4.1 Methodology Overview
To validate the α-stable network traffic model and extend prior work [9], we examined
the ISCX, MACCDC, and MAWI traces over a range of window and sub-window lengths
and for the four previously-mentioned traffic scenarios. Varying window sizes produced
novel results regarding the effect of data aggregation on α-stablemodel accuracy, while
varying the traffic scenario extended prior work to demonstrate the α-stable distribution is
more appropriate than alternative distributions including the Poisson, Gaussian, Weibull,
gamma, and exponential for both artificial and human-generated traffic.
To reach this conclusion, we obtained representative samples from the three datasets for
the traffic types specified in Table 3.3. These cases were then transformed into a vector
of M packet counts per sub-window using the Python script contained in the Appendix;
the sub-window and window size for each case are also shown in Table 3.3. Applying the
methodology described in Section 2.3 for each case, we recorded the LL of the ML fit to
the histogram of the data for each of the six candidate distributions. Note that the Poisson
model performed more poorly than the exponential model and these results are not shown
in the table due to space constraints. Also, for each case the “best” performing distribution
(i.e., the greatest LL) is indicated by bold font.
As a general orientation to the table, Scenarios 1-9 used data from the ISCX dataset; 14
June is benign-only traffic, and 15 June traffic contains a mix of benign and attack scenarios.
The MACCDC dataset was examined in scenarios 9–13; these scenarios were chosen to
more fully explore the effect of window and sub-window sizing on model accuracy. Finally,
we began exploring the effects of attacks on traffic histograms using the MAWI dataset in
scenarios 14-17, as the MAWI data contains numerous examples of real-world attacks.
One note regarding the LL measure bears discussion: It is most appropriate to compare the
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Table 3.3. Log-likelihood comparison of distributional model by aggregation
period and traffic scenario. Adapted from: [20].
Stable Weibull Gamma Exponential Gaussian Best
1 15-Jun Benign Low Vol 60 83 -501.8 -537.0 -553.0 -571.3 -728.5 -501.8
2 15-Jun Benign Mid Vol 60 83 -578.2 -575.0 -574.3 -583.3 -591.2 -574.3
3 15-Jun Mid to Attack 60 61 -950.3 -974.6 -967.6 -2000.0 -975.0 -950.3
4 15-Jun Attack 60 61 -641.1 -641.9 -650.9 -2000.0 -646.0 -641.1
5 14-Jun Benign 10 61 -385.5 -382.0 -382.4 -382.5 -438.4 -382.0
6 14-Jun Noisy 10 61 -608.8 -600.8 -602.8 -605.1 -719.6 -600.8
7 14-Jun Attack 10 25 -534.8 -553.3 -571.9 -613.5 -803.2 -534.8
8 15-Jun Trace 1 10 83 -1676.2 -1698.1 -1787.2 -1953.8 -2807.6 -1676.2
9 15-Jun 5 min window 10 5 -106.8 -102.9 -102.9 -102.9 -111.2 -102.9
10 MACCDC 30s Segment 1 0.5 -175.3 - - -191.3 -184.4 -175.3
11 MACCDC 30s Segment 0.1 0.5 -699.5 - - -1275.5 -1675.7 -699.5
12 MACCDC Full Trace 1 5.6 -2229.6 - - -2398.0 -2229.6 -2229.6
13 MACCDC Full Trace 0.1 5.6 -10488.2 - - -16239.6 -20796.9 -10488.2
14 MAWI Benign 20150925 4 4 -10932.0 -11111.7 -10925.8 -13371.1 -10993.4 -10925.8
15 MAWI Attack 20150925 4 4 -2682.4 -2691.5 -2688.0 -3424.6 -2683.1 -2682.4
16 MAWI Attack 20150925 6 6 -4036.7 -4114.8 -4357.3 -5142.3 -4071.1 -4036.7
17 MAWI Attack 20150925 6 6 -2158.7 -2247.1 -2466.0 -2783.5 -2214.9 -2158.7
1.00 1.02 1.03 1.36 1.34
Window 
[min]
Log Likelihood Ratio from ML Fit




accuracy of the various models through this average, normalized metric because LL varies
according to sample size. For example, it is not appropriate to compare the results from
Trace 5 directly to the numerical results from any of the other traces. To enable across-
scenario comparisons, we require a size-independent metric; we use the average Hellinger
distance, defined in Chapter 2, for this purpose.
Before we use the Hellinger distance to optimize performance across samples, let us return
to Table 3.3 and draw some additional conclusions.
3.4.2 Best Distribution Fit
Beginning with the bottom row, we see in Table 3.3 that the stable model has the best average
normalized LL across the range of examined scenarios and datasets. It is also important
to note that the next best distribution for our purposes is the Gaussian distribution. Even
though the Weibull and gamma distributions frequently perform better than alternatives,
we have decided that these distributions are not viable for our purposes. Gamma and
Weibull distributions are constrained to the range of (0,∞), and zero-count instances must
be excluded to apply the models: This is a data manipulation that we judge to be undesirable
because zero packet counts are a reasonable outcome at small sub-window sizes or when
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applied to captures from lower-volume networks.
Comparing the performance of the stable model to the alternatives across the range of
scenarios, we conclude that one overarching reason for the superior performance of the
α-stablemodel is that this distribution almost always provides a reasonable fit, if not the
best fit. This is likely due to its four parameters; it can shift and scale freely while also
changing skew (as given by β) to reflect the presence of attack traffic, accurately locate the
distribution over the mode of the data under nearly all scenarios, and capture the outliers
that are frequently present in network traffic using its heavy tail (represented by α). We
explore these attributes in more detail in the next section.
3.4.3 Robust Approximation through Outlier Resistance
The overall resistance of the stable distribution to outliers, as opposed to its next-best 
alternative from Table 3.3, are illustrated in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. Both figures show 
how the mean (or location) of the Gaussian distribution tends to shift towards outliers. This 
effect is well-documented in the general statistical analysis literature. The magnitude of 
this shift is proportional to both the value and population of the outliers; the Gaussian is 
so sensitive that even a few benign outliers can significantly shift its location, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.6. The stable distribution, though, continues to accurately locate the primary 
mode of the data even when the magnitude of the outliers grows significantly, such as at the 
onset of the DoS attack in Figure 3.7.
These properties of the stable distribution, and the inherited attributes of stable-derived
estimators, are harnessed using the work in Chapter 4. Let us now return to Table 3.3 and
extract some preliminary conclusions that require further analysis.
3.4.4 Effects of Window Size on Model Fit
Some of the scenarios in this table were chosen to explore the effects of data aggregation
on model accuracy. Our exploratory data analysis empirically showed that larger win-
dows (and to an extent, sub-windows) produced traffic rate histograms that tended more
towards a Gaussian distribution, implying an upper bound on desirable window size for α-
stablemodeling. At the other extreme, the scenarios of Table 3.3 in which the exponential
model produces a good approximation (i.e., Scenarios 2,5, and 9) illustrate that at lower
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 ISCX 14 Jun Data
 Stable ML Fit (MATLAB)
 Gaussian ML Fit (MATLAB)
Outliers
Figure 3.6. Differing effects of benign outliers on Gaussian and stable dis-
tributions, from the ISCX 14 June dataset. Source: [63].
traffic volumes or windows and sub-windows that are too small, the traffic histogram tends
towards an exponential distribution due to a large number of zero (or low)-packet-count
sub-windows. For instance, the best relative performance of the exponential model occurred
during Scenario 9, which used the smallest window (5 minutes) and sub-window (10.0 s)
of any ISCX scenario.
These empirical concepts of window boundaries and performance impacts inspired the
hypothesis that the α-stablemodel performance could be optimized through adjusting sub-
window and window size. We explored this concept through repeated analysis of different
MAWI scenarios, adjusting window and sub-window size to examine how the model fit
error changed. These results are shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9.
The average Hellinger distance of the stable model as a function of window size in seconds
for randomly-chosen attack and benign portions of the MAWI 20151115 trace are shown in
Figure 3.8. Using this distance to measure the cumulative difference between the histogram
of the data and the best-fit (i.e., ML) model of the data for a given distribution, we define
the smallest cumulative difference as the model with the lowest error, and thus the “best”.
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ISCX 15 Jun Data
Stable ML Fit (MATLAB)
Gaussian ML Fit (MATLAB)
Onset of Denial of
Service Attack
Figure 3.7. Differing effects of a DoS attack on Gaussian and stable traffic
models, from the ISCX 15 June dataset. Source: [63].
One conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that, up to a point where the window
grows too small (in these cases, less than 10–15 s), fit error is relatively invariant to window
size. If this trend carries across other datasets, it implies that shorter data windows can be
chosen to produce the samemodeling (and by extension, detection) accuracy while lowering
detection system response time, which is proportional towindow size. Shorter datawindows
are also less computationally costly in terms of collection and analysis, facilitating real-time
implementation.
Turning to the effects of sub-window size on model accuracy, the average Hellinger distance
as a function of sub-window size in milliseconds is shown in Figure 3.9 for a randomly-
chosen attack transition portion of theMAWI 20151115 trace. Some interesting conclusions
can be drawn from this figure. First, theα-stablemodel error has a strong globalminimum; if
repeated frequently across additional windows and datasets, this characteristic supports im-
plementation of a data-adaptive network anomaly detection system. This type of adaptation
has the potential to produce more accurate detection systems and has not been previously
published.
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Figure 3.8. Stable traffic model error as a function of window size in seconds
Second, the Gaussian model error in Figure 3.9 seems relatively insensitive to sub-window
size; if this result is also consistent, it could explain why adaptive sub-windows have not
been explored in network anomaly detection. This preliminary conclusion is intuitive; per
the central limit theorem, longer (vice shorter) data aggregation periods should produce
traffic histograms that are more Gaussian and, thus, improved model fits.
Third, for the dataset used to create Figure 3.9, the shorter sub-windows encouraged by these
results could, in turn, lead to shorter data windows that speed detection system response. A
modeling or detection system built on this methodology would size data windows as a fixed
product of the desired M and the optimal ∆sw , such that
$optimal = M∆sw,optimal . (3.3)
We have completed limited exploration of the extensibility of the above conclusions for
additional MAWI datasets and traffic scenario; an additional illustration of this exploration
is shown in Figure 3.10. Average Hellinger distance as a function of sub-window size is
again shown in this figure, this time for a randomly-chosen benign scenario of the MAWI
20151115 trace. The preliminary conclusions above are reinforced in Figure 3.10 through
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 Best Stable Fit
 Best Gaussian Fit
Figure 3.9. Stable traffic model error as a function of sub-window size in
milliseconds. Adapted from: [20].
the presence of global optimum, amarkedminimum-desirablewindow size, and the superior
performance of the α-stablemodel for the examined range of sub-window sizes.
Full exploration of the applicability and gains from adaptive sub-window sizing is an item
of future work. Let us continue to examine the benefits of the α-stablemodel through
examining how the traffic scenario affects the shape of the traffic volume histogram.
3.4.5 Effects of Traffic Scenario on Sample Distribution
The investigation supporting Table 3.3 generated an additional discovery: The shape (i.e.,
parameters) of the stable model changes significantly during an attack beyond the shifts in
location and scale that could be reasonably forecast. This exploration is important because
understanding the effects of attacks on sample location and dispersion will develop intuition
regarding the expected performance of the estimators that we develop and apply in our
detector.
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 Best Stable Fit
 Best Gaussian Fit
Figure 3.10. Stable traffic model error as a function of sub-window size for
a benign scenario
Change in location µ during attack
The location parameter is representative of the feature count per sub-window, in our case
packets per sub-window. Location µ behaves logically during an attack, with a shift that is
proportional to the change in traffic rate due to the attack. The distribution of µ (i.e., the
shape of the µ histogram of all the samples) also changes during an attack. We have not yet
identified consistent trends across scenarios and attack types other than the volume-based
rightward shift due to the additional attack traffic. We continue to analyze µ trends as we
investigate our items of future work.
Change in dispersion γ during attack
The change in dispersion during an attack is more predictable than µ. Many DoS attacks
and network anomalies are deterministically-generated, and the resulting traffic is relatively
constant in volumewhen compared to the sumof the numerous randombenign processes that
comprise the background link traffic, as shown in Figure 3.2. Logically, the addition of this
low-dispersion, high-volume anomalous traffic should reduce the overall total dispersion.
Our analysis thus far, however, shows that this result is not always guaranteed. Sample
dispersion does frequently drop during an attack, following an initial increase during the
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transition period. This has been predicted through MATLAB modeling of α-stable random
variable combination, as well as analysis of MAWI traffic samples. This behavior is
illustrated in Figure 3.11. The per-sample dispersion of the analyzed portions of the MAWI
20151114 high-volume attack trace is plotted for each window, allowing comparison of γ
values for the best STABLE-fit models of 1,472 attack and 895 benign traffic samples.
Figure 3.11. Per-sample dispersion (γ) for the MAWI 20151114 high volume
attack dataset
The results in this figure clearly illustrate the change in sample dispersion that occurs
during the development of an attack. For this trace, the overall dispersion of the attack
traffic varies significantly because the anomaly is a deterministic ON-OFF attack, with
constant amplitude during ON periods and periodic OFF periods that contain no attack
traffic. (The characteristics of this attack are explored in more detail in Section 5.5.5.)
These ON-OFF periods generate many transition windows, where the sample dispersion
increases significantly as the sample contains varying percentages of both low-volume
background traffic and high-volume attack traffic. The transition windows can be seen in
Figure 3.11 to be the samples with high gamma values (e.g., γ > 100). Once the collection
window “slides” to contain only attack traffic, sample dispersion drops below that of benign
traffic due to the dominating contribution of the deterministic attack (e.g., the samples with
γ < 50).
Note that both the sign and magnitude of the change in γ due to an anomaly depends on its
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type and volume; in the low-volume attack case of the MAWI 20160428 trace, γ increases
during the attack, as shown in Figure 3.12. This appears to be because the lower-volume,
varying-rate attack only spreads the mode of the traffic histogram instead of shifting it (e.g.,
the high volume attack case), leading to an overall increase in γ. The most interesting
observation for the stable attribute estimators (SAEs) we develop in Chapter 4, as well
as future work, is that the vast majority of the attack samples have γ values significantly
different from the benign samples, even though the attack in this scenario was at a much
lower rate (approximately 20% of the benign traffic rate).
Figure 3.12. Per-sample γ in the case of a low-volume attack
Further analysis of γ effects for attacks of various types and volumes is required. This
analysis will allow us to draw more definitive conclusions regarding the expected change in
γ; however, the observed changes in γ during attacks and its marked difference from benign
values in the vast majority of samples imply significant potential for an α-stable parametric
anomaly detection system based on measuring the change in the traffic shape (i.e., param-
eters). The detection system that was developed for this work was designed to be scalable,
so we avoided the computational costs of fitting an α-stable distribution to each sample. An
accuracy and performance comparison to that of our implemented system is also promising
future work.
The most critical result of the analysis in this sub-section is that γ values during an attack
are, in the vast majority of cases, significantly different than those of benign samples. For
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our non-parametric detector, this implies that an estimator based on the dispersion of the
sample could be highly effective at discriminating between attack and benign cases. Let us
continue developing our intuition by examining corresponding changes in tail size α and
skewness β caused by attack traffic.
Changes in α and β
Attack effects on the sample β are inconsistent. One frequent outcome is a side-effect of
the previously-discussed shift in µ. During any subsequent samples where the attack traffic
rate drops (e.g., an OFF period for the MAWI 2015114 attack or, for a constant attack, a
lull in traffic due to probabilistic network or host effects) the background, lower-volume
benign traffic appears as a heavy lower tail in the traffic histogram. This effect can be seen
in Figure 3.13 and is indicated by negative values of β.















 ML Fit to data
f  ~ S(1.63, -0.87, 43.4, 736.0)
Figure 3.13. Shift in skew of the traffic rate histogram during an attack
transition
This figure is from an attack transition period just following an OFF cycle and contains
only a small portion of benign background sub-windows, which appear in Figure 3.13 as
the outliers on the left side. Continuing to read the histogram to the right, we see the
short-ramp-up period of the attack to the left of the histogram mode, with the vast majority
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of sub-windows concentrated around the ON-portion average rate.
Trends in β for attack and benign traffic over 14 minutes of the MAWI 20160428 trace are
shown in Figure 3.14. This case was analyzed using settings of $ = 6.0 s and ∆sw = 5.0
ms, which produced 140 samples.
Figure 3.14. Trend in β for 14 minutes of the MAWI 20160428 trace
The best discriminator between attack and benign traffic may be that of β , 1, because
nearly all benign samples in both the high and low volume attack scenarios have β values
of 1. During an attack, β becomes a less valuable indicator than α because the attack traffic
histogram tends to become Gaussian or near-Gaussian. For our purposes, we define a traffic
sample with α ≥ 1.99 as Gaussian.
As this happens, the value of β becomes unimportant (theoretically, β is undefined for
α = 2 [14]). From an analytic standpoint, the ML estimation algorithms of both MATLAB
and STABLE also become less reliable around our empirically-determined threshold of
α = 1.99; above this point, the β values can fluctuate significantly between repeated
estimates, though the α, µ, and γ estimates are largely convergent. This inconsistent
estimation of β in near-Gaussian cases is one issue that must be addressed in a parametric-
detection implementation but is not important for the purposes of this work. If anything,
this encourages a parametric implementation based on a combination of β and α, so let us
now examine the low-volume attack effect on α, as shown in Figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15. Trend in α for 14 minutes of the MAWI 20160428 trace
This figure was also developed using 14 minutes of the MAWI 20160428 trace with analysis
settings of $ = 6.0 s, ∆sw = 5.0 ms, and ∆o = 0. Using the empiric α threshold above, we
can see that the attack traffic is frequently Gaussian but more often non-Gaussian. We can
also see that the benign traffic is never Gaussian.
Combining the attack and benign sample results confirms that the vast majority of traffic in
the MAWI20160428 trace is α-stable ; specifically, 86.4% of the samples have a STABLE
ML fit where α < 1.99 (121 of 140). To validate this result, we analyzed the trend in α
for the analyzed portions of the MAWI 20151114 trace using sample settings of $ = 3.0
s, ∆sw = 4.0 ms. 892 of 895 (99.7%) benign samples and 1357 of 1,472 (92.2%) attack
samples had values of α ≤ 1.99 (i.e., were α-stable vice Gaussian). Combining these two
results, we see that network traffic is dominantly and repeatedly α-stable -distributed. This
has significant implications for model appropriateness and accuracy in the general field
of network traffic monitoring, particularly for proprietary networks that are not frequently
exposed to attacks or anomalies. This result also validates our intended extension of
α-stablemethods to the anomaly detector, which is the subject of the next chapters.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, using three public datasets analyzed for a range of aggregation periods and
traffic scenarios, we have shown that the best model for the marginal distribution of network
traffic packet rate is the α-stable distribution. For our empirical threshold of α ≤ 1.99,
benign network traffic was shown to be nearly entirely α-stable , while traffic during an
attack is α-stable in excess of 80% of the time. Given that for many networks, attacks are
the great exception rather than the rule, this result proves that the α-stablemodel should be
given strong consideration as the standard for network traffic.
Additionally, we showed that the α-stable parameters of α, β, and γ change significantly
when attack traffic is added, even at relatively low volumes of 15–25% of background
traffic. (It was not shown, but it is intuitive that µ changes as well, proportional to the
volume of traffic added.) Together, these changes in parameters imply potential for an
accurate anomaly detection system based on observed changes in the ML α-stable fit.
Finally, we demonstrated that the fit of the α-stablemodel to the traffic data is dependent
on sub-window size and relatively independent of window size. This implies that there
should be little accuracy degradation using small data windows to speed detection system
response and that it should be possible to build an α-stable anomaly detector that optimizes
sub-window size to improve accuracy.
The challenge, and the objective of the remainder of this work, becomes using these
findings regarding α-stable traffic modeling to design a more accurate network anomaly
detection system. We must first examine, in detail, the implications of traffic following
an α-stable distribution. Keeping these implications in mind, we can use the literature
to develop α-stable approximation or estimation methods that enable a real-time detection
system. Then, after building an end-to-end detection system, we can finally explore and
compare the performance of a non-Gaussian approach to network anomaly detection.
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CHAPTER 4:
Estimation and Approximation of α-StableData
In this chapter we examine various approaches to formulating the α-stable signal models
that are used in our detection system. Many traditional detection approaches use probability
or likelihood ratios based on the PDFs of the data samples. To obtain this PDF, we can use
closed-form solutions (should they exist), approximations, or estimates of key attributes of
the best-fit distribution. We examine closed-form solutions and approximations and find
that they either cannot model the full range of our data or their limitations on our intended
detection system exceed any accuracy advantages they provide.
Alternatively, estimates of the PDF derived from the data instead of an MLE-fitted dis-
tribution provide an intriguing option. These stable estimators determine representative,
stable-parameter-like attributes from the data sample. Stable estimators are shown to be a
lightweight (i.e., computationally-efficient) and accurate alternative for implementation in
our detection system. We begin our discussion with a review of the potential and limitations
of the stable solutions and approximations most suited to our problem, then proceed to the
stable estimators.
4.1 Stable Signal Modeling Approaches
Numerous methods have been developed that seek to provide closed form solutions (or
approximations to these solutions) in order to harness the accuracy and flexibility of the α-
stable distribution while avoiding the computational complexity brought about by numerical
estimation methods.
The evolution of these approaches is shown in Figure 4.1; all methods in this figure use
weighted mixtures of closed-form distributions to approximate an α-stable function after its
parameters θ have been estimated from the data. This methodology leverages the closed-
form expressions of their components while still providing close fits to the data [29]. Note
that the special case approximations given on the right side of Figure 4.1 are constrained
from the maximum permissible range of θ as shown.
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Figure 4.1. Evolution of α-Stable approximation methods
The special case approacheswere of interest because they have the potential to enable closed-
form solutions using non-Gaussian components which, in turn, may enable non-Gaussian
detection algorithms. The hypergeometric approaches promise closed-form solutions that
are computationally-tractable and accurate. In the next sections, we discuss these non-
Gaussian approaches to α-stable representation and approximation.
4.2 Hypergeometric Approaches
The use of hypergeometric functions to develop closed form, finite sum solutions
of α-stable distributions is an area of active work in the literature. Multiple α-
stable hypergeometric approximations have been developed since the 1990s, and considered
earlier, for particular values of β and α [64]. The most general hypergeometric approach
was published in 2015.
4.2.1 Generalized Hypergeometric Solution for α ∈ (1, 2]
A generalized closed-form solution for α-stable distributions was developed in 2015 [65]
but was restricted to values of α ∈ (1, 2]. While this is most frequently the range of MAWI
network traffic at our chosen windows and sub-windows, other traces we examined were
best fit using models with α ∈ (0, 1) (e.g., ISCX).
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Additionally, this approach constrains β such that
β tan (πα2 )  < 1 − α−1 (4.1)
which results in limiting assumable β for some α values of interest, per Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Constraints on values of β given α using the closed-form hyper-











The vast majority of our benign MAWI data is best-fit by α-stable distributions with α ∈
[1.4, 1.9], β = 1; thus, per the limits in Table 4.1, this hypergeometric approach cannot
model skewed network traffic data unless α > 1.7. This restriction eliminates large portions
of our benign data and would significantly restrict the flexibility of our detection system;
for these reasons it is necessary to consider other hypergeometric approaches.
4.2.2 Generalized Hypergeometric Solution for α ∈ (0, 2]
In 2011, a hypergeometric closed-form finite sum solution was published that models the
entire permissible range of α. This solution decomposed α-stable RV Z into weighted finite
sums of gamma distributions per
f (α, β; z) =
M−1∑
j=1














































for integers l and k such that l < k,α = l/k; for integer r ∈ (0, l), β = α − 2r/k; and
min(l, k) = m < M = max(l, k) [64].
There are also restrictions to this approach. The broader hypergeometric solution of (4.2)
is only applicable for integer l and k that produce a rational α. Additionally, the value of
β must be defined using r ,k, and α. Similar to the hypergeometric α ∈ (1, 2] approach,
these constraints somewhat reduce the solution’s potential flexibility (and, thus, accuracy)
to represent our fitted data.
Another equally-serious issue exists: the computational cost of hypergeometric approaches.
As these approaches use potentially large sums of gamma distributions, the solution has the
potential to become costly, particularly if large l, k are used to develop a close approximation
to α. The high cost of hypergeometric approximation is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where
for varying values of α, the execution time of both discussed hypergeometric approaches
as well as a reference numerical approximation method are displayed [65]. In this figure,
the costs of the reference method are annotated in black, while the costs of Pogany and
Nadarajah’s approach [65] is annotated in red and Gorska and Penson’s [64] in blue. Note
that while both hypergeometric approaches are faster than a commonly-used numerical
approximation, they provide only a 10 – 20% improvement over the typical MLE approach.
In sum, hypergeometric solutions incur significant costs through using a gamma distribution
as well as the costs of first estimating the α-stable parameters θ. Additionally, their con-
straints restrict the applicability of the method to a space smaller than the permissible range
of α-stable parameters. For those reasons, we consider it appropriate to consider other ap-
proximation and estimation methods and now turn to the PaS approximation method. Much
of this next section was presented at the 2017 Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems,
and Computers and is scheduled for publication in its proceedings [63].
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Figure 4.2. Comparison of computational time required by three methods
for approximating an α-stable PDF. Source: [65].
4.3 Positive α-Stable
Instead of a weighted mixture of Gaussians, the PaS methodology approximates a suitable
α-stable RV (constrained per Figure 4.1) using aweightedmixture of LévyRVs distributions
[30]. This LMA approach is advantageous because in the Lévy special case of α = 0.5, the
PDF can be defined in closed form as discussed in Section 2.2.3.
There was no work in the literature subsequent to Kuruoglu’s promulgation of the decom-
position theory [30], which also did not include detail regarding implementation. Our
research into the feasibility of using this method in our detection system yielded a novel
algorithm for PaS approximation and novel findings regarding the numbers of methodology
of determining the mixture components for data samples with distributions limited to the
range of α < 0.5
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4.3.1 PaS Decomposition
The theoretical relationships for decomposing a PaS RV into the product of another PaS RV
and a Lévy RV were developed by Kuruoglu based on work by Hardin [30], [66].
The decomposition of Z for αZ ∈ (0, 1) can be expressed as
Z = XY1/αX (4.4)
whereY is α-stable with αY ∈ (0, 2] (themixing function) and X is distributed per (2.4) [30].






















αY = αZ/2, (4.7)
C is a constant, i is an integer ∈ [1, N], and N is the number of sampling points (as well as
mixture components) [30].
Examining (4.5), we find that the left terms inside the summation are weighting constants
determined by choosing sample points yi, while the right terms are Lévy RVs [30]. Both
terms are scaled using the sample points and relationships shown in Figure 4.3.







Note that (4.5) applies to the case where αZ ∈ (0, 0.5); similar expressions exist for αZ ∈




To develop our LMA algorithm and formula forC, we extended the relationships and theory
in [30] using similar approaches in the literature, such as for mixtures of Gaussians [29].
As an input, the LMA algorithm requires the parameters of a PaS RV Z with αz < 0.5.
From Z , the mixing function fY (y) is then generated, which is used to obtain N weights and
scaling factors yi and fY (yi).
These weights and scaling factors are in turn applied to N Lévy functions; the weighted
sum of these components approximates the original distribution of Z . The LMA process
for α ∈ (0, 0.5) is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 LMA Algorithm for α ∈ (0, 0.5). Source: [63].
Inputs: Data and N
Output: LMA of fZ (z)
1: Fit fZ (z) to data, confirm αZ < 0.5
2: Compute αY ,γY from αZ ,γZ using (4.6),(4.7),γX = 1
3: Generate mixing PDF fY (y)
4: Assign sample points yi for i ∈ [1, N]
5: for yi do
6: Compute fY (yi)
7: Generate scaled Lévy component fX(z/y2i )
8: end for






10: return f̂Z (z) using (4.5)
An illustration to assist in visualizing the purpose of the mixing function is contained in
Figure 4.3. As shown in this figure, the LMAweight fY (y6) is obtained from the appropriate
mixing function for the hypothetical case of fZ (z) ∼ S(0.4, 1, 1, 0).
The finite sum of Lévys resulting from the process in Algorithm 1 is the LMA. To determine
the relative accuracy of this approximation, we measured average error between the data
histogram and LMA using the Hellinger distance as given in Section 2.4. The built-in
MATLAB ML fitting and histogram functions were used for estimations and results; the
interested reader is referred to the source documentation for additional implementation
detail [39].
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Figure 4.3. Method of sampling the mixing distribution to determine weight-
ing constants fY (yi). Source: [63].
effects of sample point placement and the number of sample points required to obtain an
accurate approximation.
4.3.3 LMA Investigation: Importance of sample point location
Gaussian mixture approaches recommend uniform sampling of the mixing RV Y at a large
number of points N or using a post-processing algorithm to optimize the sample point
placement [29]. The guidance for the PaS approach is similar [30].
Our results demonstrate that, at least for the PaS method, approximation error is relatively
independent of N and largely dominated by sample point placement. It, thus, becomes
possible to improve computational efficiency and overall accuracy by selectively applying
sample points using either linear sampling around the peak of the reference distribution or
via implementation of a lightweight sample point placement algorithm.
These results are illustrated in Figure 4.4, where the density functions for LMAs with two
different values of N are compared. Case (b) was obtained using only N = 6 components
and is more accurate than the 60-component Case (a) approximation in terms of average
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Hellinger distance; visually, the fits of both results are essentially indistinguishable at the
selected scale.
In Figure 4.4, we see that sample point placement is more important than the number
of points in determining LMA accuracy. Case (a) samples were uniformly distributed
∈ [0, 1], while Case (b) samples were uniformly distributed ∈ [0, 1.2]: The average dHel
were 5.09× 10−2 and 5.00× 10−2, respectively. The slight reduction in fit error of Case (b),
while using fewer points, was due to shifting sampling bounds and the resultant change in
sample point location.
4.3.4 LMA Investigation: Ability to optimize sample location
The previous result encouraged exploration of optimal sample point placement routines.
We found that when using small N, non-uniform sampling of the mixing function can be
utilized to improve approximation accuracy, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Based on qualitative assessments as well as Figure 4.5, the best approximation accuracy is
generally obtained by concentrating sampling points around the peak and areas of maximum
change of fY (y) (i.e., points y3, y4, and y5 in Figure 4.3). Other methods were examined
such as sampling only the left or right tails; these alternatives produced inferior results and
were omitted from Figure 4.5 for display purposes.
The results in Figure 4.5 reinforce the observation from Figure 4.4 that accuracy is relatively
invariant to the number of components (at least as long as the sample points are located
appropriately). The significant variation of the linear method fit error with N ∈ [5, 10] is
due to the changing sample locations, as seen previously.
Overall, the results in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that post-processing is not strictly
necessarily to fine-tune the sample locations, though this added step could be used to
improve the relative accuracy for a given error measure, as done for the LMA in Figure 4.6.
The end-to-end approximation result of applying the LMA algorithm to the data in the
ISCX trace modeled in Chapter 3 is shown in this figure. The sample was drawn from the
14 Jun dataset. In this case only four sample points were used, though their placement was
manually optimized. The resulting dHel = 4.32×10−2, smaller than the 6 and 60-component
LMAs cases.
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 Case (a): N = 60 LMA
 Case (b): N = 6 LMA
 Reference Stable ML Fit
Figure 4.4. Demonstration of the insensitivity of LMA accuracy to the num-
ber of components N. Source: [63].
Additional investigation of sampling optimization methods is an item of future work and
should allow quantitative evaluation of cost-accuracy trade-offs. Based on qualitative
evaluation, accuracy is optimized by alternating sample points around the mode of the data
(or distribution). Concentrating sample points on the upper tail side of themodewill improve
the upper tail fit of the approximation while worsening the lower tail fit and, frequently, the
accuracy around the peak. The reverse applies for concentrating samples on the lower tail
side. Finally, concentrating samples around the peak can maintain approximation accuracy
when using a smaller N but appears to lead to overestimating the mode (as can be seen in
Figure 4.6).
4.3.5 LMA for α ∈ (0.5, 1)
Overall, the PaS approximation theory is applicable to distributions with α ∈ (0, 1) [30].
As previously identified, the LMA algorithm and relationships in this section apply only to
the case of α < 0.5. For α > 0.5, the theory relies on different transformations and, thus,
requires a different LMA algorithm.
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Figure 4.5. Comparison of fit errors with varying sample point location
schemes and N. Source: [63].
After developing the methodology for α < 0.5 and beginning to apply it to the selected
datasets, the estimated α values revealed that LMA would not be capable of modeling the
dataset of interest (i.e., the MAWI traces). The vast majority of analyzed MAWI samples
were characterized by α values ∈ [1.2, 2], as illustrated for the MAWI 20160428 trace in
Figure 3.15. Accordingly, exploration of LMAwas suspended in favor of focusing on efforts
that were suitable for analyzing MAWI data and that would enable the detection system to
operate over the full range of α observed in the real world. Further exploration of the LMA
method over the full range of α will be an item of future work.
4.3.6 Summary of Hypergeometric and Approximation Approaches
We have examined the approaches in Figure 4.1 and found that they are not suited for our
chosen application due to a combination of modeling constraints and computational costs.
Fundamentally, these methods all incur:
• Cost to initially estimate an α-stable fit to the data
• Cost to determine the approximation
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Figure 4.6. End-to-end approximation fit with minimal components. Source:
[63].
• Accuracy reduction due to applying a constrained approximation.
To meet our twin goals of reducing accepted errors and enabling real-time implemen-
tation, we decided to investigate alternatives that do not require fitting the data with an
α-stable distribution. These stable estimators are discussed in the next section.
4.4 Approximation versus Estimation
Because stable approximations are only valid in limited cases, we instead choose to model
representative attributes of our signals. The SAEs we now discuss are used in test statistics
(2.11) that permit estimating single parameters of Z or, more precisely, representations of
these parameters. These estimators still incur some estimation error, but we do not introduce
error through smoothing the data into an α-stable form or add error through approximating
the α-stablewith finite weighted sums.
Applying these stable estimators has the potential to significantly reduce computational
costs while still providing accurate characterizations that can be used in a detection system.
Single-parameter estimation is computationally-advantageous because in the worst case
scenario, we develop the MLE over the allowable space of only a single parameter (vice
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four). Furthermore, some of these SAEs are non-ML estimators that provide additional
savings because their results are obtained directly from O(N)-complex manipulations of the
sample.
Mathematical characterization of the computational savings for our application is not avail-
able in the literature and is a candidate for future work. For this work, we empirically
determine the cost savings of our alternative estimation techniques and provide these results
in Section 5.6. We now examine the first estimation technique: myriad filtering.
4.4.1 Stable Estimation: The Sample Myriad
The sample myriad was first defined in 1996 as an innovation of robust filtering methods
developed by Fischer in 1922 [34]. The sample myriad is an adaptive alternative to the
median filter, which is itself a robust alternative to the linear (Gaussian) filter. Filters with
robust performance are seen as preferred alternatives for recovering signals under non-
Gaussian conditions, as it is widely known that the performance of linear filters decline
substantially in the presence of non-Gaussian noise [14], [33].
The myriad filter provides the ML (Section 2.3.1) location estimate λ̂ of a sample using
the assumption that the data is stably-distributed [34]. This location is not necessarily the
mode or the α-stable location parameter µ (unless less-common definitions of the stable
distribution are used [41]), but we have empirically found that it closely corresponds to
the mode and µ of the best α-stable fit given the distribution of our data from the MAWI
traces. For the purposes of this work, the location estimate from the sample myriad (and
other estimators discussed in this chapter) is considered the effective location of the sample,
equivalent to the Gaussian mean µ2 of a linear process.
Myriad Filter: Derivation
The myriad location is derived from the α-stable special case, closed-form Cauchy dis-
tribution. We can rewrite the closed-form definition of the Cauchy distribution (2.5) by
substituting the tuning parameter κ for γ and λ for µ as




(z − λ)2 + κ2
(4.9)
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where κ ∈ (0,∞) is now the scale constant, or dispersion, of the distribution.
To obtain our myriad estimate of location λ̂M (the MLE of λ) given some constant κ, we
substitute (4.9) into our ML estimator (2.10) such that







(zi − λ)2 + κ2
. (4.10)
By inspection, maximizing (4.10) is equivalent to minimizing the denominator, thus, (4.10)
becomes





(zi − λ)2 + κ2
)
, (4.11)
which is defined as the myriad of sample di drawn from Z [32]. The myriad location can be
seen to be an ML estimate of the location of a Cauchy distribution with spread parameter κ
that best fits the data di.
Myriad Filter: Application
An intuitive visualization for understanding (4.11) and the effects of κ on λ̂ is provided in
Figure 4.7. In this figure, k is equivalent to κ, and k2 >> k1. For large k, the location
estimate β̂k2 tends toward the mean of di. For the small k, β̂k1 is drawn to the densest
concentration of samples and is not shifted by the outliers on the right.
The concepts illustrated in Figure 4.7 apply to our equations for the myriad as well as
subsequent derivations for other tunable estimators of sample location. A small value of
the dispersion parameter κ results in a narrow dispersion of the fitted Cauchy distribution,
causing the locator to concentrate around the portion of di with the heaviest concentration
of samples. This leads to a λ̂ that is resistant to individual outliers and that tends to produce
a result very close to the mode of di. On the other extreme, as the value of κ → ∞, the
dispersion of the locator grows and the estimate becomes more sensitive to outliers. For
κ = ∞, it has been shown that λ̂ = mean (di) [32].
The implication for our system is that we can adjust, or tune, the value of κ to set the locator
behavior we desire in our detection system, e.g., sensitive in some cases, perhaps to provide
rapid detection of the onset of an anomaly, and robust when the most accurate λ̂ is needed
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Figure 4.7. Change in Cauchy-based myriad location estimate due to differ-
ent values of dispersion κ. Source: [67].
to resolve uncertainty.
The myriad filter was derived using an assumption that the input data is symmetric α-
stable (SaS) [32] and that the residual errors are Cauchy-distributed. If we instead recognize
that our sample is skewed and non-symmetric, it is possible to develop a novel method of
estimating λ based on the Lévy distribution.
4.4.2 Lévy Location Estimate
We first derive the LLE following intuitively from the myriad derivation and then examine
its implications.
LLE Derivation
Instead of a Cauchy distribution, assume that di follows a Lévy distribution (2.4), rewritten
using κ for scale and λ for location such that
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Similar to Section 4.4.1, by substituting (4.12) into (2.10), we obtain our LLE λ̂L













If we again approach (4.13) as a minimization of the non-constant terms in the denominator,
we obtain









which, similar to the myriad case, is an ML estimate of the location.
LLE Implications
We continue to investigate the implications of this estimator, which to the best of our
knowledge does not exist in the literature. Full examination is an item of future work,
but we can draw some initial conclusions from (4.14) and possibly more insight from the
alternate LL form given by










The LLE is similar in form to the myriad and also tunable. As such, it will have a similar
computational cost.
For small κ relative to zi, which we expect for large-magnitude data sets, the right term in
(4.15) is dominated by the left. For large κ, the right term dominates. Comparing (4.11)
and (4.15), we see that the left terms differ by 1/2 ln(·), while the right term is smaller by




. We expect similar
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performance to the myriad case but, perhaps, more sensitivity in response to varying values
of κ.
Also, like λ̂M , LLE is not a selection-based estimator in that (4.15) is evaluated over the
range of permissible values of λ and, thus, min(di) ≤ λL,M ≤ max(di). The ZOL, which
we discuss in the following section, is a selection-type estimator, and its estimate λ̂Z must
equal the value of a repeated sample in di [33].
4.4.3 Relationship of Myriad and Levy Location Estimates
Additionally, as the LLE is based on the assumption that the input data is wholly-positive,
λ̂L may be more appropriate than the sample myriad for some data sets with extremely
heavy tails.
This can be inferred by examining the ratio of the tails as z → ∞. First, consider the
Lévy tail from (4.12) where, appropriate for a heavy-tailed positive distribution, we assume
z >> λ. This allows us to neglect λ, yielding







Similarly, the Cauchy tail is
















Simplifying, neglecting small constants, and assuming for practical applications κ << z










which demonstrates that the Lévy tail is larger than the Cauchy tail and, as such, may be
able to provide a better location estimate for extremely heavy-tailed data (i.e., α ∈ (0, 0.5)).
Empirical evaluation to this point has validated that the performance of the LLE is very
similar to λ̂M (as discussed in Section 4.6). The LLE produces results nearly identical to the
myriad and very similar to our other location estimator, ZOL, in more than 500 evaluated
cases. As previously discussed, a full performance evaluation and additional application of
the LLE is one of our items of future work. Preliminary comparisons of the outputs of all
location estimates are discussed in Section 4.6 after we derive additional estimators from
the family of ZOS.
4.5 Stable Estimation: Zero-Order Statistics
ZOS were developed subsequent to the sample myriad by the same research group as a way
of defining equivalents to measures of second-order (Gaussian) processes [33]. As opposed
to λ̂L and λ̂M , ZOS estimators are derived from non-special cases of the stable family. ZOS
are also a more flexible, stable-based alternative to fractional lower-order statistics (FLOS)
which have a proven history of success in non-Gaussian environments.
FLOS generally assume data follows a symmetric α-stable distribution and can only be
determined for moments p < α. In the case of very small α, a FLOS estimate may not
exist [33]. Because we do not wish to constrain our methodology based on the value of α, we
chose not to apply FLOS estimates in our work. Also, our data is not symmetric, and while
SaS approximations to skewed variables exist and could be used to enable FLOS-based
estimation, this approach requires additional computational cost (and approximation error)
similar to the mixtures examined in Section 4.1 [68].
ZOS, on the other hand, provide second-order equivalent representations of power, disper-
sion, and location while making no constraining assumptions regarding the input signal.
We begin our discussion with the power estimation method, or zero-order power (ZOP),




Second-order processes use power E(Z)2 as an expression of the strength of a process.
Because of the MOC of Section 2.2, an alternative definition of power must be determined
if we wish to characterize the strength of stable processes over the permissible range of
α ∈ (0, 2].
To nullify the MOC, ZOS uses the fact the logarithm of an α-stable distribution has finite
first and second-order moments as E(ln |X |) < ∞ [33]. These logarithmic moments enable
defining ZOP as well as ZOS estimates of dispersion (ZOD) and location (ZOL).
Zero-Order Power: Definition and Estimation
ZOP [33] is defined as
ϕ0(Z) = eE(ln |Z |). (4.20)
The literature also uses the term geometric power for ZOP, and its estimate is equivalent
to the geometric mean of a positive data sample [33]. This is demonstrated as we consider
the problem of easily determining ZOP for stable distributions, which do not have a closed
form.



























the geometric mean of |zi | [23].
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Zero-Order Power: Analysis




The proof of (4.23) is available [23], though not essential for our purposes. The asymptotic
equivalence of (4.23) is important because of the long history of FLOS and its examination
and successful application to detection in the fields of underwater acoustics and radar [14],
[43].
Returning to (4.22), we know that the geometric mean is both scale invariant and an ML
estimator of φ0 if di is Pareto-distributed [33]; thus, while ZOP is not strictly derived
using α-stable assumptions, it is firmly grounded in heavy-tailed and FLOS estimation and
should perform robustly in non-Gaussian environments. Also of particular interest for our
purposes, ZOP can be estimated from the data and does not incur the computational costs
of distribution fitting or numerical integration.
ZOP has the following additional properties important to our uses:
1. ZOP is a scale parameter and, thus, an indicator of the dispersion of a sample.
2. ZOP is an indicator of process strength proportional to the magnitude of the sample
data.
3. ZOP is multiplicative such that ϕ0(XY ) = ϕ0(X)ϕ0(Y )
We refer the interested reader to the proofs of these properties [23]; they are not essential
for our purposes.
Similar to ZOP, ZOD can be estimated directly from data at low cost. The derivation of
ZOD, however, uses the definition of ZOL, so we will develop ZOL.
4.5.2 Zero-Order Location
Gonzalez defines ZOL as the stable equivalent of the Gaussian mean, and it is the only
non-ML location estimation approach we apply [33].
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Zero-Order Location: Derivation
The derivation of ZOL begins with the definition of the linear sample location (or mean
µ2), which can be defined as the location value which, for all possible shifts µ, minimizes
the power of a shifted variable Z [69]. Equivalently,
µ2 = arg min
µ
E(Z − µ)2. (4.24)
The right side of (4.24) can be seen to be equivalent to second-order power ϕ2 for a shifted
process (Z − µ) such that
µ2 = arg min
µ
ϕ2(Z − µ). (4.25)
Similar to the second-order definition of location, ZOL is defined as the value λ0 that
minimizes the power of the shifted process [33]. We can reformulate (4.25) with zero-order
equivalents of power ϕ0 and location λ0 to obtain
λ0 = arg min
λ
ϕ0(Z − λ). (4.26)
Replacing ϕ0 with its definition from (4.20) yields
λ0 = arg min
λ
e(E ln |Z−λ |) = arg min
λ
E|Z − λ |. (4.27)
Wewish to generalize (4.27) to enable its application to our problem. To do so, we introduce
our theorem regarding stably-distributed network traffic. This enables our estimate of ZOL,
λ̂0, as well as subsequent development of a detector threshold algorithm.
Theorem 1: Even when network traffic is stably-distributed, samples of network traffic are
finite and, thus, have finite first and second-order moments.
Proof: The proof follows trivially from Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.1: Any sample d of network traffic is finite, of size proportional to the sample
period $ and traffic rate R. As such, it is possible to calculate the mean E(d) and second
moment E(d)2 of any numerical representation of the features of this network traffic sample.
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While it is possibly to apply a stable distribution (which does not necessarily have a first
moment) to model aspects of network traffic, the actual network traffic samples which define
the model are, by definition, finite with first-order moments.
Lemma 1.1 provides a theoretical foundation for estimating ZOL, as we can discretize the
expectation in (4.27) such that










Dropping the normalization term 1/N and taking the natural logarithm of each term to
compact the sum does not change the resulting estimate [33], leading to




ln |zi − λ |. (4.29)
There is one issue with this formula: Ties between estimates will be produced whenever
zi = λ because the minimization argument returns a value of −∞ [33]. These ties can
be avoided by creating a compact set of potential estimates (Ωλ̂) which exclude ties and
constraining λ ∈ Ωλ̂ [33].
This set, and subsequent evaluation of (4.29) at all possible values of λ → zi, transforms
the ZOL estimator to the form of




ln |zi − z j |, (4.30)
where ξ is the set of repeated values in a given observation of Z [33]. The proof of this
transformation is not essential to our work but is available [33].
Note that this form permits estimation of λ0 directly from data and without having to search
all possible values of location, reducing computational costs. ZOL has one drawback in
that small data sets where only outlying values are repeated are mis-estimated by λ̂0. In our
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application, data sets generally have a well-defined mode, fairly compact range, and a large
number of samples (on the order of 750 - 2000+). Our conclusion, based on analysis of the
risk and empirical evaluation, is that the ZOL is not eliminated as a potential estimator but
should be applied with an element of caution.
Now that we have defined both λ0 and λ̂0, we can use these definitions to develop the last
of our ZOS-based estimators, ZOD.
4.5.3 Zero-Order Dispersion
We develop our definition of ZOD δ0, equivalent to second-order variance, similar to our
methodology for ZOP. Returning to the definition of the mean in (4.25), where
µ2 = arg min
µ
ϕ2(Z − µ), (4.31)
we can use the minimum result µ2 of this definition. Given that ϕ = E(Z)2, the operand of
(4.31) can be seen to be the second-central moment, or variance σ22 , of Z . The variance of
Z can, thus, be written as
σ22 = minµ ϕ2(Z − µ2). (4.32)
We use this to define the zero-order equivalent of variance by replacing second-order terms
with their ZOS equivalents [23] such that
δ0 = min
λ
ϕ0(Z − λ0). (4.33)
Using the previous definition of ZOL as the actual value that minimizes the shifted process
(4.29) [23], we estimate (4.33) as
δ0 = ϕ0(Z − λ̂0). (4.34)
Little practical application of ZOD exists in the literature. It is, though, a useful measure of
the spread of α-stable data, particularly because it can also be estimated without incurring
the costs of curve fitting. Our application and assessment of the utility of ZOD is contained
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in Chapter 5; we now assess the effectiveness of the various estimators derived in this
chapter.
4.6 Location Estimator Accuracy
Preliminary results comparing estimator performance are shown in Table 4.2. In this
table, the attack and benign location estimation results for 1,798 individual windows of the
MAWI 20160428 trace are summarized. The stable location parameter µ for each sample
was obtained from the ML α-stable fit to each sample using STABLE [13]. The sample
mode was obtained by numerical search of the sample data vice the histogram.
The results in Table 4.2 warrant further discussion. First, the location estimates in many (but
not all) cases are heavy-tailed, hence the sometimes-large divergence between the mean and
median differences. Second, the LLE is the most accurate estimator of stable location µ.
The ZOL and, to an extent, the sample myriad results correspond more closely to the sample
mode. This is expected according to the theoretical design of the ZOL as a selection-type
estimator; this is also the expectation from the literature that as tuning parameter κ → 0,
the sample myriad behaves as mode-type estimator [34].
Second, all of the stable-based methods outperform the median and mean under benign
conditions by at least 50 percent. Under attack conditions, when the data is frequently
near-Gaussian, the mean and median can be seen to be the best stable location estimators of
µ but less accurate than the alternate methods in determining the sample mode. Overall, the
results of this section imply that the best estimator of the mode of stably-distributed data is
the ZOL, while the best estimate of the stable location is provided by the LLE in the benign
case and the LLE or the mean, median, or LLE in the attack case.
Finally, obtaining representative estimates directly from data is advantageous because it
avoids the computational costs of curve fitting to estimate the four α-stable parameters.
Highly-efficient MLE-based algorithms are available to rapidly perform this estimation,
but the empirical results in Section 5.6 indicate that distribution fitting is approximately
25 times more costly than application of any of the location estimates discussed above, so
our detection system will use the estimators in this chapter in order to support real-time
application.
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Table 4.2. Performance comparison of the sample myriad λM , ZOL λ0, and
LLE λL
Attack Benign
Difference Median Mean Median Mean
λ̂M − µ 13.1 13.2 1.7 1.9
λ̂0 − µ 12.0 12.5 1.8 2.0
λ̂L − µ 7.0 10.0 0.2 0.1
Median||Mean - µ 5.8 3.8 6.2 14.6
λ̂M−mode 0 12.6 10.0 10.5
λ̂0−mode 1.0 13.2 1.8 2.0
λ̂L− mode 10.1 15.7 12 12.3
Median||Mean - mode 20.0 21.9 19.0 27.4
Mean Data Range 635 468
Windows 767 1031
Windows with α ≥ 1.9 60.2% 8.5%
The conclusions of this section must be validated through similar analysis using additional
data sets, additional values of κL and κM , and with data characterized by a wider range of
α (particularly α < 1.5). This is an item of future work; however, for any stably-distributed
network data with α ≥ 1.5 and similar values of κ, it is likely that any change of data set
will yield similar results.
Overall, these preliminary results imply that ifwewish to utilize a location-based approach in
our detection system, we should utilize ZOL as it is the most accurate mode estimator under
all conditions (keeping in mind the small-sample limitations discussed in Section 4.5.2).
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we examined the feasibility of modeling our α-stable network traffic data
using both closed-form solutions based on hypergeometric solutions and approximations
based on stable special cases. Both approaches use weighted mixtures of closed-form
distributions to harness the accuracy of the α-stable distribution; however, both approaches
suffer increased computational cost through first estimating the best α-stable fit through
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MLE and also are constrained in the range of α or β values they can model.
In a third, more lightweight approach, we examined representative attributes that could
describe the best α-stable fit to the data and that could be calculated, rather than estimated,
directly from the data. These SAEs are similar to Gaussian estimates of location, dispersion,
and power. Heavy-tailed assumptions were used to develop estimators for α-stable location,
dispersion, and power attributes. Twoof these location estimators, themyriad andLLE, were
shown to be ML approaches derived using the Cauchy and Lévy assumptions, respectively,
for the distribution of the data. ZOP was defined as an MLE of the second-order moment
using Pareto assumptions. ZOL is not an MLE approach, and there is a small data set
disadvantage that must be considered when applying ZOL, but it has been empirically
shown to produce the most accurate estimates of mode in both attack and benign conditions.
Portions of results and conclusions from these analyses were presented in Section 4.6, with
the remainder held in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5:
Statistical Detection for α-StableData
Thus far, we have demonstrated that many cases of network traffic are stably-distributed.
We have also reviewed detection implications of the α-stable distribution and developed
estimation techniques suited for α-stable data.
In this chapter, we develop the detector, processes, and test statistics for our anomaly
detection system. To describe our detection environment and choose our input signals, we
first develop a modular detection system model. Using this model, we examine a suitable
statistical test (the GLRT) and then adapt a generic GLRT to our specific inputs. Any test
requires a threshold estimate suitable for α-stable data; this threshold relationship is also
derived. The developed algorithms and processes yield a detection system that responds to
the selected signal features calculated using the α-stable estimators from Chapter 4. The
end result is an ML, or in certain cases pseudo-ML, GLRT-based detection system for
detecting volumetric anomalies in network traffic due to DoS attacks.
5.1 Detection Model
Developing a well-defined system model fully enables understanding data flows and perfor-
mance influences and ultimately enables implementation of a detection system. We began
by reviewing the literature for a state-of-the-practice model that can serve as a starting point
for α-stable innovation.
Unfortunately, the existing statistical detection literature does not provide starting designs
with sufficient detail for our purposes. Accordingly, we used the literature as a starting
point to develop our own model of a modular detection system, shown in Figure 5.1.
This development process increased our comprehension of the impacts of design choices
and enabled us to identify specific processes where non-Gaussian methods might be applied
to improve system performance. A basic model of our system is shown in Figure 5.1; a
more detailed system model is contained in the Appendix. Aspects of the basic model
warrant discussion in further detail; we begin with an overview of the system functions,
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Figure 5.1. Network anomaly detection system model used in this research
then examine essential processes in greater detail.
Our anomaly detection (AD) system collects network traffic for a given period of time,
the sample window, $. To eliminate unnecessary data in the sample, the system filters
the collected data for specific features that can be analyzed using the tests in the detector.
Commonly-analyzed features include source and destination IP addresses, packet rate, and
byte rate.
Some aspect of the chosen feature is then measured (i.e., counted) over a uniform counting
period, the sub-window (∆sw). Each measurement per counting period forms an individual
vector element di; concatenating M instances of di produces the input feature vector dt . The
detection process then extracts pertinent attributes or attribute estimates from the vector to
produce the current-window input to the test statistic λ̂t .
The test statistic compares λ̂t to an estimate of the feature’s normal, or expected, value
λ̂re f . In a more advanced implementation (e.g., the modular system in the Appendix), this 
estimate of normal is produced through a combination of memory, weighting (or decay), 
and updating processes. In our proof-of-concept system, the normal estimate is simply the 
most recent prior d that does not contain attack traffic. We call this the benign prior 
reference sample dre f .
A score is then produced by comparing dre f to dt based on a test statistic that is appropriately
designed for the selected feature. If the score exceeds the threshold, an alert is generated
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through a reporting process.
Optionally, a more complex adaptive implementation, such as that shown in the Appendix,
uses a mechanism to control and update system settings such as the monitored features,
window size, and threshold. This work does not add those layers of complexity; adaptive
improvements are items of future work.
Now that we have described an overall framework for processing and testing, more specific
descriptions are necessary for some of the key processes in Figure 5.1.
5.2 Key Detection Processes
Some detection system processes are relatively straightforward and not worth additional
discussion outside of impacts on accuracy or documentation outside of the code in the
Appendix (e.g., filtering and feature extraction). Others bear elaboration, namelywindowing
and feature selection, which are discussed in further detail in this section, and activity
recognition, a complex process that is rigorously described in Section 5.3. Once we
describe the processes for measuring the contents of the signal, it is then defined and tested.
5.2.1 Data Windowing
As we demonstrated in Chapter 3, the size of the window and the sub-window can notably
affect the fit of themodel and distribution of features and, thus, can influence the performance
of the entire detection system.
In addition to $ and ∆sw , window overlap ∆o, defined in percent, is another windowing
concept that affects the feature vector. This term can be varied; large overlaps divide
changes due to anomalies over multiple dt , which can make detecting a specific change
more difficult (particularly with transient anomalies with a duration approaching $).
To maximize the accuracy of the Monte Carlo simulations, given the relatively small (<
15 minute) data traces that were available, the results examined in this work generally set
∆o ∈ [50%, 90%]. Examination and optimization of the effects of ∆o on system accuracy
is an item for future work, but some qualitative examination of the effects of large ∆o is
contained in Section 5.5.
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5.2.2 Feature Vector
Each sample is a feature vector; the detection system can test one or more feature vectors in
each window using one or more test statistics. A multiple-test implementation generates an
ensemble score from multiple test statistics and is called a layered detection system [70].
Layering can be used to refine the results of individual test statistics and has the potential to
produce more accurate detection systems. Layering and ensemble techniques are a highly
interesting item of future work, as they seem to be relatively unexamined in the recent
literature and may present significant opportunity for accuracy improvement.
In keeping with a proof-of-concept demonstration, however, in this work we examine only
one feature (packets per sub-window) over one window and apply only one test to the feature
vector; thus, our detector ultimately compares a dt and dre f , comprised of M counts of
packets over time $. With the sampling process fully described, let us now define our
signals and determine our hypotheses for testing.
5.2.3 Signal Definitions
As outlined in Chapter 1, our problem is that of detecting a change in streaming data
represented as discrete time series. This problem is complicated by the following unknowns:
1. The distribution of the signal varies in each sample dt .
2. The time of change is unknown; each dt of the series must be examined.
Our signal is constantly changing due to small randomeffects, as demonstrated by Figure 3.5.
The signal significantly changes at the onset of an attack, and these changes persist for the
duration of the attack, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we also showed that
the signal, both before and after the change, can be most accurately (and flexibly) modeled
using RVs following an α-stable distribution.
The distribution of the signal both before and after the attack is unknown and, should we
wish to apply parametric methods, must be estimated for each dt of our received signal, Z .
The vector θ was defined in Chapter 4 as the set of stable distribution parameters {α, β, γ, µ},
where θb and θk describe received benign and attack traffic, respectively.
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In the benign case of the signal without an attack
dt ∼ X ∼ S(θb) (5.1)
where RV X describes benign, but constantly-changing, background traffic in window t,
collected via an ordered time series of samples.
Due to the properties of random variables, adding attack traffic distributed per RV K results
in convolution of the benign and attack traffic, changing the distribution of the received
signal such that
dt ∼ X ∗ K ∼ S(θk) (5.2)
These definitions of our received signals can now be used to specify hypotheses that
differentiate between the following cases:
H0: dt ∼ S(θb) and
H1: dt ∼ S(θk).
With the overall system specified and our hypotheses described, we now proceed to defining
our testing process. This is the objective of the next section.
5.3 Activity Recognition: The Detector
The process of Activity Recognition, where the test statistic is compared to the detection
threshold, is critical to system accuracy and bears examination in detail. We begin this
discussion by developing the actual detector test(s) and then determine an approach for
calculating the threshold to which the test results are compared.
5.3.1 Testing Approach of Prior Work
Prior α-stable network anomaly detection work used a GLRT to perform parametric hy-
pothesis testing, comparing traffic samples to a historical library of known benign traffic
samples [10]. This approach borders on a signature-type methodology, where accurate
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representative samples of benign traffic are required for the test to perform. Signature
methods are known to be ineffective against unknown attacks. Additionally, the previous
work’s accuracy can be reduced should current traffic not follow previous patterns (e.g.,
due to the installation of new devices in the case of a small network, or a change in peering
agreements in the case of an autonomous system).
To support real-time implementation and reduce system complexity, our implementation
uses non-parametric data transformations (i.e., SAEs) to produce single-valued estimates. If
wewish to the avoid the high costs of estimating θ, then ourmethodsmust be non-parametric,
which we achieve by applying estimators that function with data of any distribution (though
they are formulated for our anticipated distribution). Similarly, we apply a non-Bayesian
GLRT to compare the signal and associated hypotheses of Section 5.2.3. The non-linear
nature of our signal requires use of a likelihood ratio test and the Bayesian-based approaches
are computationally costly and require a priori assumptions that may be incorrect [49].
To the best of our knowledge, this work constitutes the first real-time, non-parametric net-
work anomaly detection system developed using α-stable approaches. Our non-parametric
methods feed the lightweight location and dispersion estimates of Chapter 4 into a GLRT,
which are now derived.
5.3.2 Development of the GLRT
If the distribution of the signal was known beforehand, wewould apply the optimal Neyman-





where τ is given by





As the attack signal is unknown, we instead apply a GLRT in our detector. The GLRT Λ(·)
adapts the optimal likelihood ratio test of (5.3) for the unknown parameters θ in our signal
dt . It is the most-frequently applied alternative to a Neyman-Pearson test as it has been
proven to approach optimality for large data records or signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) [52].
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Our GLRT compares the likelihood of our two hypotheses p(dt ;H1) and p(dt ;H0) to a





and H0 if Λ(dt) ≤ τ [52]. The threshold τ is set empirically or derived from the fixed FAR
χ by solving





Evaluation of this likelihood ratio as written requires obtaining the MLE of the two hy-
potheses under consideration. MLEs are computationally costly for stable distributions
because four related parameters must be determined; empirical observation has shown that
estimation of the four stable function parameters for a single data sample (i.e., fitting a sta-
ble PDF to the sample) is approximately 10-500x more expensive than applying the SAEs.
Accordingly, while an anomaly detection system could be derived from MLEs of the data
(and is a candidate for future work), we maximize the scalability of our system by using the
more lightweight SAEs developed in Chapter 4.
Stable Attribute Estimator-based GLRTs
To do so, (5.5) must be adapted to our problem of SAE-based detection in a time series.
This GLRT can be re-written to use the current and benign reference samples in the form of
Λ(dt) =
p (dt)
p (dre f )
≷ τ (5.7)
where dt ∼ Zt (the current process sample), and dre f ∼ Zre f for the most recent, benign-
traffic-only sample (i.e.,H0).
In our lightweight approach, the numerator and denominator are replaced by any suitable







or alternately, applying the ln(·) operator
lnΛ(dt) = ln
(
λ̂0, t − λ̂0, re f
)
≷ ln τ. (5.9)
We have, thus, developed a log-likelihood ratio test statistic for our detection system that can
be expressed in closed form and is less computationally expensive than distribution-based
MLE approaches, but while we now have a form for the left side of test statistic inequality,
the threshold remains to be defined.
5.3.3 Threshold
The literature frequently defines τ by evaluating the PDF of the signal with respect to a fixed
FAR χ; this is the CFAR approach frequently used in radar and other detection systems [43],
[52], [71]. This is a viable method for our implementation, and the development of this
test is fairly straightforward based on the null hypothesis: numerically integrate a benign
reference sample (H0) to determine the threshold τ, which includes (1 − χ) percent of
samples.
As an alternative, τ can be estimated from previous samples by a variety of methods suited
for boundingRVs. Unfortunately, the vastmajority of threshold determination approaches in
the literature rely on assumptions of Gaussianity. Finding a suitable non-Gaussian approach
required a search of robust techniques and outlier analysis methods for alternate approaches,
such as non-parametric Markov and Chebyshev bounds. Non-parametric approaches have
increased applicability to various types of data and, as a consequence, looser bounds [60].
Our literature review identified a promising candidate, the Hoeffding inequality, which is
derived using Markov’s inequality and has been shown to produce tighter bounds than both
the Markov and Chebyshev inequalities [60]. The Hoeffding bound is also non-parametric
and advantageous for our application because it has a more general (i.e., non-exponential)
tail assumption than the other non-parametric candidates [60].
For an RV X that can be expressed as the sum of N independent RVs [60], the Hoeffding
inequality defines an upper bound ρ such that
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where ui and li are the upper and lower bounds of the independent RVs. The proof is
available [60], but for our purposes the constraints of the Hoeffding Inequality are more
important.
The Hoeffding Inequality assumes bounded RVs and is defined using the first moment;
α-stable distributions with α < 1 do not possess either of these properties. Rather than
constrain its applicability in our detection system to samples where α > 1, we make use of
Theorem 1 (Section 4.5) to permit application of finite measures of finite data that follows
a heavy-tailed distribution.
Lemma 1.1 enables the application of the Hoeffding bound in our detection system. For
chosen FAR χ and N = 1 samples, (5.10) can be reformulated to define our threshold





We have now defined the hypothesis test, test statistics, and threshold that are applied in the
Activity Recognition module; however, one additional sub-process that was not explicitly
included in Figure 5.1 bears discussion, differencing.
5.3.4 Differencing
Differencing is a data transformation accomplished by subtracting a prior sample from the
current sample. This technique is frequently applied in time-series analysis to mitigate the
effects of non-stationary trends in the data, but we do not use it for this purpose as we have
previously established that our data is trend stationary over the utilized sampling periods.
More aligned to our objectives, differencing is also used to mitigate the impacts of random
walks or other short-term cyclic influences that do not affect the series stationarity [62],
such as those seen in Figure 3.5.
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Differencing Demonstration
We apply differencing in some of our detector tests for two reasons. First, as our data is
subject to random walks, it may be logical to remove this potential accuracy degradation if
sufficiently small ∆o is used. Second, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, DoS attacks broaden
the distribution of the traffic sample by causing a higher per-sub-window packet rate over
the baseline benign traffic. Differencing the sample under test with a prior benign sample
increases the apparent signal strength of the attack by more sharply revealing the outliers.
This can best be demonstrated visually and is illustrated in Figure 5.2. This figure was
created by randomly choosing two attack and three benign windows from the MAWI
20160428 cases, then differencing each sample with a benign sample and plotting the
resulting histograms. The outliers in the attack cases show how differencing more distinctly
reveals changes in the traffic distribution during an attack.
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Figure 5.2. Varying effect of differencing benign and attack cases
Examining this figure, we see that differencing tends to eliminate “redundant”measurements
that occur in both samples and add little value when determining the difference between
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samples. The high similarity of the benign samples is proven by the clustering of the
differenced results around zero. Differencing the attack samples, however, reveals large-
magnitude outliers concentrated far from the origin. This result should produce a strong
signal, as measured by one or more of our SAEs, and large separation from the benign case,
leading to a large Pd at relatively small P f a.
Differencing Effect on Test Statistic
When differencing is applied in our detection system, we subtract the immediately-prior
benignwindow. In practicality, this results in ourGLRT test of (5.8) becoming a differencing
GLRT Λd(·), expressed as
Λd(dt) =
δ̂0, t − δ̂0, re f
δ̂0, re f − δ̂0 (re f−1)
≷ τ. (5.12)
Again, any of our SAEs can be substituted for the estimator in the numerator and denominator
in (5.12).
5.4 Summary of Detection Processes
To this point in the chapter, we have defined the inputs and the essential internal processes
of our detection system through developing and elaborating our system model. Key re-
lationships were derived for the detector, including the GLRT test statistics Λ(·) and the
associated threshold τ. The test statistics of (5.8) or (5.12) can be used with any SAE; these
estimators of dt are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Stable attributes using stable-based estimators
Description Symbol Formula





κ2 + (zi − λ)2
)








Zero Order Location (ZOL) λ̂0 arg min
∑
N ln |yi − δ |
Zero Order Dispersion (ZOD) δ0 ϕ̂0(yi − δ̂0)
Zero Order Power (ZOP) ϕ̂ exp( 1N
∑
N ln |yi |)
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Definition of the test statistics allows comparing performance results between SAEs as well
as against classical tests such as mean, median, and variance, and this is the subject of the
remainder of this chapter. For this comparison, we display only the results of ZOD and
ZOL, as their test statistics have produced the best results to date. Full quantification of the
performance differences between SAEs and optimization of their test statistics is an item of
future work.
5.5 Results: Anomaly Detection
We applied our test statistics of ZOL and ZOD, as well as mean and median, to two different
MAWI datasets. These datasets include two types DoS attacks at two different volumes. The
type of attack is not critical; however, the volumes were specifically chosen to demonstrate
the ability of our system to detect both low and high volume attacks. We first review our
proof-of-concept methodology, then present the detection results and their analysis.
5.5.1 Proof-of-Concept Methodology
This proof-of-concept was designed to provide an end-to-end demonstration of some of the
accuracy gains available from designing a network anomaly detection system that harnesses
non-Gaussian methods. The following processing and measurement steps were used to
generate our results, which are summarized in Figure 5.3:
1. Identify candidate MAWI traces, including attack and benign portions.
2. Download designated traces in .dump or .pcap format and truncate into benign and
attack portions using editcap.exe, a command-line function of Wireshark.
3. Use a Python script to subdivide the attack and benign portions into N samples with
M elements, counting the packets transiting the MAWI link per ∆sw . The outputs of
this script are a series of .txt files.
4. Ingest and process the benign and attack cases into a Monte Carlo routine per Sec-
tion 2.5.2.
5. Process the Monte Carlo results using built-in MATLAB routines and generate the
ROCs shown in this chapter.
The following technical notes may be of concern to the interested reader. All results in
this section were generated using a Monte Carlo trial size T = 20, 000 unless otherwise
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Generate attack and 
benign packet count 
samples using python
Perform T Monte 
Carlo trials for given 
selected test
Figure 5.3. Major process steps in the implemented end-to-end detection
system proof-of-concept
noted. Additionally, data was fit and generated during Monte Carlo analysis using the
commercial program STABLE vice MATLAB; although, fits displayed in figures in this
work were generated using the MATLAB MLE algorithms for convenience [13], [39].
Finally, all Python and MATLAB scripts that are referenced in this work are included in the
Appendices.
5.5.2 Low Volume Anomaly: MAWI 20160428 Trace
The MAWI 20160428 trace was selected as our low volume attack case because the magni-
tude of the attack flow against the target IP address 163.32.146.254 varies between 15 and
25 % of the baseline traffic. Typical web servers run between 20% and 65% of capacity,
with the lower figure being more typical of on-premises versus cloud servers [72]; thus, we
consider a 20% volumetric DoS attack to be a reasonable representation of the approximate
lower bound of an effective brute-force attack.
Approximately four minutes of the overall packet rate, in packets per 100 ms, is shown in
black, with the isolated attack-only volume in red, in Figure 5.4. The attack commences at
05:08:32 and continues until the end of the trace. (Note: Unless otherwise stated, stated
times are as given in the trace). This duration produced a large number of attack and benign
reference cases, which we coarsely identified by labeling all cases prior to 05:08:30 as
benign and all cases after 05:08:35 as attack.
Processing the benign (30 – 510 s) and attack (540 – 900 s) portions of theMAWI 20160428
trace using our chosen overlap andwindowparameters generated 763 attack and 1030 benign
cases. For both the low volume and high volume scenarios, the settings used to process the
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Figure 5.4. Change in packet rate due to low-volume DoS attack
traces as well as the resultant number of attack and benign samples are shown in Table 5.2.
In this table, as in the entirety of this chapter, $ and ∆sw are in units of seconds and
milliseconds, respectively.
Table 5.2. Summary of analysis parameters and number of cases for exam-
ined scenarios
MAWI Trace $ ∆sw ∆o Attack Cases Benign Cases
20160428 3 4 5/6 767 1031
20151114 3 4 11/12 1281 895
Using these benign and attack cases, we generated ROCs to compare the performance of
the α-stable test statistics, ZOL and ZOD, to their equivalent classical test statistics of mean
and variance. Figure 5.5 contains the only ROC showing the variance performance curve,
as the results from this statistic were consistently inferior to the other alternatives. For this
and all other ROCs, the performance of α-stable estimators is shown using solid lines, and
estimator family (e.g., ZOD and variance) are grouped by color.
The results of Figure 5.5 are somewhat encouraging, particularly given the significant
improvement in performance obtained by using the stable-derived ZOD instead of the
variance. The results did not align with overall expectations for improvement, however,
so investigation of concerns that arose during the Monte Carlo methodology development
was required. This investigation identified an adverse effect that we call probabilistic
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Figure 5.5. MAWI 20160428 (low volume) ROC comparison of stable and
classical estimators when using generated samples
sample smoothing (PSS), the result of a preliminaryMonte Carlo implementation that used
randomly-selected STABLEfits to probabilistically re-create data samples. These generated
samples, vice the actual samples that had been collected from the MAWI .pcap, were then
used to generate the ROC in Figure 5.5.
5.5.3 Impact of Sample Smoothing
PSS results from this method of using the MLE fits of previously-collected data to generate
new random samples for analysis. While generating data samples introduces additional
randomness to the performance assessment and permitsmore trials (and conceivably amore-
robust result), the generated-data method also has a tendency to remove actual outliers that
could significantly affect the detection results. For this reason, we consider the generated-
sample Monte Carlo approach to be a less realistic indicator of system performance. The
generated-sample approachmay, however, serve as an effective lower bound on performance
for potential designs.
The effects of PSS are illustrated in Figure 5.6, which compares histograms of a randomly-
selected actual sample and its generated equivalent, which was produced using the MLE
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α-stable parameters of the actual sample. The generated-sample histogram and fits are
given in black, while the sampled histogram and fits are shown in red. In this figure,
the unintended effects of data generation on the dispersion and mode density are evident.
Although the overall shifts are small, the effect on estimator results and detector performance
were believed to be significant. To confirm this speculation, we altered the Monte Carlo
algorithm to utilize only randomly-selected actual samples from the attack and benign pools
per the method described in Chapter 2 and re-examined performance.














 Generated Data from MLE Fit
  MLE of Generated Data
 Original Sample Data
  MLE of Original Data
Figure 5.6. Comparison of original and simulated benign data samples
5.5.4 Monte Carlo Results using Actual Samples
The improved ROC from using the revised algorithm (i.e., actual vice generated data
samples) for the low-volume attack scenario is shown in Figure 5.7, this time for a Monte
Carlo implementation of 50,000 trials. Again, mean and ZOL curves in this figure are
denoted by red lines, while dispersion estimators are shown in blue. The performance curve
resulting from a test statistic based on the median is shown in grey (for display purposes)
in Figure 5.7; the performance improvement of the α-stable estimators over this alternative
robust statistic is notable.
ZOL Performance and Analysis in Low Volume Scenario
Two aspects of Figure 5.7 warrant further discussion. First, in this scenario, ZOL out-
performs the mean and median over the entire performance curve. This is particularly
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Figure 5.7. MAWI 20160428 (low volume) ROC comparison of stable and
classical estimators when using actual samples
interesting because the mean is known to be the optimum location parameter for Gaussian
distributions, and we established in Chapter 3 that attack traffic takes a Gaussian (or near-
Gaussian) shape. For the scenario in Figure 5.7, nearly half (308 of 767) attack cases are
near-Gaussian with α values > 1.95 (where the MLE fit begins to become less reliable based
on empirical observation and the literature [13]). Effectively, even in a very-near Gaussian
environment, ZOL performs at least as well as the optimal metric for a large number of
the cases. This is a strong empiric demonstration of the effectiveness of ZOL and also
demonstrates the literature consensus that traditional linear-based detection performance
declines rapidly in the presence of non-Gaussian signals [21], [43].
Second, ZOL outperforms the median, though not by the same amount as the mean. The
median is a frequently-used “robust statistic” and is optimal when the sample follows
a Laplace distribution [23]. The performance of the SAEs relative to the median bear
examination using additional datasets and samples, but it is clear from Figure 5.7 as well as
our other empirical results that ZOL is a better robust statistic for our examined scenarios.
(Note that these results regarding the median are repeated, though not shown, in the high-
volume scenario that is discussed in the next section.)
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ZOD Performance in Low Volume Attack Scenario
The performance of the |ZOD| test statistic (shown in blue) for the case in Figure 5.7 bears
additional analysis on several points. First, both ZOL and |ZOD| are highly accurate. Their
performance is comparable to or better than the best recent statistical AD results in the
literature, as summarized in Table 5.3. The results from this research are summarized in
the top four lines of this table.
Note that the peer studies in Table 5.3 were chosen based on publication quality, age, and
rough comparability in terms of datasets and methodology. All approaches in this table are
statistical except the last entry (i.e., NFBoost), which was a state-of-the-practice machine
learning implementation using neural networks at the time of this dissertation [7]. The
comparable results of Simmross-Wattenberg et al. [10] are given by the 2011 entries, with
the volumes of the closest comparable DoS attack scenarios given by percentage in the
“Algorithm” column. The results of the other comparable non-Gaussian statistical network
anomaly detection implementation were conveyed in Figure 3.1 [5].
Table 5.3. Performance comparison of dissertation results to selected recent
network AD studies
Study date Detection Technique Pd P f a Algorithm Source
2018 MAWI 160428 95.2 1.31 ZOL -
2018 MAWI 160428 98.64 3.04 |ZOD| -
2018 MAWI 151114 99.88 0 ZOL -
2018 MAWI 151114 99.97 0.06 |ZOD| -
2017 MAWI 79 20 Sketch Entropy [73]
2014 KDD Cup 98.56 0.42 - 3.72 Entropy [74]
2016 Proprietary 91 10 Multifractal [75]
2016 Proprietary 89.6 12.6 Kalman Filtering [75]
2016 Proprietary 88 16.7 NCAS [75]
2017 Proprietary 78 0.55 Sketch&Bloom [76]
2011 Proprietary 35 10 α-stable (25%) [10]
2011 Proprietary 81 5 α-stable (100%) [10]
2012 Mixed Public 98.8 1.9 NFBoost [7]
A second observation that should be drawn from Figure 5.7 is that ZOD achieves perfect
detection (as does variance, although at a higher P f a). This implies that ZOD is an
excellent discriminator in a multi-layer or ensemble detection system. Full examination of
ZOD performance and development of multi-layer detection systems are items of future
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work, but these preliminary results are promising.
Third, the ZOD test statistic in Figure 5.7 is annotated as |ZOD| because it is a slight
adaptation of the formula in (4.33). Traffic modeling research (described in Chapter 3)
identified that attacks increase dispersion. The differencing method was shown to enhance
the separation of attack outliers; however, while developing the proof-of-concept detection
system, analysis of false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) cases identified that ZODwas
not performing as expected. This discrepancy appeared to be due to the formula of (4.33)
allowing positive and negative differences to offset when summed. ZOD was thus adapted
to fully capture the dispersion changes during an attack by quantifying the total magnitude









dt − d(re f−1)
)
, (5.14)
d(re f−1) is the sample prior to the benign reference sample, and ZOP and ZOL are estimated
from the sample under test.
Overall, ZOL and |ZOD| outperform their classical counterparts in the low volume attack
scenario and imply potential for layering in a future ensemble detector. It is, however,
appropriate to validate this assessment using other datasets and attacks. For the second
scenario, we chose a high-volume DoS attack found in the MAWI 20151114 trace.
5.5.5 High Volume Anomaly: MAWI 20151114 Trace
An overview of our selected high volume attack scenario is shown in Figure 5.8, a plot of
the packet rate per 100 ms over time for part of the MAWI 20151114 trace. A flooding
attack begins 227 s into the trace and persists through the remainder of the trace. The benign
period is characterized by a packet volume fluctuating around 185,000 packets per second,
and the rate jumps 227 s after the trace start to approximately 370,000 packets per second.
This attack is a periodic, volumetric attack with a typical rate of approximately 100% of the
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benign reference portion. The ON/OFF periods are approximately 27 and 5 s, respectively.
While not shown due to space constraints, no portion of this trace after 21:03:47, other than
OFF periods, has a rate less than or equal to the benign portion.
Figure 5.8. Volumetric overview of the benign and attack sections in the
high volume attack scenario
A close-up volumetric display of the attack is shown in Figure 5.9, a plot of packets per
second over time for the start of the attack portions of the MAWI 20151114 trace. This plot
is for the time period from 21:04:00–21:08:00. The typical packet rate doubles during the
attack, with ON/OFF periods of approximately 27 and 5 s continuing. The dark bars in the
plot are counts of TCP errors automatically identified by Wireshark.
To develop our ROC for the high volume case, we divided the trace into attack and benign
portions by time and subsequent rate analysis. All samples with an end time prior to
21:03:44 were labeled as benign; for the chosen $ and ∆o, this time period produced 895
benign samples. We sampled the next six minutes of the trace for attack data; this period
provided at least as many attack samples after purging invalid samples. Invalid attack
samples (obtained during an OFF period) were removed after classification as such based
on timing and measured ZOL, though these samples possessed additional indicators (e.g.,
significant drop in α, increasing mean-ZOL divergence, and bi-modal distribution) that may
be used to build improved detection systems in future work.
The population of attack and benign cases used in our Monte Carlo analysis of test statistic
effectiveness in the high volume scenario is given in Table 5.2. The results of the Monte
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Figure 5.9. Detailed view of packet rate for portions of the periodic high
volume DoS attack
Carlo analysis of the high volume trace are shown in Figure 5.10, illustrating that the
classical detectors of mean and median provide slightly better performance than ZOL for
larger P f a.
Additional analysis of these results shows that, in this scenario, the high volume attack
frequently produces a bi-modal distribution of packet counts per sub-window for the chosen
sampling settings. In the presence of a bi-modal data distribution with the primary mode
on the left (at a lower value), the ZOL and median robustness against outliers leads to a
performance disadvantage, as the mean responds more dramatically to outliers. This effect
is visually demonstrated in Figure 5.11, which is a plot of the packet volume histogram and
location estimates from an attack transition (i.e., OFF-ON transition) sample of the MAWI
20151114 trace.
In this figure, the ZOL returns an estimate closely corresponding to the primary mode
of the sample, while the mean estimate nearly splits the difference between the primary
and sample modes. This window was labeled as an attack for our Monte Carlo analysis;
extrapolating this case to the many transition periods included in this ON-OFF type attack
explains the overall reduced ZOL performance relative to the mean for this scenario.
Returning to Figure 5.10, we see that |ZOD| performs nearly perfectly (i.e., Pd = 99.9%
for P f a = 0.001%). Recalling that |ZOD| is proportional to the magnitude of the difference
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Figure 5.10. System ROC for the MAWI 20151114 high volume DoS attack
scenario
between the outlying samples and the location estimate per (5.13), we can understand how
the combination of a resistant ZOL and the large secondary mode in Figure 5.11 results in
a very large value for |ZOD|. Put another way, |ZOD| requires the robustness of ZOL (and
associated lessened performance in this scenario) to produce its superior result.
Overall, we have shown that the selected SAEs, when applied using suitable test statistics,
outperform classic Gaussian estimators (e.g., mean and variance) as well as the robust
classical estimator, the median. These performance gains were due to applying α-stable -
based tests in our detection systems that were aligned with and adapted (slightly) to take
advantage of the non-Gaussianity of the data. One important consideration of this result is
that it can be extended to any discipline that performs similar processing of non-Gaussian,
α-stable -distributed data.
Now that we have achieved one of our goals of a more accurate detection system, let us
examine its scalability and potential for real-time application.
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Figure 5.11. Comparison of estimator performance under bi-modal condi-
tions frequently observed during the high volume attack scenario
5.6 Results: Real-Time Potential
The scalability analysis in this section considers only the times required to ingest and process
input data files consisting of M counts of packets per sub-window, as our goal is to achieve
a total processing time ttot that is significantly less than the window size$. As such, our ttot
should includewindowing twin, sample ingestion timp, sample estimation test , and testing tdet .
The time required to actually measure and record features on the link and produce a .pcap of
the traffic is highly dependent upon end-user hardware and implementation choices. Given
our approach can process the input in a timely manner, the problem of obtaining hardware
to support actual implementation requirements is delegated to the interested user.
Given these assumptions, the processes of sample ingestion, estimation, and detection were
integrated into a MATLAB timing script (contained in the Appendix) that was used to
measure tp over 10,000 sequential runs and determine the average detection time t̄d and
average total processing time t̄tot (which includes the windowing cost twin of ingesting .pcap
data and producing the feature vector). The results of this assessment are contained in
Table 5.4, while the the average estimation times for each SAE developed in Chapter 4 (also
averaged over 10,000 trials) are contained in Table 5.5. To identify any dependency of the
computational cost on feature vector size (i.e., size of the sample in sub-windows), timing
results are given for two values of M commonly used during analysis of the MAWI traces.
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Table 5.4. Computational cost in µs of major detection process steps for a
given sample size
M $ twin timp test tdet t̄d t̄tot
750 3 690,690 713 715 1 1,429 692,118
1,200 6 875,862 753 717 1 1,471 877,333
Table 5.5. Computational cost in µs of estimators when processing a given
sample size
M Mean Myriad LLE ZOL |ZOD| ZOP Stable Fit
750 5 9,300 379 725 715 5 42,055
1,200 5 - 290 709 717 4 -
As we consider the times in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, it is important to consider that the
scripts for .pcap processing as well as the LLE and all ZOS estimators were coded by
the authors and are, as such, un-optimized. This implies that these timing results should
be used for performance comparison only between order-of-magnitude groupings. Still,
several conclusions can be drawn from Table 5.5.
First, any of these processes, with the possible exception of fitting an α-stable distribution,
should be easily scalable to a real-time environment. Note that twin was not determined from
10,000 trials due to performance issues associated with un-optimized code that resulted in
significant slowdowns as .pcap size increased. Offsetting this issue, twin includes the cost to
open and read the .pcap file as well as the cost to write the output file to disk; a streamlined
detection implementation would use smaller records and avoid the expensive file reads
and writes. Because .pcap import was the costliest process, accounting for nearly half
of the total counting time, we remain confident in our assessment that our methodology
supports real-time implementation because even our un-optimized system can complete an
end-to-end detection process on 3 and 6 s records in less than a second.
Some additional conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the total processing
time for six estimators shown in Table 5.5; these results demonstrate that any of the given
estimators can process a sample in less than one second using a personal computer. Note
that myriad and stable fit times were not recorded for the 1200-element sample due to their
large computational cost.
The second conclusion is that estimators can be grouped by performance based on cost
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increases of greater than an order of magnitude:
• The cheapest estimates take only a few microseconds and are obtained directly from
the data: mean and ZOP aswell asmedian andmode (not shown for display purposes).
• Single-parameter ML estimators cost a few hundred microseconds: myriad, LLE,
ZOL, and by extension, ZOD.
• The most expensive process is the stable MLE fit, which costs a few thousand mi-
croseconds (approximately 500 times more expensive than the least expensive op-
tions).
Finally, ZOD is costly because it relies on the determination of ZOL as well as ZOP. While
the larger execution time reduces its attractiveness slightly, ZOD is still implementable
as a real-time estimator. Given the relatively modest performance specifications of the
computer used to produce the analysis in this work, the results of this section demonstrate
the scalability of our stable-based estimation and detection methods.
The interested reader should note that the results in this work were obtained on a personal
computer running Windows 7 with 32 GB of installed memory and a 2.6 GHz Intel®
Xeon™(E5-2640V3) 8-core processor. The Python version 2.6 and MATLAB r2017a
codes used in this research were not optimized or coded for parallel computing. The use
of commodity hardware and un-optimized code implies that the methods proposed in this
research could be scaled to link rates much greater than 1 Gbps at substantially-reduced
computational cost.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we developed our modular AD system model, which we then used to specify
our data processing approaches. This allowed defining our input signal as well as test
statistics, which were adapted to both an α-stable signal and our requirement for real-time
feasibility. The performance curves of Section 5.5 demonstrated that stable-based estimators
provide superior detection performance than classical approaches when processing the α-
stable signals common in our selected network traffic traces. Finally, through a timing
evaluation of our end-to-end proof-of-concept system, we showed that α-stable network
traffic samples could be ingested, windowed, estimated, and tested in less than a second
using an off-the-shelf personal computer.
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This investigation began by exploring the ability of the α-stable distribution to accurately
model network traffic across a range of aggregation periods, network traffic rates, and
traffic types. The α-stablemodel was extended to include three public datasets (e.g., ISCX,
MACCDC, and MAWI) and multiple traffic types, including benign, noisy, transition, and
attack. This modeling work demonstrated that α-stable network traffic models are the most
appropriate for the range of examined datasets and scenarios, as quantified using the LL
ratio and average Hellinger distance.
The possibility of an α-stable parametric detection system was then assessed, using ap-
proximation or estimation of the α-stable parameters to reduce computational cost. Hy-
pergeometric and Lévy decomposition methods for approximating α-stable distributions
were examined; these approaches were abandoned after determination that their constraints
and computational costs excessively restricted the flexibility of the intended implemen-
tation. Instead, sample estimators derived from non-Gaussian heavy-tailed distributions,
namely the Cauchy and α-stable , were examined. A novel location estimator based on the
Lévy distribution was also developed. The performance of these stable-derived estimators
was evaluated with respect to traditional estimators such as mean and median in terms of
computational cost as well as location accuracy.
The heavy-tailed estimators were used to develop and test a network anomaly detection
system based solely on α-stable principles and non-parametric methods; i.e., no processes
or algorithms were used in the detection system that relied on assumptions that samples
or process errors followed a Gaussian distribution. A Monte Carlo evaluation was used
to assess the end-to-end accuracy and computational cost of this system for two types and
volumes of DoS attacks contained in real-world network traffic traces. The results of Monte
Carlo evaluation were assessed using ROCs.
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6.1 Contributions
Based on our review of the literature, this work provides a novel statistical, non-parametric
α-stable network anomaly detection system. The sole previous α-stable implementation
was a parametric system, evaluating the change in the ML α-stable fit and did not operate
in real time [10].
6.1.1 Anomaly Detection
The proposed system is the first demonstration of a proof-of-concept non-parametric, non-
Gaussian, statistical network anomaly detector with real-time capability. The estimators
used, ZOL and |ZOD|, performed well in both non-Gaussian benign traffic and attack traffic
(which tends toward Gaussian distributions). The flexibility of these estimators led to a
significant improvement in statistical network anomaly detection accuracy as compared to
the existing body of both Gaussian and non-Gaussian methods.
Results showed that the α-stable estimator of ZOL improved Pd by 6.5% in the low-volume
scenario over that of the Gaussian-based mean, at a 1.0% P f a. The α-stable |ZOD| estimator
improved Pd by 10% in the low-volume scenario over that of variance at a fixed 2%
P f a. In the high volume scenario, |ZOD| had nearly-perfect performance; the remaining
estimators demonstrated nearly equivalent performance, with ZOL outperforming mean for
P f a ≤ 0.1%
The proposed methodology also demonstrates the viability of real-time volumetric network
anomaly detection based on α-stable principles. The implemented non-parametric system
required a total, un-optimized processing time of less than 900 ms to import traffic captures
(e.g., .pcaps), detect anomalies, and report results for blocks of 3- and 6-s network traffic
samples collected from a 1-Gbps link. The un-optimized time to only handle and process
feature vectors in the detection system was less than 2 ms.
In terms of the SAEs applied in the implemented system, this research contains a novel
application of ZOS to network anomaly detection based on our review of the literature.
The ZOL was found to improve detection performance by 3.8% and 0.25% over a com-
parable robust method, the median, for the low and high volume scenarios, respectively.
Additionally, in this research we developed and demonstrated a novel, stable-based location
estimator: LLE. From limited investigation, the LLE appears to provide accurate estimates
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of the location of the data mode and possess properties and performance similar to the other
stable-derived sample myriad and ZOL estimators.
6.1.2 Traffic Modeling
The proposed methodology validates the improved network traffic modeling accuracy of
α-stable distributions via examination of multiple cases of three publicly-available datasets
for a range of normal and abnormal scenarios and aggregation periods using a quantitative
performance comparison. The α-stable distribution was shown to accurately model network
traffic at high-speed link rates (e.g., 1 Gbps) using analysis windows that are only a few
seconds in length, two orders of magnitude smaller than windows used previously in stable-
based work (and an order of magnitude smaller when accounting for differences in traffic
rates).
As part of this α-stablemodeling extension, it was identified that it is possible to improve
the fit of the stable model by up to 50% through adjusting sub-window size, even as the
traffic distribution tends towards Gaussian (i.e., during attacks). Preliminary investigation
indicates that this same gain does not appear to apply to Gaussian models and definitely
not to the same extent. Fit error of the α-stablemodel, as measured by dHel , was found to
possess a global minimum in many of the examined traffic scenarios. This global minimum
implies that adaptive methodologies can be applied to reduce fit error and improve detection
system accuracy when employing α-stable parametric detection methods. Finally, limited
investigation also demonstrated that α-stablemodel fit appears to be relatively insensitive
to window size, justifying the use of smaller data windows to speed traffic analysis and,
presumably, network anomaly detection without significantly sacrificing accuracy.
The exploration of traffic models also showed that, during an attack, the α-stable parameters
α, β, γ, and µ change significantly and usually assume values that are significantly different
than those of benign traffic. These trends imply that combinations of parameter shifts could
be harnessed to develop a changepoint parametric anomaly detection system that advances
the state of the practice.
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6.1.3 Lévy Decomposition
In this research, we extended the scope of prior work in one other area besides α-stable traffic
modeling. In this dissertation research, we considered an algorithmic implementation and
practically demonstrated the Lévy decomposition of a PaS sample comprised of real data.
The investigation of Lévy decomposition also included novel exploration of optimization
techniques to reduce the computational cost and improve the accuracy of Lévy decomposi-
tion.
6.2 Recommendations
We remark that the majority of the results reported in this dissertation can be applied to
any appropriately-distributed (i.e., α-stable ) time series. Given the variety of areas in
which the α-stablemodel has been successfully applied, the results of this research have
the potential to affect many other fields of work, such as signal detection in wireless
communications [18], [24] and rolling element fault monitoring in heavy machinery [77],
given appropriate caveats.
6.2.1 Methodology Limitations and Mitigation
The proposed system must be considered in the context of its intended purpose: real-time,
non-Gaussian detection of volumetric anomalies. The examined system detects traffic
anomalies based only on changes in the volume or dispersion of one underlying feature,
packets per sub-window.
Volumetric Detection and Data Aggregation
In its current implementation, the proposed system’s effectiveness is limited, at best, against
attacks that are designed to evade volumetric sensors, such as asymmetric workload attacks
or expert attacks that rely on known weaknesses of the defended systems [78]. In principle,
the methods of this research can be applied to detect other types of attacks using alternative
features that respond to these types of attacks, such as bi-directional traffic volumes and
response times. Alternative features, if properly selected, may even respond only to certain
types of attacks, providing a combined classification and detection solution.
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Related to this volume constraint, this implementation assumes an endpoint, aggregated view
of traffic (i.e., that all packets destined for a target are visible to the system). Distributed
attacks on a multi-homed target, or attacks contained in traffic collected from a monitoring
point upstream of the defended target, are unlikely to be detected by this system. In the event
of distributed or stealthy attacks, pre-detection data aggregation from distributed sensors
may enable effective, alternative detection implementations that are still aligned with the
principles of this research.
Conversely, disaggregation of data through methods such as hierarchical heavy hitters
(HHH) could enable detecting small-relative-volume attacks that are normally not identifi-
able in aggregated traffic using the methods in this work [79]. Similar to HHH methods,
disaggregation can also potentially be used in conjunction with algorithm optimization to
scale the proposed system to full backbone speeds (i.e., terabits per second), as required [79].
“Optimal” Detection and Overfitting
In terms of the examined attacks, alternative detection approaches, such as entropy of ports
and IP addresses, or signature-type detectors, may obtain better results against the specific
attacks contained in the examinedMAWI traces. The strength of the proposed methodology
in its perceived implementation is that it may serve as a more accurate alerting first layer in
a multi-layer (i.e., multi-detector) intrusion detection system. More generally, a statistical
methodology has the further advantage of being un-reliant on a signature; i.e., the proposed
statistical system can detect previously-unseen attacks with a volumetric component.
This statistical methodology may be extended to other detection approaches based on
the expectation that many other features of network traffic can be modeled using α-
stable distributions based on the heavy-tailed nature of the controlling process (e.g., TCP
retransmission [2]); thus, the test statistics and general methodology of this research could
be easily adapted to create additional detection layers (i.e., for attack classification) that
more accurately respond to changes in heavy-tailed features.
As more features are added to a detection system, model overfitting and assessing the
independence of these features become significant concerns [60]. We assess that the pro-
posed single-attribute detection system is unlikely overfitted; the consistent results across
both datasets (both in terms of absolute as well as relative performance) despite different
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volumes and types of attacks reinforce, but admittedly do not prove, this assertion. Over-
fitting remains a valid concern, as proposed extensions of this research include developing
multi-attribute ensemble detection systems such as those proposed in Section 6.2.2.
Overfitting is a also potential issue with the modeling methodology in this dissertation.
Given the background literature of α-stablemodeling discussed in Chapter 1 ( [10], [12],
[16], [17], [21], [22]) as well as the results in Chapter 3, it is our conclusion that the
Gaussian model underfits network traffic data by failing to account for the heavy tails and,
frequently, skew. As such, the α-stablemodel is more appropriate than the Gaussian but
still may possess the drawback of overfitting the data.
In sum, we acknowledge the potential for the 4-parameter α-stablemodel to overfit network
traffic data while deferring detailed overfit analysis to future work for the reasons discussed
above. Evaluation of overfit goes hand-in-hand with the extension of the proof-of-concept
system in this dissertation to additional datasets, attacks, and detection systems and is one
of several items of future work.
6.2.2 Future Work
Two areas of this investigation were not as productive as we had hoped. First, we were
unable to develop a PaS approximation method for the α ∈ (0.5, 1.0) case during the
allotted investigation time. The α-stable parameterization issues (see Chapter 2), combined
with complex-valued results induced by decomposing negative-valued mixing functions,
prevented easy extension of the methods from the α ∈ (0, 0.5) case.
The second under-productive research area was that of adapting ZOP to network anomaly
detection. ZOP produced perfect detection results in the low volume scenario but only at a
higher P f a than alternative SAEs. The limited time available for this research precluded full
investigation into the causes and potential solutions. Given the importance of Gaussian-
derived power in numerous real-world applications, a more detailed investigation of the
issues surrounding our ZOP results seems to be warranted. Also, ZOP’s lack of direct
correlation to ZOL and |ZOD| performance suggest potential for application of this statistic
in an ensemble system.
There are several other lines of investigation that were not fully explored during this re-
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search project due to time constraints; these topics have also been incorporated into our
recommendations for future work.
PaS Decomposition
In our examined datasets, samples with α ∈ (0.5, 1) were more typical than ∈ (0, 0.5).
Also, very heavy-tailed datasets are common in the field of natural processes, and the
performance of Gaussian methods increasingly declines as α → 0 [43]. Development and
evaluation of a PaS decomposition algorithm for α ∈ (0.5, 1), as well as an examination of
the accuracy impacts of extending this methodology to approximating α-stable distributions
with characteristic exponent α > 1, could have broad applicability both in and out of the
networking field. Part of this investigation could include approximation optimization and
quantification of the maximum achievable accuracy of this methodology. Ultimately, this
closed-form approach could enable fast, accurate probabilistic applications such as detection
in Lévy environments and Bayesian analysis.
Non-Parametric α-stable Estimation
A detailed functional exploration of the characteristics and performance of the various
SAEs examined in this dissertation would enable determination and application of the
“best” SAE for a given scenario or dataset. It bears repeating the problem and methods of
α-stable detection apply to numerous fields besides networking, particularly when real-time
implementations are supported.
Future modeling and estimation applications could be supported by, first, a full performance
and accuracy exploration of the LLE and alternatives, particularly for data characterized
by small α. It is important to fully quantify the performance differences between SAEs,
as well as the relative impacts of differencing. This investigation would be aided by full
dissection of the FP and FN cases from the MAWI 20160428 and 20151114 datasets,
an investigation that was not completed during the course of this research due to time
constraints. Resolving these FPs and FNs would be the first part of a full performance
exploration of, and optimization of, SAE test statistics, including ZOP, using additional
DoS and non-DoS attacks and datasets.
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Improved α-stableNetwork Anomaly Detection Methods
The performance demonstrated by the implementation in Chapter 5 remains inadequate
in terms of the ever-increasing volumes of network traffic and threats. A multi-layer
detection system using SAEs may improve overall system accuracy or at least improve P f a
at the current Pd . Parametric α-stable detection may provide another method of improving
performance. Additional examination of the changes in α, β, and γ using a broader range of
scenarios and datasets may identify methods to distinguish between traffic scenarios (e.g.,
transition, benign, and attack). It would ultimately be interesting to compare the maximum
achievable performance of the parametric and non-parametric implementations in terms of
speed, P f a, and Pd .
Implementation and assessment of an automatically-adaptive α-stable detection system is
another interesting topic that could improve α-stable detection performance. Empirical
analysis over the course of this project (even if not discussed in this dissertation) showed that
adaptive windows, sub-windows, and memory have the potential to affect system accuracy.
Quantification of the available gains, and application of these methods to additional datasets
and types of attacks, is a relatively narrow research topic that should yield novel methods
and further accuracy gains.
One final topic that has the potential to contribute to network anomaly detection theory
and accuracy is an investigation of the independence (i.e., orthogonality) of different α-
stable indications of the same network anomaly. Feature independence does not seem to
have been treated rigorously in the literature [80]–[82], yet it has significant implications
for all ensemble approaches.
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APPENDIX: Modular Detection System and Code for
Lévy Mixture Approximation and Proof-of-Concept
Detection System
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Modular Detection System and Supporting Code
In this appendix, we provide details supporting the detection system, such as a more
detailed detection system diagram and the code used to support the end-to-end detection
system proof-of-concept. This code is divided by function. The implementation for
α-stable estimation discussed in Chapter 4 is in Section A.2. Finally, the Monte Carlo
probabilistic analysis code used to obtain the detection results in Chapter 5 is contained in
Section A.3.
A.1 Modular Detection System
The modular detection system in Figure A.1 is a more detailed version of the detection
system shown in Figure 5.1. This modular system is intended to serve as an implementation
framework for adaptive features and additional layers discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6,
































Figure A.1. Modular network anomaly detection system model developed in
this research. Source: [20].
A.2 MATLAB Code for LMA
The LMA algorithm code is contained in this subsection. It is only valid for α ∈ (0, 0.5), as
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
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%% Th i s s c r i p t decomposes a f i l e w i t h da ta d i s t r i b u t e d a t
a lpha < 0 . 5 and d e v e l o p s a P o s i t i v e alpha− s t a b l e
d e compo s i t i o n u s i ng we igh t ed sums o f Levy d i s t r i b u t i o n s
per [ Kuruoglu 2003]
c l e a r ;
% De f i n e new v a r i a b l e N , = number o f samp l ing p o i n t s
N = 10 ;
%% Our samp l ing i n t e r v a l w i l l be from 0 t o 10
%y_ i = l i n s p a c e ( min ( a x x i s ) ,max ( a x x i s ) ,N) ; [27 Mar]
r i g h t _ I = 3 ; % As s i g n s end o f i n t e r v a l
l e f t _ I = 0 . 1 ; % As s i g n s s t a r t o f samp l ing i n t e r v a l
NumPoints = 500 ; % Number o f p o i n t s on a x x i s where we
c a l c u l a t e PDFs
l a s t P o i n t = 20 ; % Las t Po i n t o f a x x i s t h a t we are f i t t i n g
%% Genera te fY ( y ) S t a b l e PDF f o r un i f o rm samp l ing
% Also g en e r a t e fX ( x ) f o r comparison , as we l l as fZ ( z ) .
R equ i r e s :
%
% ∗ Parameter t a b l e
%% De f i n e D i s t r i b u t i o n s and RVs
% Fixed Params %
% Se t Parame ter s f o r S t a b l e RVs X ( Levy ) , Y ( PaS ) , Z ( PaS )
% a = alpha , b = beta , d = d i s p e r s i o n , s = s h i f t
% Loca t i o n i s c a l c u l a t e d / a d j u s t e d f o r k = 1 p a r am e t e r i z a t i o n
per
% Nolan [2002]
% a , b , g , mu
ParamTable = [ 0 . 5 , 1 , 1 , 0 ; % RV X g i v en as Levy
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0 , 1 , 1 , 0 ; % RV Y , PaS , aY from aZ
0 . 3 5 , 1 , 1 , 0 ] ; % RV Z , PaS , aZ s e t t o 0 . 4
ParamTable2 = [ 0 . 5 , 1 , 1 , 0 ; % RV X g i v en as Levy
0 , 1 , 1 , 0 ; % RV Y , PaS , aY from aZ
0 . 3 5 , 1 , 1 , 0 ] ; % RV Z , PaS , aZ s e t t o 0 . 4
%%
% ∗ Updated d i s p e r s i o n s per [ Kuruoglu , 2003]
% ∗ Cor r e c t ed d i s p l a c eme n t s t o c o n v e r t from k=0 t o k=1
p a r am e t e r i z a t i o n per
% Nolan
%% Compute c o r r e c t i o n s and d e r i v e d c o n s t a n t s
% aY = aZ / aX per [ Kuruoglu , 2003] , o r i g i n a l l y [ Hardin ,
1984]
ParamTable ( 2 , 1 ) = ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) / ParamTable ( 1 , 1 ) ;
ParamTable2 ( 2 , 1 ) = ParamTable2 ( 3 , 1 ) / ParamTable2 ( 1 , 1 ) ;
% dY g i v en by [ Kuruoglu , 2003] ( 4 ) i f aZ < 0 . 5 or ( 1 1 ) i f
0 . 5 < aZ < 1
i f ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) < 0 . 5
dY = ( ParamTable ( 3 , 3 ) ∗ cos ( ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) ∗pi ) ) / ( ( 2 ^
ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) ) ∗ cos ( ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) ∗pi / 2 ) )
e l s e i f ParamTable ( 3 , 1 ) < 1 . 0
e r r o r d l g ( ’We␣have ␣ no t ␣ y e t ␣ i n t r o d u c e d ␣ f u n c t i o n a l i t y ␣
f o r ␣1␣<␣ a l ph a (Y) ␣<␣ 2 . ’ ) ;
e l s e
e r r o r d l g ( ’ I n v a l i d ␣ a l ph a (Z ) ’ ) ;
end
% Update ParamTable f o r c a l c u l a t e d dY
ParamTable ( 2 , 3 ) = dY ;
ParamTable2 ( 2 , 3 ) = dY ;
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% Now s h i f t D i s t r i b u t i o n s from k=0 −> k=1 by a d j u s t i n g
Loca t i o n f o r a l l RVs i n ParamTable
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( ParamTable , 1 )
ParamTable ( i , 4 ) =ParamTable ( i , 4 ) + ParamTable ( i , 2 ) ∗
ParamTable ( i , 3 ) ∗ tan ( ParamTable ( i , 1 ) ∗pi / 2 ) ;
end
%% Now t h a t we ’ ve pa r ame t e r i z e d t h e S t a b l e D i s t r i b u t i o n s




% Crea t e d i s t r i b u t i o n t a b l e
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( ParamTable , 1 )
D i s t T a b l e ( i , : ) = maked i s t ( ’ S t a b l e ’ , ’ a l p h a ’ , ParamTable ( i
, 1 ) , ’ b e t a ’ , ParamTable ( i , 2 ) , ’gam ’ , ParamTable ( i , 3 ) , ’
d e l t a ’ , ParamTable ( i , 4 ) ) ;
end
for i = 1 : s i z e ( ParamTable , 1 )
D i s tT ab l e 2 ( i , : ) = maked i s t ( ’ S t a b l e ’ , ’ a l p h a ’ , ParamTable2 ( i
, 1 ) , ’ b e t a ’ , ParamTable2 ( i , 2 ) , ’gam ’ , ParamTable2 ( i , 3 ) , ’
d e l t a ’ , ParamTable2 ( i , 4 ) ) ;
end
% Se t d i s t r i b u t i o n s i z e
a x x i s = l i n s p a c e ( 0 , l a s t P o i n t , NumPoints ) ;
a x x i s 2 = l i n s p a c e ( −2 ,8 , NumPoints ) ;
% . . . and f i n a l l y , make PDFs
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( ParamTable , 1 )
PDTable ( i , : ) = pdf ( D i s t T a b l e ( i , : ) , a x x i s ( 1 , : ) ) ;
end
for i = 1 : s i z e ( ParamTable , 1 )
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PDTable2 ( i , : ) = pdf ( D i s tT ab l e 2 ( i , : ) , a x x i s 2 ( 1 , : ) ) ;
end
%% And now , l e t ’ s p l o t them .
f i g u r e
hold on
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 1 , : ) , ’ k ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 2 , : ) , ’m−− ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 3 , : ) , ’ r − . ’ ) ;
%p l o t ( samp l ePo in t s , v_ i , ’ bx ’ ) ;
ax i s ( [ 0 , 6 , 0 , 1 . 2 ] )
t i t l e ( { ’Mixing␣ Fun c t i o n s ␣ f o r ␣ Fig . ␣2␣ [ Kuruoglu , ␣ 2003] ’ , ’ (
d i s t r i b u t i o n s ␣ s h i f t e d ␣ f o r ␣k=1) ’ } )
l gd . Fon tS i z e = 11 ;
l egend ( ’X: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 5 ’ , ’Y: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 8 ’ , ’Z : ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 4 ’
, ’ Loc a t i o n ’ , ’ n o r t h e a s t ’ )
hold o f f
%% Plo t t h e u n s h i f t e d components f o r compar i son
f i g u r e
hold on
p l o t ( axx i s2 , PDTable2 ( 1 , : ) , ’ k ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s2 , PDTable2 ( 2 , : ) , ’m−− ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s2 , PDTable2 ( 3 , : ) , ’ r − . ’ ) ;
%p l o t ( samp l ePo in t s , v_ i , ’ bx ’ ) ;
ax i s ( [ − 2 , 6 , 0 , 1 . 2 ] )
t i t l e ( { ’Mixing␣ Fun c t i o n s ␣ f o r ␣ Fig . ␣2␣ [ Kuruoglu , ␣ 2003] ’ , ’ ( k=0␣
( Un s h i f t e d ) ␣ P a r am e t e r i z a t i o n ) ’ } )
l gd . Fon tS i z e = 11 ;
l egend ( ’X: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 5 ’ , ’Y: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 8 ’ , ’Z : ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 4 ’
, ’ Loc a t i o n ’ , ’ n o r t h e a s t ’ )
hold o f f
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%%
% No t i c e t h a t t h e r e i s some th ing " unusua l " go ing on here . . .
because t h e s h i f t
% c o r r e c t i o n f o r d i f f e r e n t p a r am e t e r i z a t i o n s i s $ \ ( \ b e t a \
gamma \ t an \ Big ( \ f r a c { \ a lpha \ p i } { 2 } \ Big )
% \ ) $ . . . t h e v a r i o u s S t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s don ’ t s h i f t by
equa l amounts .
%
%
%% Let ’ s g e t t h e Mix ing I n g r e d i e n t s ! !
% F i r s t , we must sample fY ( y ) u n i f o rm l y t o o b t a i n our
components .
%
% ∗ Note 1 : Because o f t h e c a l c u l a t e d s h i f t fY ( y ) < 0 . 6 i s
zero , some mix ing
% components may c r e a t e z e r o / i n f i n i t e v a l u e s and w i l l have
t o be d i s c a r d e d t o
% make t h e code work .
% ∗ Note 2 : Because [ Kuruoglu , 2003 ] d e f i n e s S t a b l e
d i s t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e k=1
% Pa r ame t e r i z a t i o n per [ Nolan , 2002] , we w i l l pe r fo rm our
c a l c u l a t i o n s based on
% th e s h i f t e d S t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e ma t r i x
v a r i a b l e s _ParamTable
% _and_ PDTable_ ( i n t h e code ) .
% ∗ Note 2a : [27 Mar] To a t t emp t t o improve t h e f i t ,
a l t e r i n g code t o a d j u s t
% # o f Components ( _N_ ) and t h e samp l ing i n t e r v a l ( now
c a l l e d _I_ ) . [K03 , K98 ,
% and B06 ] make no r e f e r e n c e as t o how t o d e t e rm i n e t h e
samp l ing i n t e r v a l , j u s t
% t h a t fY ( y ) s hou l d be sampled u n i f o rm l y .
%
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% We w i l l s t a r t by d e f i n i n g t h e Number o f Mix tu r e Components
( _N ) _ and t h en
% s e t t i n g un i f o rm sample p o i n t s . For now , we w i l l d e f i n e
t h e un i f o rm samp l ing
% i n t e r v a l t o be t h e same as our i n i t i a l a x i s v a l u e s [0 , 10 ]
s i n c e v a l u e s > 6 are
% l a r g e l y t r i v i a l . These samp l ing p o i n t s are a c t u a l l y our
y _ i v a l u e s t h a t have
% a r o l e i n g e n e r a t i n g our mix ing c o n s t a n t s .
%%
% De f i n e new v a r i a b l e N , = number o f samp l ing p o i n t s
%N = 40; % Ass ignmen t moved t o t op
%% Our samp l ing i n t e r v a l w i l l be from 0 t o 10
%y_ i = l i n s p a c e ( min ( a x x i s ) ,max ( a x x i s ) ,N) ; [27 Mar]
%r i g h t _ I = 20; % As s i g n s end o f i n t e r v a l ; ASSIGNMENT MOVED
TO TOP
%l e f t _ I = 0; % As s i g n s s t a r t o f samp l ing i n t e r v a l ;
ASSIGNMENT MOVED TO TOP
% Accord i ng l y , t h e samp l ing i n t e r v a l i s now be tween t h e
l e f t and r i g h t e y e s
y_ i = l i n s p a c e ( l e f t _ I , r i g h t _ I ,N) ;
%%
% Now we need t o a c t u a l l y sample our S t a b l e fY ( y )
d i s t r i b u t i o n t o g e n e r a t e
% fY ( y _ i ) v a l u e s f o r i = 1 t o N
% Sample mix ing d i s t r i b u t i o n = fY ( y ) a t y _ i un i f o rm l y −
d i s t r i b u t e d p o i n t s
% Compute y _ i v a l u e s by samp l ing Y a t c a l c u l a t e d un i f o rm
p o i n t s
fY_y_i = pdf ( D i s t T a b l e ( 2 , : ) , y_ i ) ;
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%% Plo t t h e o r i g i n a l components and t h e sample p o i n t s
f i g u r e
hold on
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 1 , : ) , ’ k ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 2 , : ) , ’m−− ’ ) ;
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 3 , : ) , ’ r − . ’ ) ;
p l o t ( y_i , fY_y_i , ’ b∗ ’ ) ;
%p l o t ( samp l ePo in t s , v_ i , ’ bx ’ ) ;
ax i s ( [ 0 , 6 , 0 , 1 . 2 ] )
t i t l e ( { ’Mixing␣ Fun c t i o n s ␣ f o r ␣ P o s i t i v e ␣ a lpha −S t a b l e ␣
Approx ima t ion ’ , ’ ( d i s t r i b u t i o n s ␣ s h i f t e d ␣ f o r ␣k=1) ’ } )
l gd . Fon tS i z e = 11 ;
l egend ( ’X: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 5 ’ , ’Y: ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 8 ’ , ’Z : ␣ \ a l p h a ␣=␣ 0 . 4 ’
, ’Mixing␣Sample␣ P o i n t s ’ , ’ Lo c a t i o n ’ , ’ n o r t h e a s t ’ )
hold o f f
%%
% We now have y _ i v a l u e s and t h e i r c o r r e s pond i ng f Y _ y _ i
v a l u e s . We need
% to map t h e s e v a l u e s t o t h e i r c o r r e s pond i ng v _ i and fV_v_ i
v a l u e s by app l y i n g
% t h e t r a n s f o rm a t i o n s i n [ Kuruoglu , 2003 ] g i v e n by Eq . ( 6 ) and
V = Y ^ 2 .
% F i r s t , v _ i :
% Now t r a n s f o rm y_ i t o v _ i from [ Kuruoglu , 2003]
r e l a t i o n s h i p V = Y^2
v_ i = y_ i . ^ ( 2 ) ;
%%
% And now , fV ( v _ i ) :
% Ca l c u l a t e fV ( v _ i ) from [K03 ] Equa t i on ( 6 )
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f o r i = 1 :N
fV_v_i ( i ) = fY_y_i ( i ) / ( 2 ∗ sqr t ( v_ i ( i ) ) ) ;
end
K = sum ( fV_v_i ) ;
%%
% Now , I ’ ve made a coup l e o f s h o r t c u t s v i a t h e code :
%
% ∗ Note 3 : r e p l a c e d fY ( s q r t ( v _ i ) ) i n [K03 ] Eq . 6 w i t h fY (
y _ i ) v a l u e s c a l c u l a t e d
% e a r l i e r due t o t h e t r a n s f o rm a t i o n t h a t s q r t ( v _ i ) = y_ i
% ∗ Note 4 : The use o f _N _ d i s c r e t e y _ i or v _ i v a l u e s
c r e a t e s d i s c r e t e sample
% po i n t s , e f f e c t i v e l y , f o r fV ( v _ i ) .
% ∗ Note 5 : I c a l c u l a t e d K by summing t h e fV_ v_ i v a l u e s . K
i s t h e n o rma l i z a t i o n
% f a c t o r , and has been de t e rm in ed by adap t i n g [ Kuruoglu ,
1998] and [ Boubch i r and
% Fad i l i , 2 006 ] .
% ∗ Note 6 : I f K = 1 , t h en t h e No rma l i z a t i o n Cons t an t has no
e f f e c t
%
% Ul t ima t e l y , now , we have our mapping o f y _ i −> v_ i −> fY (
y _ i ) −> fV ( v _ i )
% va l u e s f o r _N_ m i x t u r e components :
%%
%% Fina l l y , t h e Mix ing !
% Let ’ s s t a r t by d e f i n i n g t h e b a s i s f o r what we are mix ing ,
a Levy d i s t r i b u t i o n .
% Th i s i s a c l o s e d form o f t h e S t a b l e ( 0 . 5 , 1 ) d i s t r i b u t i o n fX
( x ) . The whole p o i n t
% o f t h i s work i s t o s i m p l i f y c a l c u l a t i o n s by u s i ng N mix ing
components o f s c a l e d
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% Levy d i s t r i b u t i o n s .
%
% The Levy d i s t r i b u t i o n i s d e f i n e d i n [ Kuruoglu , 2003] i n Eq
. ( 2 ) , where
% d i s p e r s i o n _ ( d ) _ = 1 . In t h e d e f i n i t i o n below , I ’ ve
pa r am t e r i z e d i t t o s u ppo r t
% a r r a y s as we l l as v a r y i n g v a l u e s o f d i s p e r s i o n ( _d_ ) and
mix ing parame t e r s _ ( v ) _ .
%%
Levy_dv = @( x , d , v ) ( ( d / ( 2 ∗ pi ) ) ^ 0 . 5 ) ∗ ( 1 . / ( x . / v ) . ^ 1 . 5 ) .∗ exp (−d
. / ( 2 ∗ x . / v ) ) ;
% Cur r e n t l y we w i l l f i x d = 1
d = 1 ;
%%
% Now we ’ l l c a l c u l a t e t h e fX ( z / v _ i ) v a l u e s f o r _N_ Levy
d i s t r i b u t i o n s u s i n g
% our o r i g i n a l p l o t t i n g a x i s .
% Ca l c u l a t e s c a l e d f x ( z / v ) v a l u e s f o r each row
f o r i = 1 :N
% Update v f o r n e x t s c a l i n g f a c t o r
v = v_ i ( i ) ;
% Ca l c u l a t e new s c a l e d f x ( z / v ) f o r new s c a l i n g f a c t o r
f x_ sca l ed_X ( i , : ) = Levy_dv ( axx i s , d , v ) ;
end
%% ### Note t h a t m u l t i p l e p l o t s used t o v i s u a l i z e t h e
p r og r e s s o f t h e code have been removed .
%% ### Con tac t Chad Bollmann f o r t h e o r i g i n a l code .
% Now t h a t ( removed ) i s p rom i s i ng . . . n o t e t h a t t h e y have been
s h i f t e d by t h e v a r i o u s
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% v_i , bu t no t y e t _we igh t ed_ by t h e co r r e s pond i ng t e rms
from [ Kuruoglu , 2003]
% Eq . 9 , adap ted t o be $ \ f r a c { f_V ( v _ i ) } { v_ i $ . Note t h a t we
p r e v i o u s l y c a l c u l a t e d
% each fV ( ) . . . we now need t o s imp l y d i v i d e each term by i t s
a p p r o p r i a t e v _ i and
% then we igh t t h e Sca l ed Levys by t h e i r c o r r e s pond i ng term .
s c a l e F a c t o r s = zeros ( 1 ,N) ;
f o r i = 1 :N
s c a l e F a c t o r s ( i ) = fV_v_i ( i ) / v_ i ( i ) ;
end
% Th i s c a l c was checked , as were a l l o f t h e above w i t h t h e
e x c e p t i o n o f t h e Raw Levy g en e r a t i o n , which was
p r e v i o u s l y checked .
%%
% Th i s seems promis ing , s i n c e t h e S ca l e Fac t o r s computed
w i t h d i f f e r e n t
% we i gh t s ; a d d i t i o n a l l y , i t p a s s e s t h e gu t check because t h e
h i g h e s t we i gh t i s
% l e f t −skewed , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p o s i t i v e s t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s
.
%%
% Ana l y s i s : These v a l u e s ( p l o t removed ) seem reasonab l e ,
w i t h v a l u e s on t h e l e f t o f t h e
% p l o t hav ing a l a r g e r magni tude than v a l u e s t h a t would be
ob t a i n e d from t h e t a i l
% o f t h e sampled d i s t r i b u t i o n , fY ( y ) .
%% "So , t h e r e we were . . . "
% So now , l e t ’ s pu t some t h i n g s t o g e t h e r and see where we
are . We have t h e
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% raw m i x t u r e components composed o f Levy d i s t r i b u t i o n s f o r
v a r i o u s s c a l i n g s o f
% v_ i ( _ f x _ s ca l e d_X ) _ , t h e we i g h t i n g s c a l a r s ( _ s c a l eFa c t o r s _
) . Why don ’ t we m u l t i p l y
% them t o g e t h e r and see what we g e t ? I n t u i t i v e l y would
e x p e c t :
%
% ∗ Components t o t h e l e f t , such as Component 2 , t o have t h e
h i g h e s t we i gh t
% and p r o v i d e t h e most c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Whereas Components
c ap t u r ed more from t h e
% t a i l t o have lower we i g h t s and ma in l y shape t h e " t a i l " o f
t h e we igh t ed d i s t r i b u t i o n
%%
% F i r s t we have t o e l i m i n a t e any pe sky NaN i n s c a l e F a c t o r s
% Nice r e c u r s i v e loop from S t ephen Cobe l d i c k v i a MathWorks
, t h an k s
s c a l e F a c t o r s ( i snan ( s c a l e F a c t o r s ) ) = 0 ;
s c a l e F a c t o r s ( i s i n f ( s c a l e F a c t o r s ) ) = 0 ;
% Pr e s i z e our o u t p u t ma t r i x f o r speed
sca l edZ_componen t s = zeros (N, s i z e ( axx i s , 2 ) ) ;
% And compute
f o r i = 1 :N
sca l edZ_componen t s ( i , : ) = s c a l e F a c t o r s ( i ) .∗ f x_ sca l ed_X (




%% And , f i n a l l y . . .
% Let ’ s j u s t s t r a i g h t −up sum t h e we igh t ed Levys
% along t h e x p o i n t s g i v e n by _a x x i s _ and see what t h e
r e s u l t i s :
%%
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% Again , g e t r i d o f any pe sky NaN and recompute K
sca l edZ_componen t s ( i snan ( s ca l edZ_componen t s ) ) = 0 ;
fV_v_i ( i s i n f ( fV_v_i ) ) = 0 ;
K = sum ( fV_v_i ) ; % Based on [ Kuruoglu 1998] and [ Boubch i r
and F a d i l i XXXX]
fZ_approx = sum ( s ca l edZ_componen t s ) ;
% Compute t h e no rma l i z e d v a l u e s
fZ_approx_normd = fZ_approx . / ( K) ;
% And p l o t
f i g u r e
hold on
p l o t ( axx i s , fZ_approx )
p l o t ( axx i s , fZ_approx_normd )
p l o t ( axx i s , PDTable ( 3 , : ) , ’ k . ’ )
ax i s ( [ 0 , 8 , 0 , 1 . 0 ] )
%s e t ( gca , ’ YScale ’ , ’ log ’ )
t 1 = s t r c a t ( ’ f o r ␣N␣=␣ ’ , num2str (N) , ’ ␣Components ’ ) ;
%, Sampl ing I n t e r v a l = [ ’ , num2s t r ( l e f t _ I ) , ’ , ’ ) ;
%t 1 = s t r c a t ( t1 , num2s t r ( r i g h t _ I ) , ’ ] , K = ’ , num2s t r (K) ) ;
t i t l e ( { ’Sum␣ of ␣Weighted ␣Levy␣Components ␣ v e r s u s ␣ Re f e r enc e ’ , t 1
} ) ;
l gd . Fon tS i z e = 11 ;
l egend ( ’ Levy␣Sum ’ , ’ Normal ized ␣Sum ’ , ’ Re f e r enc e ␣ fZ ( z ) ~S
( 0 . 3 5 , 1 , 1 , 0 . 6 1 2 8 ) ’ , ’ Loc a t i o n ’ , ’ n o r t h e a s t ’ )
hold o f f
%% Notes on K:
% ( a ) K i s c o r r e c t as coded . The accuracy o f t h e
app rox ima t i on i s t r emendou s l y
% a f f e c t e d by t h e l o c a t i o n o f sample p o i n t s o b t a i n e d from
t h e mix ing
% f u n c t i o n .
% ( b ) Be s t l o c a t i o n s are near t h e peak o f t h e mix ing
f u n c t i o n , t h en
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% app ro x ima t e l y ba lanced and a l t e r n a t i n g on each s i d e
A.3 MATLAB Code for Monte Carlo Implementation
The code in this section takes, as an input, the .txt files from MAWI_Reader, applies
SAEs and test statistics, then generates performance curves from the results. Two types
of performance curves are produced: Curves derived from actual sample data, and curves
from generated data. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach is
contained in Chapter 5.
Benign and attack samples must be stored in different folders, and the folder paths must
be updated in order to use this script. Additionally, for the generated data implementation,
this script was designed to ingest α-stableML fits from an .xlsx file containing all of the
attack or benign sample fits. The fit for each sample should be placed in a different column.
This script assumes that the parameter order is α, β, γ, µ for rows 2–5, respectively, of each
column.
% Th i s i s t h e Monte Car lo code t o ( 1 ) i n g e s t . t x t f i l e s o f
r e a l da ta samples o f ne twork t r a f f i c windows coun t i n g
p k t s per sub−window , ( 2 ) app l y t e s t s t a t i s t i c s , ( 3 )
d e v e l op ROCs t o a s s e s s r e s u l t s ( 4 ) i n g e s t . x l s x f i l e s t o
g e n e r a t e da ta samples and r e p e a t above
% ∗ Note t h a t L must be s e t t o t h e l e n g t h s o f t h e i n g e s t e d
da ta f i l e s
%% 1 . Crea t e r andom i z a t i o n and Monte Car lo c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s
c l e a r ;
% of t r i a l s
N = 50000 ;
% Number o f da ta p o i n t s i n each t r i a l
% ∗∗∗ NOTE THAT THIS PARAMETER MUST BE VARIED BASED ON THE
RECORD LENGTHS IN THE INGESTED DATA FILES ∗∗∗
% The low volume 160428 s c e n a r i o f i l e s have 750 , 1500 , and
1200 e l emen t f i l e s a v a i l a b l e
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L = 750 ;
% S h u f f l e t h e random numbers so t h e y don ’ t r e p e a t
rng ( ’ s h u f f l e ’ )
%% 2 . Real L i f e Data Case
%% A . S e t up da ta a r ray − I n g e s t t h e da ta
% Read da ta from f o l d e r c o n t a i n i n g . t x t f i l e s w i t h pa c k e t
c oun t s . These f i l e s
% were c r e a t e d by Mark Kragh ’ s py thon program .
%
% ∗ S t a r t w i t h Benign F i l e s ( S c r i p t g en e r a t e d by MATLAB)
%%
% Read a l l t h e f i l e s i n t h e s p e c i f i e d f o l d e r :
%%
Fo l d e r = ’D : \MAWILab\20160428 \3 secSegs \ BenignSegs \ 3 s_0 . 5
overlap_4msSubWindow \ ’ ;
o l d F o l d e r = cd ( Fo l d e r ) ;
F i l e s = d i r ( ’ ∗ . t x t ’ ) ;
% End r e s u l t i s a Nx1 s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h e . t x t f i l e names i n
t h e f i r s t
% column . Working d i r e c t o r y i s s t o r e d i n ’ o ldFo lde r ’
% Now we w i l l c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s from a l l o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e
f i l e s i n t h e
% d i r e c t o r y . And de t e rm i n e sub−window s i z e from t h e v a l u e s
i n t h e l e f t
% column
numFi le s = l eng th ( F i l e s ) ;
BenData = zeros (10000 , numFi l e s ) −1; % Crea te a p l a c e h o l d e r
a r ray o f n e g a t i v e numbers . . . max ar ray s i z e i s 10000 ! !
% I n t o our p l a c e h o l d e r a r ray o f l e n g t h 10000 , l e t ’ s i n s e r t
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t h e coun t from
% each CSV f i l e i n our f o l d e r i n t o a r ray " f i l e L e n g t h s "
f i l e L e n g t h s = zero s ( 1 , numFi le s ) ;
f o r k = 1 : numFi le s
x = csvread ( F i l e s ( k ) . name ) ;
f i l e L e n g t h s ( k ) = l eng th ( x ) ; % Measure t h e r e co rd l e n g t h
and r e co rd
BenData ( 1 : f i l e L e n g t h s ( k ) , k ) = x ; % Append new reco rd
i n t o I n p u t Ma t r i x
end
%%
% So now we have a l l o f t h e ben ign r e c o r d s i n "Data " . Let ’ s
t r u n c a t e t h e
% i n p u t s t o t h e minimum l e n g t h t o en su r e un i f o rm reco rd
l e n g t h s .
sm a l l e s t = min ( f i l e L e n g t h s ) ;
BenData=BenData ( 1 : sma l l e s t , : ) ;
% Now check each f i l e t o v e r i f y i t i s t h e same l e n g t h
% r e f S i z e = sum ( Data ( : , 1 ) >=0) ; % Depreca ted code t o coun t
number o f
% e l emen t s != −1 i n ma t r i x column
r e f S i z e = sm a l l e s t ;
d i f F i l e L e n g t h s = 0 ;
f o r i = 1 : numFi l e s
i f s i z e ( BenData ( : , i ) ) ~= r e f S i z e
f p r i n t f ( ’∗∗∗WARNING: ␣THIS␣WARNING␣SHOULD␣NOT␣APPEAR .
␣NOT␣ALL␣INPUT␣FILES␣ARE␣OF␣SAME␣SIZE␣ ! ! ␣ \ n ’ )




%% Now , r e p e a t f o r t h e a t t a c k da ta
Fo l d e r = ’D : \MAWILab\20160428 \3 secSegs \ A t t a ckSeg s \20160428
_At tack_3s_4ms \ ’ ;
o l d F o l d e r = cd ( Fo l d e r ) ;
F i l e s = d i r ( ’ ∗ . t x t ’ ) ;
% End r e s u l t i s a Nx1 s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h e . t x t f i l e names i n
t h e f i r s t
% column . Working d i r e c t o r y i s s t o r e d i n ’ o ldFo lde r ’
% Now we w i l l c r e a t e v a r i a b l e s from a l l o f t h e a p p l i c a b l e
f i l e s i n t h e
% d i r e c t o r y . And de t e rm i n e sub−window s i z e from t h e v a l u e s
i n t h e l e f t
% column
numFi le s = l eng th ( F i l e s ) ;
AtkData = zeros (10000 , numFi l e s ) −1; % Crea te a p l a c e h o l d e r
a r ray o f n e g a t i v e numbers
% I n t o our p l a c e h o l d e r a r ray o f l e n g t h 10000 , l e t ’ s i n s e r t
t h e coun t from
% each CSV f i l e i n our f o l d e r i n t o a r ray " f i l e L e n g t h s "
f i l e L e n g t h s = zeros ( 1 , numFi le s ) ;
f o r k = 1 : numFi le s
x = csvread ( F i l e s ( k ) . name ) ;
f i l e L e n g t h s ( k ) = l eng th ( x ) ; % Measure t h e r e co rd l e n g t h
and r e co rd
AtkData ( 1 : f i l e L e n g t h s ( k ) , k ) = x ; % Append new reco rd




% So now we have a l l o f t h e ben ign r e c o r d s i n "Data " . Let ’ s
t r u n c a t e t h e
% i n p u t s t o t h e minimum l e n g t h t o en su r e un i f o rm reco rd
l e n g t h s .
sm a l l e s t = min ( f i l e L e n g t h s ) ;
AtkData=AtkData ( 1 : sma l l e s t , : ) ;
% Now check each f i l e t o v e r i f y i t i s t h e same l e n g t h
% r e f S i z e = sum ( Data ( : , 1 ) >=0) ; % Depreca ted code t o coun t
number o f
% e l emen t s != −1 i n ma t r i x column
r e f S i z e = sm a l l e s t ;
d i f F i l e L e n g t h s = 0 ;
f o r i = 1 : numFi l e s
i f s i z e ( AtkData ( : , i ) ) ~= r e f S i z e
f p r i n t f ( ’∗∗∗WARNING: ␣THIS␣WARNING␣SHOULD␣NOT␣APPEAR .
␣NOT␣ALL␣INPUT␣FILES␣ARE␣OF␣SAME␣SIZE␣ ! ! ␣ \ n ’ )
d i f F i l e L e n g t h s = 1 ;
end
end
%% 2b . Now we have i n g e s t e d our r ea l − l i f e da ta . Let ’ s pu t
t h a t i n t o t h e r i g h t da ta f o rma t f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e
s c r i p t :
%%
ben ignCase s = s i z e ( BenData , 2 ) ;
a t t a c kC a s e s = s i z e ( AtkData , 2 ) ; % SIZE f o r array , WIDTH f o r
t a b l e
t o t a l C a s e s = ben ignCase s + a t t a c kC a s e s ;
%% 2c . P ick random ben ign p r i o r window
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%%
b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s = r a n d i ( [ 1 ben ignCases −1 ] , 1 ,N) ;
randomWindow = zeros ( 2 ,N) ;
%% 2d . P ick e i t h e r a t t a c k or ben ign window
% Genera te random i n t e g e r v e c t o r s f o r a t t a c k and ben ign
ca s e s .
%
% NOTE THAT THIS IS THE MORE DIFFICULT CASE OF DIFFERENCING
AGAINST ANOTHER
% WINDOW RATHER THAN THE PREVIOUS ( t −1)
f o r i = 1 :N
typeWindow = r a n d i ( 2 ) ;
i f typeWindow == 1 %Benign case
randomWindow (1 , i ) = 0 ;
randomWindow (2 , i ) = b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s ( i ) +1 ; %
choose t h e n e x t ben ign window
e l s e
randomWindow (1 , i ) = 1 ; % a t t a c k case




% Now we have p i c k e d a ben ign p r i o r window a t random , and
t h en randomly
% chosen an a t t a c k or t h e s ub s e qu en t ben ign case as our "
c u r r e n t " window .
%
% ∗ Th i s window cho i c e s are s t o r e d i n t h e 2xN randomWindow
ar ray
% ∗ The ben ign p r i o r case i s s t o r e d i n t h e "
b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s " 1xN ar ray
%% 2e . Popu la t e t h e da ta s e r i e s
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%% Benign
% Ass i gn t h e p a r am e t e r i z a t i o n we are u s i ng f o r STABLE . We
w i l l use t h e param = 0 s e t t i n g ;
param = 0 ;
% Crea te z e r o a r r a y s
cur ren tWindowData = zero s (L ,N) ;
b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a = cur ren tWindowData ;
% Use t h e randomized sou r c e t a b l e s t o p opu l a t e t h e Cur ren t
Window and Benign Pr i o r Window da ta a r r a y s
f o r i = 1 :N
% popu l a t e t h e ben ign p r i o r da ta based on "
b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s " randomized c h o i c e s
b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a ( : , i ) = BenData ( : , b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s ( i )
) ;
% Repea t f o r unknown c u r r e n t window . F i r s t , d e t e rm i n e t h e
da ta sou r c e based on a t k or ben ign case :
i f randomWindow (1 , i ) == 1 % i f a t t a c k case , choose sampel
randomly from a t t a c k ca s e s
cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) = AtkData ( : , r a n d i ( a t t a c kC a s e s ) ) ;
e l s e % ben ign case , choose a p p r o p r i a t e params from ben ign
ca s e s
cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) = BenData ( : , b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s




% Now we ’ ve g en e r a t e d our sma l l e s t xN ar ray o f Benign Pr i o r
pa rame t e r s and
% a sma l l e s t xN ar ray o f c u r r e n t Window Params




c u r r e n t D i f f = zero s (1+L ,N) ; % ex t r a space t o copy ben ign or
a t t a c k case
%%
% D i f f e r e n c e t h e Cur ren t Window
f o r i = 1 :N
c u r r e n t D i f f ( 2 : L+1 , i ) = s o r t ( cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) )− s o r t
( b e n i g nP r i o rDa t a ( : , i ) ) ;
c u r r e n t D i f f ( 1 , i ) = randomWindow (1 , i ) ; % copy Benign ==
0 , A t t a c k == 1 d e s i g n a t o
end
%% 2g . Trans form and save i n t o Array
% Genera te o u t p u t a r ray . S t a r t w i t h t h e Benign Case ( no t e :
t h e a t t a c k and ben ign
% ca s e s were s e p a r a t e d f o r t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g ; no t r equ i r ed ,
j u s t t h e way i t ended
% up ) .
da t aOu t pu t = zero s (12+2∗L,2∗N) ;
s1 = ones (L , 1 ) ; % a ones ma t r i x f o r we i g h t i n g f u n c t i o n s f o r
t h e myr iad
%% ∗∗ Begin Tuning Parame ter s ∗∗
kappa_myr iad = 10 ;
kappa_ l evy = 0 . 0 2 ;
kappa_ l evy2 = 1 ;
kappa_ l evy3 = 4 ;
%% ∗∗ End Tuning Params ∗∗
% Apply t e s t s t a t i s t i c s t o da ta .
f o r i = 1 :N % ben ign and mas t e r i n d e x
da t aOu t pu t ( 1 , i ) = c u r r e n t D i f f ( 1 , i ) ; % Mark as a t t a c k or
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ben ign Case
% F i r s t , t h e Sample Myriad , a f u n c t i o n c a l l t o STABLE
by Jona than Nolan
da t aOu t pu t ( 2 , i ) = m y r i a d f i l t e r ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) , s1 ,
kappa_myr iad ) ;
d a t aOu t pu t ( 3 , i ) = LevyLoc ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) , k appa_ l evy ) ;
%LLE
da t aOu t pu t ( 4 , i ) = ZOLest ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ; %ZOLs
% Must two− s t e p t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n t o a l l ow removal o f − I n f
v a l u e s from l n ( pa c k e t coun t ) i f f packe tCoun t == 0
t = l og ( abs ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ) ;
d a t aOu t pu t ( 6 , i ) = exp ( sum ( t ( t ~=− In f ) ) ∗1 /L ) ; %ZOP
da t aOu t pu t ( 5 , i ) = d a t aOu t pu t ( 6 , i ) ∗ ( sum ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i )−
da t aOu t pu t ( 4 , i ) ) ) ; %ZOD
da t aOu t pu t ( 7 , i ) = mean ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ; % Mean
da t aOu t pu t ( 8 , i ) = median ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ; % Median
da t aOu t pu t ( 9 , i ) = va r ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ; % Var iance
da t aOu t pu t ( 10 , i ) = −96;
d a t aOu t pu t (11 :10+L , i ) = cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) ;
% % da taOu tpu t (11:10+L , j ) = a t t a c kDa t a ( : , i ) ;
da t aOu t pu t (10+L+1 , i ) = −96;
d a t aOu t pu t (10+L+2:11+L+L , i ) = b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a ( : , i ) ;
% 2 o t h e r LLE f o r d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s o f kappa
da t aOu t pu t (12+L+L , i ) = LevyLoc ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ,
kappa_ l evy2 ) ;
d a t aOu t pu t (13+L+L , i ) = LevyLoc ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ,
kappa_ l evy3 ) ;
% Calc t h e non− d i f f e r e n c e d ZOP f o r compar i son
t = l og ( abs ( cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) ) ) ;
d a t aOu t pu t (14+2∗L , i ) = exp ( sum ( t ( t ~=− In f ) ) ∗1 /L ) ;
% Calc t h e non− d i f f e r e n c e d ZOD f o r compar i son
da t aOu t pu t (15+2∗L , i ) = d a t aOu t pu t (14+2∗L , i ) ∗ ( sum (
cur ren tWindowData ( : , i )−da t aOu t pu t ( 4 , i ) ) ) ;
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% And t h e abs (ZOD) f o r g r i n s
da t aOu t pu t (16+2∗L , i ) = d a t aOu t pu t ( 6 , i ) ∗ ( sum ( abs (
c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i )−da t aOu t pu t ( 4 , i ) ) ) ) ;
% And t h e a l t e r n a t e d i f f e r e n c e d ZOP us i ng t h e PROD
form v i c e SUM
da t aOu t pu t (17+2∗L , i ) = ( prod ( abs ( c u r r e n t D i f f ( : , i ) ) ) ) ^ ( 1 / L
) ;
% The non− d i f f e r e n c e d ZOL f o r compar i son
da t aOu t pu t (18+2∗L , i ) = ZOLest ( cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) ) ;
i f i ==5000
di sp ( ’ 5000␣ T r i a l s ␣Done ’ ) ;
e l s e i f i == 10000
di sp ( ’ 10 ,000 ␣ T r i a l s ␣ done ’ )
e l s e i f i == 15000
di sp ( ’ 15 ,000 ␣ T r i a l s ␣Done ’ )
end
end
%% 2e . Genera te ROCs
%% ### NOTE t h a t many ROCs were removed t o reduce t h e
amount o f p u b l i s h e d code
[ ndZOLx , ndZOLy , T ,AUC_ndZOL] = p e r f c u r v e ( d a t aOu t pu t ( 1 , : ) ,
d a t aOu t pu t (18+2∗L , : ) , 1 ) ;
%% 2 f . Calc Hoe f f d i n g I n e q u a l i t y f o r Th r e sho l d
%%
CFAR = 0 . 1 % Se t t h e p lanned Fa l s e Alarm Rate
t h r e s h o l d s _ r e a l d a t a = zeros ( 1 ,N) ;
f o r i = 1 :N
t h r e s h o l d s _ r e a l d a t a ( i ) = (− l og (CFAR) ∗ ( 0 . 5 ∗ (max (
b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a ( : , i ) )−min ( b e n i g nP r i o rDa t a ( : , i ) ) ) ^2 ) )
^ ( 0 . 5 ) ;
end
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%% 3 . THIS IS THE GENERATED DATA CASE
% ∗ Impor t t h e f i t t e d s t a b l e pa rame t e r s f o r t h e a t t a c k and
ben ign ana l y z ed d a t a s e t s .
% ( Code from MATLAB) .
%%
% NOTE THAT THESE Reads " i m p o r t f i l e B e n and imp o r t F i l e A t k "
were g en e r a t e d f o r o t h e r i n p u t f i l e s . . . so t h e y may no t
app l y t o a l l da ta f i l e r eads . The p o i n t i s t h a t we are
impo r t i n g 4−parame te r STABLE ML f i t s f o r a l l ATTACK or
BENIGN ca s e s from Exce l f i l e s t o c r e a t e our a t t a c k and
ben ign poo l s o f da ta . These f i t s w i l l be used t o
g e n e r a t e da ta samples , which are t h en p ro c e s s e d i n a
manner s i m i l a r t o above .
b e n i g nD i s t r o s = imp o r t f i l e B e n ( ’D : \MAWILab\20160428 \3 secSegs \
BenignSegs \ 3 s_0 . 5 overlap_4msSubWindow \{0} _t_01000_497
.5601941747573 _500 .5601941747573 . t x t . x l s x ’ , ’ Shee t1 ’ , 2 , 5 ) ;
% Have t o use t h i s A t t a c k f i l e because i t has been e d i t e d t o
remove t r a n s i t i o n and non−a t t a c k sample s
a t t a c k D i s t r o s = im p o r t f i l e A t k ( ’D : \ MAWILab\20160428 \3 s ecSegs \
A t t a ckSegs \20160428 _At tack_3s_4ms \ {0} _t_0100_565
.2415143603133 _568 .2415143603133 . t x t . x l s x ’ , ’ Shee t1 ’ , 2 , 5 ) ;
b en ignCase s = wid th ( b e n i g nD i s t r o s ) ;
a t t a c kC a s e s = wid th ( a t t a c k D i s t r o s ) ;
t o t a l C a s e s = ben ignCase s + a t t a c kC a s e s ;
i n p u tC a s e s = zero s ( 5 , t o t a l C a s e s ) ;
%%
i n p u tC a s e s ( 1 : 4 , 1 : ben ignCase s ) = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( b e n i g nD i s t r o s ) ;
i n p u tC a s e s ( 1 : 4 , ben ignCase s +1: t o t a l C a s e s ) = t a b l e 2 a r r a y (
a t t a c k D i s t r o s ) ;
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i n p u tC a s e s ( 5 , ben ignCase s +1: t o t a l C a s e s ) = 1 ;
%% 3a . P ick random ben ign p r i o r window
b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s = r a n d i ( [ 1 ben ignCases −1 ] , 1 ,N) ;
randomWindow = zeros ( 2 ,N) ;
%% 3b . P ick e i t h e r a t t a c k or ben ign window
% Genera te random i n t e g e r v e c t o r s f o r a t t a c k and ben ign
ca s e s .
%
% NOTE THAT THIS IS THE MORE DIFFICULT CASE OF DIFFERENCING
AGAINST ANOTHER
% WINDOW RATHER THAN THE PREVIOUS ( t −1)
f o r i = 1 :N
typeWindow = r a n d i ( 2 ) ;
i f typeWindow == 1 %Benign case
randomWindow (1 , i ) = 0 ;
randomWindow (2 , i ) = b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s ( i ) +1 ; %
choose t h e n e x t ben ign window
e l s e
randomWindow (1 , i ) = 1 ; % a t t a c k case




% Now we have p i c k e d a ben ign p r i o r window a t random , and
t h en randomly
% chosen an a t t a c k or t h e s ub s e qu en t ben ign case as our "
c u r r e n t " window .
%
% ∗ Th i s window cho i c e s are s t o r e d i n t h e 2xN randomWindow
ar ray
% ∗ The ben ign p r i o r case i s s t o r e d i n t h e "
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b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s " 1xN ar ray
%% 3c . Genera te s t a b l e da ta s e r i e s
%% Benign
% Ass i gn t h e p a r am e t e r i z a t i o n we are u s i ng f o r STABLE . We
w i l l use t h e param = 0 s e t t i n g ;
param = 0 ;
% Crea te z e r o a r r a y s
cur ren tWindowData = zero s (L ,N) ;
b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a = cur ren tWindowData ;
% Now drop s t a b l e E s t ima t e s i n Each
t i c
f o r i = 1 :N
% popu l a t e t h e ben ign p r i o r da ta
t h e t a = t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( b e n i g nD i s t r o s ( 1 : 4 ,
b e n i g n P r i o r S e l e c t o r s ( i ) ) ) ;
% Genera te L samples from MLE s t a b l e f i t u s i n g STABLE
v i c e MATLAB
b e n i g nP r i o rD a t a ( : , i ) = round ( s t a b l e r n d (L , t h e t a , param ) ) ;
% Repea t f o r unknown c u r r e n t window . F i r s t , d e t e rm i n e t h e
t h e t a based on a t k or ben ign case :
i f randomWindow (1 , i ) == 1 % i f a t t a c k case , choose from
a t t a c k ca s e s
t h e t a = ( t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( a t t a c k D i s t r o s ( 1 : 4 , randomWindow (2 , i
) ) ) ) ;
e l s e % ben ign case , choose a p p r o p r i a t e params from ben ign
ca s e s
t h e t a = ( t a b l e 2 a r r a y ( b e n i g nD i s t r o s ( 1 : 4 , randomWindow (2 , i
) ) ) ) ;
% Genera te L samples from MLE s t a b l e f i t u s i n g STABLE
v i c e MATLAB
end
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% Then popu l a t e t h e currentWindowData based on a p p r o p r i a t e
t h e t a
cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) = round ( s t a b l e r n d (L , t h e t a , param ) ) ;
end
t ime toGene ra t e_N_S tab l e_RVs = [ toc ,N]
%%
% Now we ’ ve g en e r a t e d a 4xN ar ray o f Benign Pr i o r pa rame t e r s
and a 4xN ar ray
% o f c u r r e n t Window Params
%% 3d . D i f f e r e n c e Data
% Zero Arrays
%%
c u r r e n t D i f f = zero s (1+L ,N) ; % ex t r a space t o copy ben ign or
a t t a c k case
%%
% D i f f e r e n c e t h e Cur ren t Window
f o r i = 1 :N
c u r r e n t D i f f ( 2 : L+1 , i ) = s o r t ( cur ren tWindowData ( : , i ) )− s o r t
( b e n i g nP r i o rDa t a ( : , i ) ) ;
c u r r e n t D i f f ( 1 , i ) = randomWindow (1 , i ) ; % copy Benign ==
0 , A t t a c k == 1 d e s i g n a t o
end
%% 3e . Trans form and save i n t o Array
% Genera te o u t p u t a r ray . S t a r t w i t h t h e Benign Case ( no t e :
t h e a t t a c k and ben ign
% ca s e s were s e p a r a t e d f o r t r o u b l e s h o o t i n g ; no t r equ i r ed ,
j u s t t h e way i t ended
% up ) .
% ### The rema in ing code f o r t h e Genera ted Data case i s
d u p l i c a t i v e o f t h e code f o r t h e Real Data . T r un ca t i n g
f o r space c o n s t r a i n t s ###
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%% #### Ca l l ed Func t i o n s f o r Loca t i o n E s t ima t i o n ####
% #### Note t h a t m y r i a dF i l t e r i s a f u n c t i o n o f STABLE , by
Jona than Nolan
% Take a v e c t o r i n p u t and r e t u r n t h e Levy Loca t i o n
f unc t i on LevyLoc = LevyLoc ( sample , d i s p e r s i o n )
% In p u t s are a v e c t o r SAMPLE and a con s t a n t , DISPERSION
%s i z e = l e n g t h ( sample ) ;
%syms X G D
%f = symfun ( ( ( X−G) ^ ( 1 . 5 ) )∗exp (D^ 2 / ( 2∗ ( X−G) ) ) , [X G D] ) ;
fun = @(G) sum ( l og ( ( ( abs ( sample−G) . ^ ( 1 . 5 ) ) .∗ exp ( ( d i s p e r s i o n
^2 ) . / ( 2 ∗ abs ( sample−G) ) ) ) ) ) ;
G = fminbnd ( fun ,−max ( abs ( sample ) ) ,max ( abs ( sample ) ) ) ;
LevyLoc = G;
%% ZERO ORDER LOCATION Algo r i t hm
% Impor t t h e da ta
f unc t i on z o l = ZOLest ( sample )
% " sample " i s v e c t o r i n p u t ; " z o l " i s one o f t h e mu l t i p l y −
o c c u r r i n g v a l u e s
% in t h e v e c t o r and a l o c a t i o n e s t i m a t e o f t h e v e c t o r , a
r o b u s t e q u i v a l e n t
% o f t h e sample mean
% Th i s f u n c t i o n imp l emen t s t h e Zero Order Loca t i o n e s t i m a t e
o f Gonza le z and Arce (1997 )
% For each mu l t i p l y −o c c u r r i n g va l u e (MOV) i n t h e sample
v e c t o r , f i n d t h e p roduc t o f t h e r e s i d u a l s f o r each non−
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equa l sample
% Th i s i s Equa t i on ( 8 ) i n Gonza le z and Arce ( 1997 ) " Zero−
Order S t a t i s t i c s : A s i g n a l p r o c e s s i n g framework f o r v e r y
im p u l s i v e p r o c e s s e s "
% a . k . a . Zero Order Loca t i o n e s t i m a t e . We d id no t use
Equa t i on ( 1 2 )
% [ p roduc t o f r e s i d u a l s ] because i t h i t i n f t y f o r l a r g e
sample s i z e s
%% I d e n t i f y e l emen t s o c cu r i ng more than once
% Thanks t o S t ephen Cobe l d i c k f o r t h e below l o g i c t o
i d e n t i f y modes i n t h e da ta sample
U = un ique ( sample ) ;
modes = U(1 < h i s t c ( sample , un ique ( sample ) ) ) ;
r e s u l t s = zeros ( 2 , l eng th ( modes ) ) ;
%% Now f o r each mode , c a l c u l a t e t h e r e s i d u a l t o t a l
% For each mu l t i p l y −o c c u r r i n g va l u e (MOV) i n t h e sample
v e c t o r , f i n d t h e sum o f t h e r e s i d u a l s f o r each non−equa l
sample
% Th i s i s Equa t i on ( 8 ) i n Gonza le z and Arce ( 1997 ) " Zero−
Order S t a t i s t i c s : A s i g n a l p r o c e s s i n g framework f o r v e r y
im p u l s i v e p r o c e s s e s "
% a . k . a . Zero Order Loca t i o n e s t i m a t e
f o r j = 1 : l eng th ( modes )
r e s i d = 0 ; % " Zero " t h e r e s i d u a l s c oun t e r .
% Now compare each sample va l u e w i t h MOV. I f t h y are
no t equal , app l y t h e d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e sum v e c t o r
f o r i = 1 : l eng th ( sample )
i f modes ( j ) ~= sample ( i )




% Update t h e r e s u l t s t a b l e w i t h t h e mode va l u e and t h e
p roduc t
r e s u l t s ( 1 , j ) = modes ( j ) ;
r e s u l t s ( 2 , j ) = r e s i d ;
end
%% Now r e t u r n t h e ZOL e s t i m a t e l o c a t i o n = minimum r e s i d u a l
o f p r o du c t s
[Min , Index ] = min ( r e s u l t s ( 2 , : ) ) ;
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